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An Exploration and Analysis of the Evolving Bank Corporate Governance Practices in Egypt: 
A Grounded Theory Approach 
Mohamed Karim Fathy Sorour 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates the phenomenon of corporate governance in the Egyptian banking 
sector (EBS); it aims to understand the nature of corporate governance in this context and 
identify the factors shaping it. Especially that these aspects had been ignored by the 
literature. Through groxmded theory methodology, an empirical study of the nature of 
corporate governance in the EBS is undertaken, it identifies the factors affecting corporate 
governance in the EBS, the interests corporate governance is serving and as such outline 
the model of corporate governance prevailing in the EBS. 
Grounded theory methodology is illustrated by the thesis in the following ways. First, 
through an application of the comparative method in the open coding stage based on semi-
structured interviews conducted with bank directors and executives, government officials, 
auditors and central bank officials, open coding developed categories and identified their 
properties and dimensions. Indeed, the interviews were informed by the survey of banks' 
corporate governance (BCG) practices. Second, through axial coding open categories were 
subsumed into broader categories, and the relationships among these categories were 
established by means of the paradigm model. This has led to building the Bank Action 
Choice Matrix and the Paradigm Model of Evolving BCG in the EBS. Axial coding 
provided the basis of the substantive theory. Third, selective coding based on a second 
round of semi-structured interviews had identified the core category, verified its 
relationships with other sub-categories and eventually presented the substantive theory of 
BCG. 
The substantive theory was further explored in terms of the New Institutional Sociological 
Theory (NIST), leading to more formal substantive theory that consider corporate 
governance a social process affected by non-economic factors such as culture, politics, 
legal framework and human factors. It identified that BCG is in the process of 
institutionaUzation in the EBS. This process is geared toward the regulative pillar of 
institutions and the use of coercive power by the regulator, with banks adopting corporate 
governance seeking legitimacy. It also concluded that BCG is a political process, with 
powerful actors pushing to serve their interests; as such BCG is about power. Finally, it 
explained the heterogeneity of banks' strategic responses to BCG institution, as some banks 
comply while others disguise their non-compliance, affected by internal organizational 
characteristics that hinder compliance and mdice some banks more susceptible to external 
obstacles. 
This thesis extended the use of grounded theory to explore the phenomenon of corporate 
governance in an unexplored context, identified the prevailing BCG model in the EBS and 
explained the substantive theory of BCG in terms of NIST as such offered a non-traditional 
perspective for corporate governance theorizing. It contributes to better understanding of 
NIST by accounting for institutionalization as a pro'cess and explaining the heterogeneity of 
organizational strategic responses. Finally, this thesis is the first attempt to combine 
corporate governance, grounded theory and NIST offering policy-makers useful views for 
BCG reform. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction and Overview of the Thesis 
The nineteenth century saw the foundations laid for modern corporations: this was the 
century of the entrepreneur. The twentieth century was the century of management: the 
phenomenal growth of management theories, management consultants, management gurus 
and management teaching all reflecting a preoccupation with management Now the twenty-
first century promises to be the century of governance - as the focus swings to the legitimacy 
and the effectiveness of the wielding of power over corporate entities world-wide (Tricker, 
2000:2). 
1.1. Introduction 
In the contemporary business environment proper corporate governance structures and 
practices are crucial for maintaining the soundness of any banking sector within 
developing, transitional and developed economies. Obviously, weak corporate 
governance has been a main reason behind many banking crises such as the East-Asian 
and the Russian banking crises (Barth et al, 2007; Nam and Lum, 2006). Similarly, the 
global financial crisis (2007) has indicated that effective corporate governance of 
banking organizations cannot be compromised (Kirkpatrick, 2009; De Larosi6re et al, 
2009). However, this is easier said than done. 
In general, corporate governance research has not paid enough attention to banking 
organizations compared with the attention paid to non-financial institutions (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997). Additionally, having certain peculiar characteristics, banking 
organizations need for effective corporate governance is paramount (Caprio and Levine, 
2002; Levine, 2003; Macay and O'hara, 2003;-Mullineux, 2006; Barth et al, IQ^l). 
hideed, the global financial crisis (2007) has emphasised that corporate governance of 
financial institutions needs more attention (De Larosi^re et al, 2009). In fact, this need 
is much greater in developing countries where economies are bank-based (Das and 
Ghosh, 2004). In Egypt the situation is even more critical because it is a developing 
country that witnessed banks' failures in 1990s due to weak corporate governance 
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leading to a huge amount of non-performing loans (NPL)^ Nonetheless, the issue has 
been totally neglected by the literature. 
At the same time, the mainstream corporate governance theorising is either based on 
shareholding or stakeholding perspectives that have common economic theoretical 
underpiimings (Letza et al, 2008). Unfortunately this traditional approach to corporate 
governance theorising fails to conceive the complex phenomenon of corporate 
governance as a social dynamic phenomenon that varies according to the institutional 
environment where it is embedded (Letza and Sun, 2002; Aguilera and Jackson, 2000; 
Letza et al, 2004; Kirkbride et al, 2005; Mason et al, 2007; Ardalan, 2007; Letza et al, 
2008). It fails to account for the role of non-economic factors (political, cultural and 
human factors) in shaping corporate governance (Ardalan, 2007). Furthermore, 
corporate governance related scandals signify the need to revisit corporate governance 
theorising. Indeed, this is crucial because it affects how bank corporate governance 
systems are designed and maintained. Finally, from the developing countries 
perspective, the situation is more complicated because much of the assumptions 
applicable in market based systems of developed countries such as low degree of 
ownership concentration, limited bank holdings and timely information are not 
realizable (Rwegasira, 2000) thus creating additional barriers in front of utilising the 
traditional shareholding-stakeholding theoretical framework to understand the corporate 
governance phenomenon. 
This thesis aims to discover the nature of the corporate governance phenomenon in the 
EBS. It will attempt to decrease the degree of uncertainty surrounding this phenomenon 
in this particular context. Indeed, the study will attempt to identify and understand the 
particular factors shaping corporate governance within the EBS. This is intended not 
' According to Rottke and Gentgen (2008:6) NPL can be defined in many ways but the most straight 
forward definition is the Basel II accord definition of NPLs "as loans that are past due and unpaid for 
more than 90 days". 
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only to fill the knowledge gap but also to offer a better understanding of the 
phenomenon, which can assist in protectmg the EBS against recurrence of similar 
detrimental bank failures. 
Moreover, this thesis wishes to extend the literature on corporate governance theorizing 
by utilising the NIST as an alternative corporate governance theoretical framework that 
can interpret the corporate governance phenomenon from a more social, interpretative 
and context specific perspective. This trend of corporate governance research began to 
gain momentum during the past few years (Letza and Sun, 2002; Aguilera and Jackson, 
2003; Letza et al, 2004; Kirkbride et al, 2005; Chizema and Buck, 2006; Seal, 2006; 
Ardalan, 2007; Letza et al, 2008; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008; Lee and Yoo, 2008; 
Chizema, 2008; Judge. 2009). Indeed, this is more compatible with the objective of 
understanding the corporate governance phenomenon within the context of the EBS and 
determining factors shaping it. 
Through the application of grounded theory methodology this thesis aims to build a 
substantive theory of BCG within the EBS; a substantive theory that is grovmded and 
faithful to the reality and based on studying the phenomenon of corporate governance in 
its original settings. Indeed, grounded theory is a rigorous approach that "forces the 
researcher to look beyond the superficial, to apply every possible interpretation before 
developing final concepts, and to demonstrate these concepts through explication and 
data supported evidence " (Goulding, 2004: 297). 
Data collection began with a survey of bank corporate governance practices within the 
EBS. This was important to allow access to data and inform question formulation in the 
subsequent semi-structured interviews (A). Following the survey, open coding 
procedures started with data collection using semi-structured interviews (A) with bank 
directors and executives from various banks, governmental officials, CB officials and 
auditors. Semi-structured interviews (A) were the basic data collection method 
employed in this thesis and contribute to open, relational / variational, and discriminate 
sampling. Finally another round of semi-structured interviews (B) were carried-out at 
the stage of selective coding to identify the core category, discover its properties and 
dimensions and verify its relationship with sub-categories. Indeed, this semi-structured 
interview (B) is related to discriminate sampling. 
The thesis has buih a substantive theory of BCG that is the result of coding, 
categorization and analysis of data systematically collected for this study through two 
rounds of semi-structured interviews. It reflects the opinions of bank directors and 
executives, CB officials and auditors. As such, it is grounded on data obtained from a 
substantive area of investigation. The substantive theory exemplifies a system of BCG, 
it captures complexities from real life by accounting for the structure where BCG 
phenomenon is embedded as well as the processes taking place in relation to BCG. It 
shows the interaction and interplay between BCG and the banking environment that 
indeed leads to the evolution of BCG practices in the EBS. 
1.2. An Overview of the Thesis 
The thesis is divided into nine chapters. 
Chapter one outlines the thesis in terms of the research problem, the nature of the 
phenomenon investigated and the research objectives. It briefly highlights the research 
methods and methodology utilised to build the substantive theory of BCG within the 
EBS context. Finally, it provides an overview of the thesis. 
Chapter two provides the literature review which is divided into three parts: part one 
reviews the corporate governance literature; part two reviews corporate governance 
within banking organizations; while part three provides a brief profile of the EBS and 
reviews related corporate governance issues. This chapter highlights how the 
corporate governance issue is a controversial and full of debatable issues. It also 
discusses the traditional perspectives of corporate governance theorizing and related 
4 
criticism grounds. Then, it reviews NIST as an alternative theoretical framework for 
understanding corporate governance and explains the merits of this non-traditional 
perspective. 
In part two of this chapter, the issue of corporate governance in banking organizations 
is reviewed and the special features of banks are identified showing corporate 
governance significance to banking organizations. Also, BCG is reviewed within the 
context of developing countries clarifying the reasons for its greater significance in 
these countries. Finally, part three of this chapter, provides a brief profile of the EBS 
and reviews corporate governance issues of the Egyptian banking sector. Essentially 
this included reviewing the situation of the Egyptian banking showing how weak 
corporate governance contributed to previous bank failures in Egypt; nonetheless, it 
was totally ignored by the literature. 
It must be noted that chapter two recognises a gap in the body of knowledge regarding 
corporate governance research within the EBS and also acknowledges the criticism of 
traditional corporate governance theorizing. Indeed, it offers an alternative theoretical 
framework that promises to provide more fruitful interpretations of the corporate 
governance phenomenon. 
Chapter three identifies the research problem and the degree of uncertainty surrounding 
the phenomenon of corporate governance within the EBS. Then it discusses the 
relevance of the qualitative research design to achieve the research objective of building 
a substantive theory of BCG to discover the nature of corporate governance 
phenomenon within the EBS and identify the factors shaping it, in addition to utilising 
the NIST to further explore the substantive theory. As such filling the knowledge gaps 
identified in the literature review namely: the absence of research addressing corporate 
governance of the EBS; the inability of the traditional corporate governance 
perspectives to offer the necessary understanding of this phenomenon that can help in 
enhancing corporate governance practices within the EBS. 
Then chapter three explains various paradigms of inquiry within qualitative research 
and differentiated between them on the basis of their ontological, epistemological and 
methodological stances. The chapter identifies the paradigmatic stances of the research 
by adopting a combination of interpretive- social constructionist paradigms to underpm 
the methodology of this research discussing the rationale for this selection. Moreover, 
this chapter discusses grounded theory methodology, identifies the type of theory it 
develops, highlights its philosophical origins and identifies the grounded theory 
versions that match the philosophical underpinnings of this thesis. 
This chapter has also presented Glaser, Strauss and Corbin approaches for grounded 
theory procedures. It highlights the core differences between both approaches, and 
presents the rational for selecting Strauss and Corbin approach in this thesis. 
Chapter four explains the research methods utilized in this research, through discussing 
the sampling and research site selection as well as the data collection scheme. Indeed, 
this thesis follows the logic of theoretical sampling, which seeks to obtain data that are 
theoretically relevant, as such it assists the researcher to predict where and how to find 
necessary data to fill gaps and saturate emergent categories (Charmaz, 2006). Here, 
commercial banks were the primary research site for conducting this research, but 
application of theoretical sampling has guided the researcher to other relevant research 
sites. These include the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE), International auditing Firms, the 
Egyptian Stock Market, the Egyptian Banking Institute (EBI) and the Egyptian Institute 
of Directors (EIOD). 
This chapter explains the data collection scheme used in this research. It clarifies how 
the substantive theory generation was grounded on data gathered fi-om three sources. A 
^ Based on shareholding-stakeholding corporate governance theorising 
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survey that evaluated the current corporate governance practices of banks. The objective 
of the survey is to allow access to data, and discovery of important areas that inform 
question formulation in the semi-structured interviews (A). This is followed by semi-
structured interviews (A) with bank directors and executives from various banks, 
governmental officials, CB officials and auditors. Indeed, the semi-structured interviews 
(A) was the basic data collection method employed at the stages of open and axial 
coding. Finally, another round of semi-structured interviews (B) were carried at the 
stage of selective coding to identify the core category, discover its properties and 
dimensions and verify its relationship with sub-categories. 
This chapter presents the results of survey statement analysis. This includes grouping 
the eleven likert scale statements into three groups: stakeholders' interests, board of 
directors corporate governance practices and communication of corporate governance 
issues. Frequency tables and figures were constructed to clearly compare corporate 
governance practices of various banks. This has indeed furthered the understanding of 
the corporate governance within the context the EBS, contributed towards the 
identification of areas that require further mvestigation in semi-structured interviews 
stage. The main conclusions of this chapter highlighted the quality of the current BCG 
practices and informed subsequent data collection using the semi-structured interviews 
(A). 
Chapter five shows a detailed analysis of the semi-structured interviews (A) questions. 
Indeed, the questions were formulated in the light of the survey analysis as well as the 
informal conversations with participants. Following the grounded theory procedures, 
data collection and analysis proceeded simultaneously; leading to the development of 
nine open categories in terms of their properties and dimensions. These open categories 
are the foundation of the substantive theory. These open categories are: corporate 
governance identity, laws and regulations; upgrading supervision, bank 
competitiveness, pressure groups, interests' protection, board effectiveness in corporate 
governance, modifying BCG internal mechanisms and Hawkamat Al-Sharikat culture^. 
These categories are carried forward to the next stage of grounded theory procedures 
that is the axial coding. 
Chapter six demonstrates the process of axial coding within grounded theory 
procedures. The main purpose of axial coding was to reassemble data fractured during 
open coding (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). It demonstrated how the nine open categories 
that emerged during open coding can be further arranged and linked together to form a 
coherent overall system (Howell, 2000). It developed five main categories; here the 
focus was on developing categories on the basis of their relationship not in terms of 
their properties and dimensions. The main categories developed through axial coding 
are: Drivers, obstacles, reform strategies, contextual factors and evolving BCG 
practices. These categories were related together by means of the coding paradigm 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1990b; 1998). An application of the paradigm model indicated that 
the drivers are the causal conditions, evolving BCG practices is the phenomenon; while 
obstacles represent the intervening conditions; reform strategies are the action / 
interactional strategies that occurred with the consequences of enhancing banks' 
legitimacy, improved perceived protection of shareholders', CBE and depositors besides 
bringing further corporate govemance reform. Indeed, the phenomenon represents the 
category and other components of the paradigm model are sub-categories. 
Axial codmg was aided by the means of an action choice matrix and the evolving BCG 
practices model. The former contributed to understanding how banks' act in relation to 
adopting corporate govemance requirements, while the latter provides a visualization of 
the application of the paradigm model and clarifies how the structure and process are 
^ This is the Arabic term for corporate govemance as will be discussed in chapter five 
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integrated in axial coding. The output of this chapter is the foundation of further data 
collection (semi-structured interviews (B)) and analysis within the selective coding. 
Chapter seven presents selective coding that is the final coding procedure of grounded 
theory. It identifies the core category in terms of its properties and dimensions, and 
validates the relationship between the core category and other subcategories. This took 
place through a second round of semi-structured interviews (B) based on the results of 
axial coding. At this stage sampling was directed and deliberate (discriminate 
sampling). As such, interviewees were asked to state their opinion regarding eight 
statements prepared carefully to verify relationships between the core category and 
other subcategories and develop the core category in terms of its properties and 
dimensions. 
This chapter deployed a statement by statement analysis, and developed an overall 
frequency table and a figure to clarify the results of interviews. However, notes taking 
during interviews enriched and supplemented the analysis, especially in what concerns 
developing the core category in terms of its properties and dimensions. This was 
summarized through a BCG reform system model. Linking the core category with other 
subcategories was undertaken by the means of the paradigm model. Finally, this chapter 
presented the substantive theory of BCG that is the result of coding, categorization and 
analysis of data systematically collected for this study through a survey and two rounds 
of semi-structured interviews. It reflects the opinions of bank directors and executives, 
CB officials and external auditors. As such it is grounded on data obtained firom 
substantive area (EBS). 
Chapter eight explores the substantive theory of BCG in the light of NIST. This chapter 
revisits the relevance of NIST to discuss corporate governance phenomenon and 
summarizes the reasons of such relevance. Explaining the substantive theory in terms of 
an existing formal theory such as NIST was not meant to turn the substantive to formal 
theory, but to make it a formal substantive theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). The 
substantive theory was interpreted in terms of the NIST from three perspectives: It 
interprets BCG reform as a social process and shows that banking organizations within 
the EBS can be analyzed from an open system perspective, where their respective BCG 
practices are affected by the wider context or environment (Scott, 2001). The second 
perspective explains that the BCG reform process indicates the institutionalization of 
BCG within the EBS, and indicated that this institutionalization process is a political 
process based on the concept of power. Indeed, powerful actors within this process 
further their interests. The third aspect is that NIST explained the heterogeneity of 
banks' strategic responses to the BCG institution. Some banks choose compliance while 
other chooses disguising of non-compUance. But both types are legitimacy seekers. 
Indeed, the strategic choice is affected by internal organizational characteristics that 
enhance or hinder compliance. Finally, the chapter restates the substantive theory within 
the NIST framework. 
Chapter nine provides an overall summary of the thesis and discusses the contributions 
of this thesis; which include using of grounded theory to explore the phenomenon of 
corporate governance in an unexplored context, and extension of the NIST to explore 
the phenomenon of BCG. The thesis also accounted for institutionalisation as a process 
not only as an output (Dillard et al, 2004) and explains heterogeneity of organizational 
responses. The thesis also contributes to corporate govemance theorizing through 
showing that the shareholding and stakeholding perspectives are not capable of 
exploring the BCG phenomenon especially that it is based on legitimacy seeking rather 
than efficiency and rationality notions. It also advances corporate govemance theorizing 
by utilizing an alternative theoretical framework that is well suited to explore the 
findings of the substantive theory of BCG. Also, this thesis presents the current model 
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of BCG within the EBS. This model is a pluralistic model that aims serving the interests 
of shareholders, regulator and depositors. 
This thesis is the first thesis that triangulate between the corporate governance, 
grounded theory and NIST domains. As such, this is another novelty dimension as this 
thesis addressed an important concept such as corporate governance of banks using the 
grounded theory methodology that yorce the researcher to look beyond the superficial, 
to apply every possible interpretation before developing final concepts, and to 
demonstrate these concepts through explication and data supported evidence" 
(Goulding, 2004: 297). It also revisits corporate governance theoretical underpinnings 
and shows that the resulting substantive theory of BCG can be interpreted by utilizing 
NIST, thus providing a new approach to corporate governance understanding. Through 
this approach corporate governance is context specific. This triangulation is a response 
to calls to seek meaningful evidence that can "inform and improve practice" 
(Smallman, 2007). 
The thesis has also practical contributions of discovering determinates of banks' 
corporate governance identity, the obstacles facing BCG within the EBS and explains 
the BCG reform process as an institutionalization process. Indeed, this can better inform 
further reforms and policy making, through knowing in advance what to address and 
how banks' are expected to respond. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Literature Review 
Part One: Corporate Governance Literature 
2.1 Introduction 
The Literature review is divided into three parts: part one reviews corporate governance 
literature and highlights controversial issues in corporate governance such as corporate 
governance definitions and the shareholding and stakeholding perspectives. 
Additionally, part one assesses the traditional corporate governance theorising in terms 
of capturing the complexities of the corporate governance phenomenon. It also shed the 
lights on NIST as an alternative theoretical framework to study corporate governance 
phenomenon. While part two focuses on discussing the significance of corporate 
governance of banking organizations especially in developing countries, part two also 
discusses the corporate governance model within banking industry. Finally part three 
presents an overall review of the EBS, its development and corporate governance 
related issues. 
2.2 Defining Corporation 
Defining corporation has been an area of debate since the times of Adam Smith (1776) 
and throughout the industrial revolution till the globalisation. Different definitions of the 
corporation are in essence reflecting various perspectives of those defining it (Post et al, 
2002).The metaphor used by Monks and Minow (2004) is quiet helpful to illustrate this 
point: 
Anyone who tries to come up with a definition is like the blind men who tried to 
describe an elephant—one feeling the tail and calling it snake, one feeling the leg 
and calling it a tree, one feeling the side and calling it a wall (P.8). 
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Essentially, defining corporation determines "whom and for what it and its managers 
responsible? " (Post et al, 2002:7). 
Two perspectives are worth mentioning here, a narrow perspective defining corporation 
as "legal fictions which serve as a nexus for a set of contracting relationships among 
individuals" (Jensen and Heckling, 1976:8), which indicates that a corporation is just a 
sum of agreements that are necessary for its existence (Monks and Minow, 2004). From 
a broader perspective a corporation can be defined as "the centre of a network of 
interdependent interests and constituents, each contributing to its performance, and 
each anticipating benefits (or at least no uncompensated harms), as a result of the 
corporation's activities " (Post et al, 2002:7). 
A more balanced pluralistic definition of a corporation is advocated by Monks and 
Minow (2004:9) as follows: 
A corporation is a mechanism established to allow different parties to contribute 
capital, experience, and labor, for the maximum benefits of all of them... the 
investor get the chance to participate in the profits... without taking responsibility 
for the operations. The management gets the chance to run the corporation 
without taking the responsibility of personally providing fiends... the independent 
entity must still relate to a wide variety of "constituents " including its directors, 
managers, employees, shareholders, customers, creditors, suppliers... the 
community and the government...each of these relationships affects the direction 
andfi}cus of the corporation. 
2.3 Defining Governance 
The term governance has been subject to many interpretations, with the literature 
offering numerous ways of defining governance (Peters and Pierre, 1998). However, it 
is important to recognise that "governance is not government" (Young 1999 cited in 
Kahler and Lake, 2003:6). 
Pierre (2000) argues that govemance refers into two meanings; firstly it can refer to 
''empirical manifestation of the state adaptation to its external environment as it 
emerges in the late twentieth century" (P.3). Secondly, govemance can refer to "a 
* Jensen and Meckling (1976) refers to the "artificial constructs under the law which allows certain 
organisations to be treated as individuals " 
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conceptual or theoretical representation of coordination of social systems and for the 
most part, the role of the state in the process" (ibid). The former reflects a policy 
perspective of governance that clarify how various instruments can be employed to 
achieve particular policy objectives, ranging from ''types of more or less heavy-handed 
instruments in order to achieve certain societal outcomes " (Treib et al, 2007:4). Here 
the main problem is how far the institutional and political capacities of the state are 
capable of steering (Pierre, 2000). The latter, refers to a societal perspective of 
govemance, emphasising that governance denotes "systems of rules that shapes the 
action of social order ...governance ...is thus explicitly conceptualized as an institutional 
perspective (Mayntz, 2004, cited in Treib et al, 2007:3). Here the main problem lies in 
"coordination and self-governance" (Pierre, 2000:3). 
Moreover, according to Pierre (2000) and Heritier (2002) govemance entails achieving 
sustainable coordination and coherence among various parties with different objectives 
and purposes including "political actors and institutions, corporate interests, civil 
society, and transnational organizations" (Pierre, 2000:4). Maintaining the 
coordination and coherence between such (possibly) conflicting interests is now seen as 
a "societal problem" that can be resolved by political institutions and in cooperation 
with other parties (ibid). Govemance and related steering of such interests, essentially 
involve both public and private actors^ (Treib et al, 2007). 
Jessop (1995:317) argues that theories of govemance are primarily concemed with a 
wide range of 'social' modes of social coordination rather than with narrowly political 
aspects; he argues that 
social coordination refers to the ways in which disparate but interdependent social 
agencies are coordinated to achieve specific social (economic, political, etc.) 
objectives... one could define the -governance studies as concerned with the 
Here the role of the private sector in shaping public policy cannot be underestimated or neglected, as it 
exists with various degrees of formality, and may be dominant in case that the state has "delegitamted" 
(Peters and Pierre, 1998:225). This is tiie case that can occur due to "State actors are excessively clumsy, 
bureaucratic and path dependent and in part because of the control of information and implementation 
structures by private actors" (ibid: 225). 
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resolution of-political problems ( in the sense of problems of collective goal-
attainment or the realisations of collective purposes) in and through specific 
configurations of governmental (hierarchical) and extra governmental (non-
hierarchical) institutions, organizations and practices. 
Indeed, the abovementioned definitions of corporation and governance as 
separate concepts would indicate that there will be more than one definition of 
corporate governance, depending on whether it is a narrow or a wide perspective 
of defining each concept. However, from a balanced point of view, and building 
on Monks and Minow (2004) and Jessop (1995), one can argue that corporate 
governance is related to how the interests of various constituents within a 
corporation setting are coordinated. 
2.4 Deflning Corporate Governance 
Reviewing the literature reveals numerous ways to define corporate governance, each 
with a particular focus. Thus there is "no single accepted definition of corporate 
governance" (Solomon and Solomon, 2004:12). Indeed, this is unsurprising as several 
definitions exist for the terms: corporation (Monks and Minow, 2004) and governance 
(Treib et al, 2007). However, Cadbury report provides a widely accepted definition for 
corporate governance as ^'the system by which companies are directed and controlled" 
(1992: para. 2.5f. Moreover, Cadbury report considers that the board of directors of a 
company is responsible for the governance of the company and clarifies that the 
shareholders' role in corporate governance is to appoint directors, auditors and satisfy 
themselves that an appropriate governance structure is in place. 
Adopting a narrow finance perspective to define corporate governance looks at the 
corporation as serving solely the interest of its shareholders. Here Parkinson (1994) 
defines corporate governance as the process of supervision and control intended to 
ensure that the company's management acts in conformance with the interest of the 
* It should be noted that this is also the accepted definition when political science researchers defme 
governance in a corporation context such as Rhodes (1996). 
15 
shareholders. While, looking at the corporation from a more wider perspective as 
serving the interests of a wide range of stakeholders and not only the shareholders, 
Tricker (1984) states that the corporate governance "role is not concerned with 
running the business of the company, per se, but with giving an overall direction to the 
enterprise with overseeing and controlling the executive actions of management, and 
with satisfying legitimate expectations of accountability and regulation by interests 
beyond the corporate boundaries" (cited in Solomon and Solomon, 2004:13). Thus a 
basic distinction between whether corporate governance should only serve shareholders' 
interests or extend its role to serve a wider range of stakeholders has emerged. 
The OECD presents a well-balanced definition' which considers the interests of both 
shareholders and other stakeholders (Nwanji and Howell, 2007b). 
The definition states that corporate governance is 
a set of relationships between a company's management, its board, its 
shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides the 
structure through which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of 
attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are determined 
(OECD.2004: 11). 
As the main objective of this study is to discover the nature of corporate governance 
within the EBS, the OECD's definition of corporate governance can provide some 
objective guidance as it is perceived as unbiased to neither the narrow finance 
perspective nor the wide stakeholder perspective. However, it is data collection and 
analysis that will determine the best definition that fits the Egyptian banking context. 
This will be discussed later in the substantive theory chapter eight. 
2.5 Emergence of Corporate Governance as an Issue 
The term corporate governance was scarcely used until the mid 1980s when it emerged 
as the title for a research paper, report and book title (Tricker, 2000: xviii). Its 
' The Organization For Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) issued its principles of 
corporate governance in 1999 with an updated version in 2004. The World Bank's research confirms that 
the OECD principles are incorporated in nearly 98% of countries corporate governance codes and hence 
present a well-balanced widely accepted definition (Nwanji and Howell, 2007b). 
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subsequent spread was very much the result of several corporate scandals that occurred 
during and after this period as a consequence of weak corporate governance. A notable 
example is the Maxwell scandal of 1991 which was named as the greatest fraud of the 
20 century, and had a great influence on making corporate governance an issue for 
public, business and political concerns (Jones, 2005). Improper borrowing strategies 
were linked to the fact that chairman and the chief executive officer (CEO) positions 
were held by the same person. Another example is the Barings Bank collapse of 1995, 
where in addition to the unethical behaviour of the person in charge, there was no 
separation between the chairman and the CEO positions in addition to ineffective 
internal control functions (ibid). More recently, the American Enron scandal of 2001 
was a pre-eminent example of corporate governance failure. It was considered the 
largest business collapse in USA history. Moreover, Enron's auditing firm Arthur 
Anderson was implicated in the scandal and was convicted of obstructing justice, for 
shredding the audit documents of Enron and it too subsequently collapsed (ibid). 
The Enron scandal led to stringent corporate governance reforms in the USA with 
Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act passed in 2002 reforming the corporate governance 
framework and making it more robust in dealing Avith the identified failures. In the UK, 
although some researchers such as Solomon (2007) claim that issuing of Higgs and 
Smith reports on corporate governance in 2003 was a response to the Enron scandal, 
there is no explicit relationship between the two events, as these two reports were the 
latest in a series of reports already issued, starting with Cadbury code (1992), followed 
by Greenbury report (1995), Hampel report (1998), Combined Code (1998) and 
TumbuU report (1999). 
Other corporate collapses linked to corporate governance failures after Enron were the 
American WorldCom scandal of 2002 and the European Parmalat scandal of 2003. 
These incidents not only increased the need for an effective system of corporate 
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governance but also demonstrated that the need for developing and improving corporate 
governance will be an ongoing issue as fraud, power abuse and mismanagement could 
never be totally eliminated (Jones, 2005; Cadbury Report, 1992: Para.1.9). Despite, the 
efforts undertaken by countries around the world to improve their corporate govemance 
systems, the global financial crisis clearly showed that these efforts have not been 
enough to stop further crises from occurring. More importantly, the financial crisis has 
shown that significant efforts need to be directed towards strengthening corporate 
govemance of financial institutions; especially inappropriate risk assessment and 
management, reckless boards and improper remuneration systems that encouraged 
short-termism rather than long term value creation (Kirkpartick, 2009; De Larosi^re et 
al,2009). 
2.6 Reasons for Corporate Governance Reform 
Witherell (2000) indicated that good corporate govemance practices are essential to 
economic well-being of any country. As such an intergovernmental organisation such as 
the OECD, issued a set of corporate govemance principles to assist governments of 
emerging, transitional, and developed economies in building stronger corporate 
govemance systems capable of protecting investors (ibid). 
Here at a macro-economic level, corporate govemance reform is essential to attract 
foreign direct investment, being widely considered as the best safeguard against the sort 
of business failures cited above* is an effective system of corporate govemance (Vinten, 
1998). So if a country lacks a reputation for sfrong corporate govemance practices, 
investors will be reluctant to invest in this country (Levitt, 1999; Judge, 2006). Effective 
corporate govemance is important because it increases investor confidence; this was 
substantiated by a global investors' survey which stated that investors are willing to pay 
Section 2.5 
18 
premium for companies that exhibit high corporate governance standards; this premium 
has reached 39% in the case of Egypt (Mckmsey and Company, 2002). 
At a micro-economic level, corporate governance reform is important in terms of 
minimising conflict of interests that would impede a company from achieving its 
designated objectives such as maximising shareholders wealth (Shivdasani and Zenner, 
2004; Laing and Weir, 1999). Moreover, there is a growing body of knowledge that 
corporate performance can be a function of effective corporate governance (Coyle, 
2005; Gillan, 2006). This can allegedly occur by preventmg lazy and inefficient 
management, by replacing reckless or over ambitious management, and generally 
improving the quality and performance of boards (Mardjono, 2005). However, research 
undertaken in this domain produced inconclusive results^ putting this reason as a 
mediocre reason for corporate governance reform. 
In conclusion, corporate governance reforms have been always a response to corporate 
failures and scandals related to corporate governance malpractices (Kirkpatrick, 2009). 
It is the fear of corporate failures rather than hope of corporate success that drives 
corporate governance reform. To illustrate this we need to look no further than the 
history of corporate governance reform in the UK for instance, the country that very 
much led the way in what has become a world-wide movement towards the corporate 
governance reform. Obviously, the Cadbury report initiated the reform process in 
response to the corporate scandals of this period (Cadbury, 1992: Para.2.2). Similarly, 
recent corporate governance reform in the USA was a post Enron response. Now the 
emphasis on financial institutions' governance is also a response to other corporate 
governance failures (Kirkpatrick, 2009; De Larosiere et al, 2009). 
'For examples of research supporting a positive relationship between corporate governance and 
performance see Rechner and Dalton (1991), Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), Hambrick and Jackson 
(2000), Gompers and Ishii (2003), Klapper and Love (2002) and Bauer et al (2008). For examples of 
research rejecting this relationship see Bhagat and Black (1999,2002), Baliga et al (1996), Dalton et al 
(1996), Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), Dulewicz and Herbert (2004) and Larker and Tuna (2004). 
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2.7 Traditional Corporate Governance Theorising 
Reviewing the literature reveals that several theories have been utilized to underpin 
corporate governance models and practices (Solomon and Solomon, 2004; Solomon, 
2007). Unsurprisingly, different theories led to different diagnoses of corporate 
governance problems and approaches of solving such problems (Letza et al, 2004). 
Moreover, it has not always been clear whether practices follow theory or the opposite 
(Daily et al, 2003). This has led to a difficultly to find a widely accepted and 
comprehensive theory of corporate governance (Young and Thyil, 2008). However, the 
research mainstream indicates that there are two principal theories utilized to explain 
corporate governance: the agency and the stakeholder theories with two models of 
corporate governance based on these theories identified: the shareholding and 
stakeholding models respectively (Freeman and Reed,1983; Maher and 
Andersson,2000; O'Sullivan,2000; Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2001; Gamble and 
Kelly,2001; Friedman and Miles, 2002; Omran et aZ,2002; Letza and Sun,2002; Letza 
et al, 2004, Chilosi and Damiani , 2007; Carillo,2007; Nwanji and Howell, 2007a, 
Nwanji and Howell,2007b; Letza et a/,2008; Keay,2010). 
Each of these two perspectives supposes primacy to the other (Keay, 2010). The 
shareholding perspective considers the purpose of the corporation to maximise the 
shareholders wealth and identifies the corporate governance problem as an agency 
problem arising from separation of ownership and control as with such separation 
comes the conflict of interests between the principal (shareholder) and the agent 
(managers) (Carrillo,2007; Letza et a/,2004;Letza et al, 2008). While the stakeholding 
perspective considers the purpose of the corporation is to serve the interests of 
stakeholders and not shareholders only, as such the corporate governance problem Ues 
in the inconsideration of non-share owning stakeholders' interests and potential conflict 
of interests between stakeholders per se (ibid). As such the adoption of either 
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perspectives of corporate governance (Shareholding v. stakeholding) is to a great extent 
a decision based on particular conception of the company, its purposes and its legal and 
political foundations (Gamble and Kelly,2001). This can be demonstrated by the 
example of the UK where the shareholding perspective is dominant in relation to 
historical debates "around the principal of limited liability and the merits of the joint 
stock company" (ibid: 10) and how the shareholding perspectives is well-suited to serve 
owners of these companies. More recently, and with the change in the business 
environment especially with the transformation of the UK economy from being based 
on small scale individual enterprises to the dominance of large pubUc companies comes 
the debates on the advantages that the stakeholding perspectives can bring about to 
businesses (ibid). 
The following sections will discuss each of the two corporate governance models 
(shareholding v. stakeholding) in terms of explaining their theoretical underpinnings, 
fundamental premises and highlights the main arguments for and against. The main 
objective here is to demonstrate the ongoing debate on corporate governance theorising 
rather than favouring one model to the other. Finally, this section will discuss the extent 
to which such dualistic approach for corporate governance theorising fits the case of 
modem business corporations. Lights are then shed on alternative or non-traditional 
approaches for corporate governance theorising, namely, the NIST framework as an 
alternative that can offer better understanding of the corporate governance phenomenon 
(Seal,2006;Chizema and Buck,2006; Judge et a/,2008; Zattoni and Cuomo,2007; 
Carver,2007;Chizema,2008). 
2.7.1 The Shareholding Model of Corporate Governance 
The shareholding model theoretical underpinnings can be traced back to the agency 
theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This theory is one of the principal theories utilised 
to explain corporate governance, and it underpins the so called simple finance model of 
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corporate governance (Hawley and Williams, 1996; Letza et al, 2004; Letza et al, 
2008). It is the introduction of limited Uability form of business and the increase of 
diffused share ownership in public corporations that led to the separation of ownership 
and control (Gamble and Kelly, 2001), with management responsibilities assigned to 
professional personnel (Solomon and Solomon, 2004; Solomon, 2007). Here, an agency 
relationship exists between the two parties: the owners and the management, this 
relationship has been defined by Jensen and Meckling (1976:308) as 
a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person 
to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision 
making authority to the agent If both parties to the relationship are utility maximizers 
there is a good reason to believe that the agent will not always act in the best interest of 
the principal. 
Therefore in such setting the separation of ownership and control trigger a conflict of 
interests between the principal and the agent. This conflict arises based on the 
assumption that agent will act opportunistically to pvirsue his/her own objectives rather 
than maximising the shareholders wealth deemed as the legitimate objective of the 
corporation (ibid). 
Furthermore, TumbuU (1997) states that a basic conclusion of the agency theory is that 
the value of the firm and hence its shareholders wealth caimot be maximised because of 
this agency problem, especially that managers (agents) have better access to information 
and are responsible for decision making, giving them the chance to further their own 
interests at shareholders' expense. This is likely to occur given the non-existence of a 
well-developed market for corporate control leading to "market failure...moral 
hazards''^, asymmetric information^'... and adverse selection'^"(Bonazzi and Islam, 
2007:7). 
'" Moral hazard occurs as a result of asymmetric information when managers are not motivated to make 
decisions that serves the shareholders interests and the inability of the principal (Shareholder) to monitor 
the agent's actions due to lack of information (Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe,2006; Rauchhaus,2006). 
" Different levels of mformation between the agent and the principal, where the earlier own more 
information than the latter, as such being able to make informed decisions, which can be serving other 
interest and not the shareholders' (Maher and Andersson,2000). 
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Therefore in such setting the separation of ownership and control would trigger a 
conflict of interests between the principal (shareholder) and the agent (management). 
The agency theory suggests that aligning the interests of both the agent and the principle 
requires incurring agency costs; this includes "monitoring costs" to limit the 
opportunistic activities of the agent, in addition to "bonding costs" to assure that the 
agent v^ dll not make decisions that may harm the principal. Additionally, there is the 
cost arising from difference in decision making process between the agent and the 
principal, where different course of action leads to reduction in the principal's welfare. 
Here, alignment of interests can be reached through having effective contractual 
agreements between the principal and the agent(s), which includes incentive contracts 
for instance (Jensen and MeckUng, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989). 
With the separation of ownership and control becoming inevitable with the 
establishment of public companies with a diffused ownership base, where owners 
(shareholders) have limited liability but " bear the residual risk of the enterprise" 
(Gamble and Kelly, 2001:110). The shareholder primacy became a dominant concept 
especially in the Anglo-American corporations (Chilosi and Damiani, 2007). Here the 
assumption is that company directors owe a fiduciary duty to run the company in the 
interest of its shareholders (Gamble and Kelly, 2001). This assumption can be traced to 
the so called Fiction theory^^ 
Advocated by the German Jurisprudent Rudolf Vonjhering (1818-1892) and the 
American Jurisprudent Wesley N. Hohfed (1879-1918). That doctrine asserts that the 
corporations as a legal group is simply created by the state and is no more than a 
private association of shareholders. The new form of corporate property is the 
aggregation of individual property rights under d collective name, united by contract 
and protected by law (Letza et al, 2004:247). 
'^  Adverse selection occurs as a result of information asymmetry when the agent chooses the alternative 
that is not in the best interest of the principal because of ignoring the agents preferences before selection 
takes place i.e. before contracting with the agent (Rauchhaus, 2006). 
" Jensen and Meckling (1976:8) used the term legal fictions when defining a corporation referring to that 
corporation "are legal fictions that serve as a nexus for a set of contracting relationships among 
individuals" 
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Clearly, a central premise in the shareholding perspective is the notion of private 
property. So from the corporate governance point of view, the only interests that 
qualifies for protection by corporate governance mechanisms are those of the owners of 
the corporation (shareholders). Moreover, it should be noted that the agency problem is 
not new, but can be traced back to Adam Smith (1779) who documented it well as 
follows: 
The trade of a Joint stock company is always managed by a court of directors. This 
court, indeed, is frequently subject, in many respects, to the control of a general court of 
proprietors. But the greater part of those proprietors seldom pretend to understand 
anything of the business of the company, and when the spirit of faction happens not to 
prevail among them, give themselves no trouble about it, but receive contentedly such 
half yearly or yearly dividend as the directors think proper to make to them. This total 
exemption from trouble and from risk, beyond a limited sum, encourages many people 
to become adventurers in Joint stock companies, who would, upon no account, hazard 
their fortunes in any private copartnery. Such companies, therefore, commonly draw to 
themselves much greater stocks than any private copartnery can boast of... The directors 
of such companies, however, being the managers rather of other people's money than of 
their own, it cannot well be expected that they should watch over it with the same 
anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over 
their own. Like the stewards of a rich man, they are apt to consider attention to small 
matters as not for their master's honour, and very easily give themselves a dispensation 
from having it. Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, 
in the management of the affairs of such a company (Smith, 1779, Chapter VI: 989-
990). 
Furthermore, and with the rise of the social responsibility doctrine as an emerging 
notion in free markets, requiring businesses to have a social conscience and do not focus 
solely on serving shareholders interests. The shareholding perspective demonstrated 
dominance and the social responsibility was faced with objections and perhaps the most 
widely cited argument against this notion is Friedman's (1970) statement that stressed 
on 
In a free society, there is one and only one social,responsibility of business... to use its 
resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays 
within the rules of the game, which is to say, engage in open and free competition 
without deception of fraud (P.5). 
Equally important, arguments against the shareholding perspective were formulated, for 
instance, Kay (1997) rejects the property rights argument on the grounds that a 
company cannot be considered the property of its shareholder. He argued that 
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ownership entitles many different rights, including possession, use, management, 
income, capital, security, transmission, no limit of ownership term, duty not to do harm 
and residual control. Therefore, if a company really was the property of its shareholders 
then they would enjoy all these rights. However, Kay argues they only fully enjoy the 
no limit of term and residual control rights, and partially enjoy rights to management, 
income and capital rights, but have no enjoyment at all of possession, use, security, 
transmission and duty not to harm rights. Accordingly, Kay claimed no one owns the 
company and called for a stakeholder model of corporate governance where directors 
and managers serve a wide range of interests and not just those of shareholders. 
Additionally, Freeman (1983) argues that the notion of private property is misplaced 
and more attention should be given to corporate stakeholders. 
Moreover, Blair (1995:181) also rejects the argument that shareholders own 
corporations, she claims that shareholders owning equity are entitled to a part in a 
bundle of rights which the owner of property possesses with regard to something- rights 
to possess, use, dispose of, exclude others, manage and control. The corporate concept 
divides this bundle of rights into several pieces. The stockholder gets the right to receive 
some of the fruits of the use of property, a fractional residual right in corporate 
property, and a very limited right of control The rights to possess, use, and control the 
property go to the managers of the corporation. When property rights have been broken 
up into this way, trying to identify one party as the "owner" is neither meaningful nor 
useful 
Another argument to justify the shareholding perspective was made by Jensen (1991), 
who favoured utilitarian groimds for the shareholding perspective, arguing that when 
companies have maximising shareholder value as their long term objective, they make 
maximally efficient contracts with non-shareholders groups that will maximize the 
interests of both those groups and shareholders. 
Thus, he claimed that: 
Value-maximizing decision-making devotes resources to members of each important 
corporate constituency to improve the terms on which they contract with the company, 
to maintain the firm's reputation, and to reduce the threat of restrictive regulation. In 
this sense, there is no conflict between management's service to its stockholders and to 
other corporate stakeholders (Jensen, 1991:21). 
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This was also rejected by, Campbell (1997) who argues that giving the primacy to 
shareholder wealth maximization without considering the interests of other groups 
means that a company does not make optimum use of all its resources with a consequent 
loss of benefits to society. He adds ''I support stakeholder theory not for some left wing 
reason of equity, but because I believe it to be fundamental to understanding how to 
make money in business" (P.446). 
2.7.2 The Stakeholding Model of Corporate Governance 
The word stakeholders can be traced back to 1963, when it was used in "an internal 
memorandum at the Stanford Research Institute" (Freeman and Reed, 1983:89). They 
added that it refers to "those groups without whose support the organisation would 
cease to exist" (ibid:89). The stakeholder theory '^' starts its reasoning based on the 
premises that public companies do have an effect on lives and interests of many parties 
and as such it is inappropriate to be managed for serving the interests of shareholders 
only (Karmel, 1993). 
In the early 1970s the Anglo-American countries began to witness changes in the 
business environment such as the rise of institutional investors. The time when 
concerns began to increase about company's social responsibility and their 
competiveness compared with the German and Japanese companies, where a more 
stakeholding perspective was prevalent (Gamble and Kelly, 2001). That is where the 
corporation was seen as '^spontaneous and voluntary associations in which diverse 
individuals and interests collaborate for the creation and distribution of wealth" (The 
Clarkson Principles, 2002:257). Moreover, the stakeholding theory considers the 
corporation as real rather than fictional as assumed by the shareholding perspective, as 
such 
'•* It is also known as stakeholders model, stakeholder framework or stakeholder management (Freeman, 
1984; Keay, 2010:4). 
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It has a distinctive mind/will and capacity to act, has its own rights and duties and is 
responsible for its own actions and their consequences. Individuals in the corporation 
carry out duties and other activities and as such are not acting as independent persons 
but as organs of the corporate system (Letza et al, 2004:250). 
Based on the changes in the business environment and the consideration that a 
corporation is a social entity (The Clarkson Principles, 2002) management should 
maximise the wealth of stakeholders and not the shareholders only (Freeman, 1984; 
Phillips 2003). These stakeholders can include 
Persons or groups that have, or claim, ownership, rights, or interests in a corporation 
and its activities, past, present, or future. Such claimed rights or interests are the result 
of transactions with or actions taken by, the corporation, and may be legal or moral 
individual or collective. Stakeholders with similar interests, claims, or rights can be 
classified as belonging to the same group: employees, shareholders, customers and so 
on. (Clarkson, 1995:106). 
Freeman and Reed (1983) have suggested two definitions for stakeholders, the first is 
the "wide sense of stakeholder" referring to any group or individual that affect the 
organisation and is affected by its achievements. This definition can refer to government 
agencies, customers, employees and shareholders. The second definition is "narrow 
sense of stakeholders" pointing to any group or individual "o« which the organisation is 
dependent for its continued survival" (ibid: 91). This can include employees, customers, 
certain suppliers and key government agencies. 
Stakeholder theory has several versions (Donaldson and Preston, 1995); has many 
"interpretations, generalisations and definitions" (Stoney and Winstanley, 2001:605). 
Here the stakeholder theory faces an epistemological'^  problem related to its acceptance 
and justification against other theories, where "fhe muddling of theoretical bases and 
objectives, although often understandable, has led to less rigorous thinking and analysis 
than the stakeholder concept requires" (Donaldson and Preston, 1995:73). However, 
these concerns regarding the groimds of the stakeholding theory do not undermine its 
" Epistemology "is the word that defines how we conceptualize our reality and our images of the world" 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 2000:11). 
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usefulness as "fundamental to understanding how to make money in business" 
(Campbell, 1997:446). 
According to Donaldson and Preston (1995), three types of stakeholder theory can be 
identified: these are the descriptive, instrumental and normative stakeholder theories. 
While, the descriptive version of the theory aims to describe and explain certain 
corporate features and behaviours, the instrumental version links the adoption of 
stakeholder management and achievement of corporate objectives, such as performance 
improvement. Finally, the normative version focuses on the identification of moral and 
ethical "guidelines " for corporate management to follow. 
Linking corporate governance and stakeholder theory, two stakeholding models of 
corporate governance exist. The first being the normative model which stresses on the 
necessity of serving stakeholders interest by corporate governance arrangements, 
reflecting a logic of appropriateness to serve stakeholders. The second is the 
instrumental model that requires serving stakeholder interest as a means to an end, 
which is improving corporate performance (Letza et al, 2004; Donaldson and Preston, 
1995). 
To Donaldson and Preston (1995) the instrumental stakeholder theory and its claims that 
stakeholder management positively contributes to the organization economic 
performance are an insufficient justification for the stakeholder theory; accordingly, 
they consider the normative argument of the stakeholder theory being the only accepted 
justification of the theory. 
The stakeholder theory identifies the corporate governance problem in the absence of 
stakeholders' involvement, meaning whether there is a separation of ownership and 
control or not, the corporate governance structure should protect the interests of 
stakeholders' and not solely shareholders (Allen and Gale, 2002; Krishnan, 2009); and 
try to align stakeholders' interests (Keay, 2010) 
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Within this context Blair (1995:17) defines corporate governance as the system that 
''set the ground rules that determine who has what control rights under what 
circumstances, who receives what share of the wealth created, and who hears what 
associated risk". She calls for a stakeholder approach of corporate governance where it 
should consider non-shareholder stakeholders whose relationship with the company 
contributes to the wealth creation process. This requires that a company's board and 
management recognize that their job is to maximize the ''wealth creating potential of the 
enterprise they direct" (ibid). She acknowledged that according to the situation, interest 
of particular stakeholders will be deemed more important than others. Blair (1995) 
argues that stakeholder definition should include those Mdth investment at risk within the 
company, thereby resolving a controversial issue associated with stakeholdership 
perspective. 
The concept of stakeholding has faced many objections from various researchers, for 
instance, Phillips (1997) argues that Freeman's (1984) definition of stakeholder is 
impractical. He claims that although the identification of stakeholders who affect the 
company is straight forward (as one can clearly identify who can affect the 
accomplishment of his goal). This is not the case when identifying the stakeholders 
who are affected by the firm, especially that "Those whom the corporation affects may 
someday come to affect the firm's operations" (P. 53). 
Furthermore, in their literature survey Nwanji and Howell (2007b) highlighted an 
important point of view, expressed by many researchers such as Elias et al (2003), 
Alkhafaji (1989) and Mitchell and Wood (1997) and at the same time confirms 
Phillips's (1997) earlier argument, that is stakeholder identification is problematic, 
especially that the mix of parties defined as the company's stakeholders is subject to 
change, with new parties possibly qualifying as new stakeholders and existing 
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stakeholders quietuig the stakeholder orbit and thus makmg the identification of the 
company stakeholders a complex matter. 
Sternberg (1997; 1999; 2001) saw many defects in the stakeholding approach. She 
agrees with above mentioned researches that the approach is impractical, arguing that 
having to serve a wide range of different and possibly opposing interests makes it 
difficult to adopt this approach in practice. Furthermore, Sternberg (2001) argues that 
the stakeholder approach does not provide an effective benchmark forjudging directors' 
actions because in contrast to having the very specific aim of maximizing shareholder 
wealth laid down by the shareholding approach, its aim of serving a diverse range of 
interests means there is no clear objective against which judgment can be made. 
Essentially, this lack of a clear objective makes it much easier for them to maximize 
their own interests rather than that of the company (Sternberg 1997, 1999, 2001; 
Phillips, 2003). 
2.8 Alternative Corporate Governance Theorizing 
This section aims to present the principal criticism of the traditional corporate 
governance theorizing based on the shareholding v. stakeholding taxonomy. Then, the 
section proceeds with suggesting an alternative theoretical framework: The NIST and 
demonstrates how the fundamental aspects of NIST can produce a relatively better 
understanding of corporate governance by taking into consideration some crucial 
aspects ignored by the shareholding and the stakeholding underpinnings of the corporate 
governance phenomenon. 
2.8.1 Criticism of Traditional Corporate Governance Theorizing 
Criticism of the traditional corporate governance theorizing can be grouped mto two 
groups. Firstly, criticism of the economic underpinnings of traditional corporate 
governance theorizing that forgoes capturing the complexities of social phenomena. 
Secondly, other criticism grounded on the inability of traditional theorizing to offer an 
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understanding of the corporate governance phenomenon within countries other than 
Anglo-American countries. This can be discussed in details as follows: 
Criticism of the Economic Underpinnings of Traditional Corporate Governance 
Theorizing 
The principal criticism addressed by scholars arguing for the need to adopt non-
traditional corporate governance theorizing starts with the fundamental theoretical 
underpinnings of both the shareholding and stakeholding perspectives of corporate 
governance. According to Letza et al (2008:22) both the shareholding and stakeholding 
perspectives share a "normative rational model in... organizational analysis". Although 
each perspective has its particular worldview both share rationality and efficiency 
notions (ibid). The principal-agent (shareholding finance model of corporate 
governance) is highly based on the efficiency theory, while, the stakeholder model, 
despite its focus on corporate ethical behaviour and social responsibility, posits that 
"ethical business is more rational and more efficient" (ibid: 23-24). This is also 
acknowledged by Edward Freeman "The problem with focusing on a single objective is 
that the world is complex, and managers and directors are boundedly rational (at least 
we can meet economists on their own assumptions) " (Freeman et al, 2004:366). Here, 
this would indicate that the shareholding perspective would qualify as a version of the 
stakeholder theory (Letza et al, 2008; Shankman, 1999). As such it can be argued that 
both perspectives share similar economic underpiiming. 
The pre-eminence of the traditional corporate governance perspectives is itself a main 
obstacle to develop corporate governance body of knowledge (Learmount, 2002). As 
scholars criticizing the economic theories underpinning corporate governance are 
usually ignored (ibid). 
This economic firamework which underpins the main stream of corporate governance 
research is criticized on the grounds that it ignores that corporate governance is a social 
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process embedded in particular contextual factors that indeed differs from one 
environment to another (Letza and Sun, 2002; Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Letza et al, 
2004; Kirkbride et al, 2005; Mason et al, imi; Ardalan, 2007; Letza et al, 2008). These 
contextual factors are crucial determinates of a particular corporate governance system 
and can include many non-economic factors such as "power. Legislation, social 
relationships and institutional contexts" (Ardalan, 2007: 511). Also may include 
"politics, ideologies, philosophies, legal systems, social conventions, cultures, models 
of though (Letza et al, 2004: 258) 
Moreover, the traditional corporate governance theorizing based on the economic 
foundations of efficiency and rationality is criticized because of its narrow perspective 
that is incompatible to study a complex social phenomenon such as corporate 
governance. It adopts a closed system approach of organizational analysis^ ,^ especially 
the shareholding perspective (Aguilera et al, 2008) which makes traditional corporate 
governance perspectives as ^'isolated from social and other non-economic conditions" 
(Letza et al, 2008: 256). 
It is thus argued that corporate governance analysis should rather adopt an open system 
perspective for organizational analysis (Aguilera et al, 2008; Filatotchev and Boyd, 
2009). This is because an open system perspective 
stresses the complexity and variability of the individual parts .... Many heads are present to 
receive information, make decisions, direct action .... System boundaries are seen as amorphous 
and transitory; the assignment of actors or actions either to the organization or to the 
environment often seems arbitrary .... The cultural-cognitive dimension of social life looms large 
in the open systems perspective, great attention is devoted to information flows and sense-
making activities. Organizations create, but also appropriate knowledge, know-how, and 
meaning fi-om their environments (Scott, 2003:101). 
'* To some scholars the stakeholding approach is closer to an open system approach to corporate 
governance because it "recognizing that the effectiveness of corporate governance practices depends on a 
wider set of firm-related actors .... Stakeholder theory shifts attention from efficiency arguments .... 
Towards a broader understanding of effectiveness" (Connolly et al 1980 cited in Aguilera et al, 2008: 
476). However, still the stakeholder approach is grounded on economic underpinnings which makes it 
together with the shareholding as" isolated from social and other non-economic conditions " (Letza et al, 
2008: 256) 
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This means that if corporate governance research adopts an open system perspective, 
corporate governance analysis will attend for its surrounding social context. 
Finally, the economic perspective looks at corporate governance as a static object which 
is ^'less compatible with the fluidity and diversity of practical reality" (Letza et al, 2004: 
257). On the contrary, corporate governance is a socially embedded complex 
phenomenon that requires analysis on a dynamic processual basis to be able to explain 
'V/ie temporary, transient and emergent patterns of corporate governance on a 
historical and contextual basis in a given society" (Ardalan, 2007: 511). Moreover, 
deploying a dynamic processual approach to corporate governance analysis is needed 
because the static approach that promotes an ideal solution to corporate governance 
problems has obviously failed, one could find no better example than the global 
financial crisis that fiercely hit the Anglo-American countries, where the traditional 
corporate governance perspective is prevailing. Simply putting it, the static approach 
assuming an objective, single social reality detached from the social and non-economic 
conditions is inappropriate (Letza and Sun, 2002; Letza et al, 2004; Kirkbride et al, 
2005; Ardalan, 2007; Letza et al, 2008, Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). While, a 
processual approach is favoured because "it acknowledges that corporate governance is 
changeable, corporate governance models around the world have developed from their 
own unique cultural, historical and social circumstances .... each model will continue 
to evolve " (Letza et al, 2004: 258)''. 
In addition to the above mentioned reasons that economic underpinnings fails to capture the 
complexities of the corporate governance phenomenon. Letza et al (2008) provides a comprehensive 
accoimt and careful scrutinizing of the theoretical assumptions of the efficiency theory that underlies 
both the finance model (Principal - agent) of corporate governance as well as the stakeholders model. 
It should be noted that though the latter has a wider scope that covers ethical aspects of the 
corporation, it does not deny the concept of economic efficiency and rationality. As such illustrating 
the short comings of the efficiency theory that reduce its utility in addressing corporate governance 
would be useful, (ibid). 
According to Roy (1997), efficiency theory posits that various actors engaged in production and 
service providing compete over scarce resources "so that only the efficient survive" (P.8). Here, the 
economic system shaped "the structural selection of efficient actors" (ibid). Here, Roy (1997) 
question the efficiency theory and its over consideration of the efficiency notion does not mean that 
efficiency takes place in absence of other social processes. Letza et a/(2008) criticize the efficiency 
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Other Criticism of Traditional Corporate Governance Theorizing 
Many researchers criticise traditional theorizing of corporate governance on different 
grounds. Firstly, these theories have emerged within a particular consideration of what 
corporation is and what purpose it should serve (Zingales, 2000). Though, these 
conceptions are highly appreciated, being valid in previous times would not extend their 
validity nowadays, it is even argued that this dualistic approach: 
Sets its roots in long standing philosophical traditions... entrenched in unrealistic theories, 
shareholders short-term maximization of wealth leads to system abuses such as we have seen in 
the dramatic financial scandals through history... stakeholders interest maximization can lead to 
theory as a ground for the traditional corporate governance theorizing due to its inability to explain a 
complicated social phenomenon such as corporate governance , their criticism can be summarized in 
the following: 
• "Efficiency theory assumes a singular decision making entity" although "decision making is 
a social process in which actors are involved m negotiating based on their mutual and 
conflicting interest (ibid.: 24). 
• Efficiency theory "assumes a pure and free market in which resources are evenly distributed 
and actors have the same chances and abilities to utilize resources", while the reality is quite 
the opposite as both resources and economic power are "unevenly distributed and controlled 
by key decision makers" (ibid) 
• Efficiency theory does not explain the reasons that justify rational choices made by actors, 
neither it explain what makes these choices are deemed rationales and not others. Finally, it 
ignores the impact of other business actors. 
• The efficiency theory ignores the "social conditions and interconnections in making 
choices" (ibid). 
Moreover, following (Rescher, 1988) Letza et al (2008) criticize the economic approach utilized by 
the traditional corporate governance theorizing on the basis that economists suppose that rationality 
equals utility maximization, meaning that actors to be deemed rational they have to '^maximize a 
meaningful and measurable utility" (ibid). However, having a measure of utility "is oversimplified 
and unrealistic in describing the real world" (ibid). Furthermore, Letza et al (2008) criticize the 
economic rationality and efficiency being a limited conception that forgoes the "Complex and many-
sided nature of rationality" (ibid: 25). They highlight that the concept of rationality is a survival 
instrument of humans rather than an apparatus that uses the actors' intelligence to achieve the best 
possible results. They reiterate (Rescher, 1988) view of rationality as: "It is a mean to adaptive 
efficiency, enabling us - sometimes at least - to adjust our environment to our needs and wants 
rather than the reverse" (Rescher, 1988:2). 
Finally, the economic logic of corporate governance is a narrow perspective to look at corporate 
governance because it cannot 
explain complicated social phenomenon ignores the question of how .... Constituents 
are organized and constructed into products which are more valuable than separate 
ingredients ... neglect the human condition ....Characterizepeople not as human beings ... 
but in terms of their utility to capital as labour (Consider) The social world .... To exist 
without the social .... Present us with myth, relating a static and not human nature of 
knowledge, which poses perhaps the essential problem with the dominant economic logic in 
corporate governance... Argue that exante design of appropriate governance structure can 
largely solve governance problem ... this fails to consider dynamism of choice, (ibid: 25-
26). 
Moreover Learmount (2002) and Ghoshal and Moran (1996) warns that the normative economic 
theories can have some dangerous unplication of encouraging the type of behaviour they assume. 
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corporation's assets waste and diversion. Governance analysis must serve as a means to 
organize, structure and to establish an efficientprioritisation ojf interests (Carrillo, 2007:99). 
As such their assumptions and reflections on corporate governance understanding needs 
questioning (Letza and Sun, 2004; Letza et al, 2004; Letza et al, 2008). 
While modem business corporations being "purely human capital firms... whose main 
assets are key employees, is changing the very nature of the firm... the changing nature 
of the firm forces us to re-examine much of what we taken for granted" (Zingales, 
2000:1641). Then, the role of human resources in corporate governance should be 
central in shaping corporate governance systems and therefore, should not be forgone in 
corporate governance analysis. 
Secondly, Ratnatunga and Ariff (2005) argue that every organization operates under its 
particular "contextual factors", where they need to adapt their governance systems to 
create shareholders value and be attractive to potential investors. Additionally, they 
argue, that although globalization has initially led to adoption of the traditional 
corporate governance perspectives "there is little evidence to show that there should 
have or will he implemented widely, especially after the famous corporate collapses 
such as Enron, WorldCom and Paramalat" (P. 10). 
Thirdly, although, the shareholding model of corporate governance model has been 
dominant in the Anglo-Saxon countries for long times (Judge, 2009); and is considered 
the more appealing alternative to other countries to acquire resources from the global 
capital market (Lee and Yoo, 2008); It is now criticised for lacking the consideration to 
the market dynamics of companies operating in different non-Anglo-Saxon countries 
(Lubatkin et al, 2005) as well as developing covintries (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). 
Where much of the assumptions applicable in market based systems such as low degree 
of ownership concentration, limited bank holdings and timely information are not 
realizable in Africa for instance (Rwegasira, 2000). As such a need for non-traditional 
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theorising of corporate governance is asserted (Judge, 2009). Theorising that considers 
shareholders and other non-share owning stakeholders' interests interrelated and 
reciprocally supportive of each other rather than competing and mutually exclusive 
(Letza et al, 2008). 
Fourthly, when corporate governance is seen from an international perspective, it can be 
observed that differences among countries exist in terms of character and extent 
(Durisin and Puzone, 2009). A recent survey of corporate governance research covering 
the period (1993-2007), asserts that empirical corporate governance research undertaken 
in various countries shows that what is "... valid in one institutional context, cannot be 
generalised to other contexts" (Judge,2007 cited in Durisin and Puzone:2009: 279). 
Moreover, "It is the study of different institutional settings comparatively and 
contemporarily that promises to revise and extend our global understanding of 
corporate governance " (ibid: 2009:280). 
Fifthly, corporate governance improvements and reforms take place post corporate 
governance crisis (Kirkpatrick, 2009; De Larosiere et al, 2009), in the form of new and 
updated corporate governance rules and standards, in itself, this indicates that "other 
local contexts and various factors " (Letza et al, 2008) play an important role in shaping 
corporate governance. Indeed, these contexts and factors are not part of traditional 
corporate governance approaches. Otherwise, they would have prevented failures to 
occur. Here one can argue that crises associated with corporate governance failure, 
should have encouraged theorists and policy makers to question the traditional 
theorizing of corporate governance rather than naively continuing improving corporate 
governance best practices that did not stop failures from occurring. Carver (2007) raise 
this issue 
to think that codes and incremental improvements-even so called "best practices" can make 
more than piecemeal advances is folly. So we forge ahead, developing this best practices, then 
this rarely going back to first principles nor even searching for what they might be... trapped in 
a disastrous set of habits" (Carver,2007:1031). 
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Sixthly, Smallman (2007) argues that the extant corporate governance literature 
Treat governance as the context of other causal processes they do not study governance per se. 
But instead take governance in the frame within which other phenomena are clear...the objective 
of these studies... to test series of reactions to governance (P.242). 
Finally, Smallman (2007) calls for corporate governance theorizing to seek more 
meaningful evidence that can "inform and improve practice " (P. 246). 
2.8.2 Concluding Remarks on Corporate Governance Theorizing 
The previous section has presented various criticism directed at the traditional 
corporate governance theorizing. On the one hand the economic underpinnings of the 
traditional corporate governance theorizing were exposed showing the inability of 
traditional theorizing based on the economic notions of efficiency and rationality to 
conceptualize corporate governance as a social process embedded in particular 
contextual non-economic factors that vary from one context to another. Thus, 
considering corporate governance as a static, taken-for-granted phenomenon, detached 
from the environment, adopting a closed system perspective to organizational analysis. 
On the other hand, other criticism includes: the inability to continue utilizing the 
traditional corporate governance theorizing today, neglecting the ever changing nature 
of organizations when these approaches were developed (Zingales, 2000). As such 
disregarding the variation between organizations observed at the national level where 
variation is observed between organizations sharing the same macro-environment 
(Ratnatunga and Arif, 2005). Moreover, the characteristics of the Anglo-American 
markets such as low degree of ownership concentration, limited bank holdings and 
timely information are unrealizable in other economies such as Africa (Rwegarsia, 
2000), making the traditional corporate governance models hardly transferable. 
Furthermore, traditional corporate governance models failed to prevent corporate 
governance related scandals even in Anglo-American countries, the global financial 
crisis stands as a good example of such allegation (Kirkpatrik, 2009; De Larosie're et 
al, 2009). Fmally, traditional corporate governance theorizing deals with corporate 
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governance as an explanatory factor of other phenomena rather understanding 
corporate governance itself (Smallman, 2007). 
In conclusion, an alternative theoretical framework should deal with some or most of 
the above mentioned criticism. An approach that looks at stakeholders including 
shareholders on the basis that their interests are supportive, interrelated and not 
essentially mutually exclusive (Letza et al, 2008; Vitals, 2004).This encourages more 
effort to be directed at utilizing an alternative theoretical perspectives that account for 
factors shaping corporate governance practices which offer a better explanation to 
'""corporate governance practices and outcomes throughout the global 
eco«o»j;^ "(Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Lee and Yoo, 2008; Judge, 2009: iii). 
Reviewing the literature indicates that there is a growing body of research that utilizes 
the NIST in examining corporate governance as it offers a better understanding of the 
corporate governance phenomenon and as such enables finding better ways to improve 
corporate governance practices (Judge et al, 2008; Chizema and Buck, 2006; Seal, 
2006; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008; Lee an Yoo, 2008; Chizema, 2008). 
The foUoAving section will present an overview of NIST and its basic features and 
shows how utilizing a NIST theoretical framework would provide a better 
understanding of the corporate governance phenomenon, hence better inform policy 
making related to corporate governance reform. 
2.8.3 The Neo-Institutional Sociological Theory as an Alternative Theoretical 
Framework for Corporate Governance 
This section endeavours to demonstrate how the NIST can serve as an altemative 
theoretical framework for corporate governance. However, as the body of knowledge of 
the NIST is quite enormous because "Institutional theory is not a single, unified system 
of assumption and propositions, but instead a rather amorphous complex of related 
ideas, a broad theoretical perspective or family of approaches" (Scott, 2004: 408). This 
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section will present an overview of the NIST, its characteristics and its fundamental 
concepts. Then, it vw.ll show how NIST can provide a better understanding of corporate 
governance that can deal with the shortcomings of traditional corporate governance 
theorizing as discussed in the previous section. 
2.8.3.1 Overview of NIST 
Reviewing the literature in the domain of the institutional theory or institutionalism 
reveals that two generations of the institutional theory exist: old and new 
institutionalism (Scott, 1995; 2005b; Peters, 2005). To some extent the old 
institutionalism inspires the new version; however, the unpact varies according to the 
institutional schools of thought'^ (Scott, 2005b). NIST has gained much of the 
contemporary social scientists focus compared to the older version, especially that it 
provides the theoretical "aspirations and motivation" associated with contemporary 
social science (ibid: 3). While, the old institutionalism had been more descriptive 
regarding the examined phenomenon and did not offer the abstract theoretical insights 
as the new version (ibid). More importantly, while the old institutionalism emphasize 
"issues of influence, coalitions and competing values... power and informal structures" 
(Clark, 1960, 1972; Selznick, 1949, 1957 cited in Greenwood and Minings, 1996: 
1022). NIST emphasize legitimacy, the embeddedness of organizational fields and 
centrality of classification, routines, scripts and schema (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; 
Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Furthermore, NIST focuses on the "deeper and resilient 
aspects of social structure" (Scott, 2005c: 460). Sandhue (2009) indicated that 
obviously during the last 30 years the NIST has developed and moved from 
"adolescence"{^coVi, 1987)to "/Mflrwnry"(Scott,2008: 15). 
V 
" There are various institutional schools of thought within the new institutionalism, according to Taylor 
and Hall (1996) there is historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism, and sociological 
institutionalism. However, the focus of this thesis is the sociological institutionalism for the reasons stated 
at the end of this section. 
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Scott (2005c) adds that NIST encompasses 
The processes by which structures, including schema, rules, norms, and routines, became 
established as authoritative guidelines for social behavior. It inquires into how these elements 
are created, diffused, adopted, and adapted over space and time; and how they fall into decline 
and disuse .... Perforce attend not just to consensus and conformity but to conflict and change in 
social structures (Scott, 2005c: 460). 
NIST is very much interested in analyzing the relationship between an organization and 
its environment (Sandhu, 2009). Scott (2001) considers that NIST is a continuation of 
the open systems theory application in organizational analysis. As such NIST attends to 
the "importance of the wider context or environment" (ibid.xx). The impact of external 
environment can take many dimensions including constraining, shaping, penetrating and 
renewing of organizations (ibid). 
With recent developments in NIST recognizing the wider enviroimient (institutional 
environment) impact on organizations including social and cultural forces (ibid), there 
was a shift in the organization conception seen not only as production systems but as 
social and cultural systems (ibid). In essence, NIST emphasize on the impact of external 
environment on organizations, it acknowledges that the impact is not technological or 
material based but more importantly is based on cultural and symbolic aspects (Powell 
andDiMaggio, 1991). 
NIST has challenged the idea that "the institutional forms and procedures" adopted by 
organizations are adopted based on being the most efficient for carrying-out various 
tasks. More precisely, organizations are not adopting such forms and procedures based 
on the economic conceptions of rationality and efficiency. Rather, new institutionalism 
argues that this occurs because these forms and structures are "culturally specific 
practices akin to myth and ceremonies devised by many societies and assimilated into 
organizations" {Hall and Taylor, 1996: 946). 
Meyer and Rowan (1977) have clearly stated that organizations adoption of formal 
structures takes place regardless of the efficiency notion. 
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organizations are driven to incorporate the practices and procedures defined by prevailing 
rationalized concepts of organizational work and institutionalized in society organizations that 
do so increase their legitimacy and their survival prospects, independent of the immediate 
efficacy of the acquired practices and procedures (P. 340). 
As such organizations adopt particular institutional forms or practices that are widely 
accepted and appreciated within the broader "cultural environment" (Hall and Taylor, 
1996). 
Institution can be defined as 
social structures that have attained a high degree of resilience ... are composed of cultural-
cognitive, normative, and regulative elements that together with associated activities and 
resources, provide stability and meaning to social life ... are multifaceted, deniable social 
structures, made up of symbolic elements, social activities, and material resources (Scott, 2001: 
48-49). 
Obviously, NIST is considered as a departure from the interpretations of institutions 
based on the economic conceptions of rationality and efficiency (Mason et al, 2007). 
Equally important, institutionalization can refer to different meanings; it can be seen as 
a process or as an outcome (Tolbert and Zucker, 1996; Sandhu, 2009). Reiterating 
Selznick (1996) and Tolbert and Zucker (1983); Zajac and Westphal (2004) indicate 
that the institutionalization process refers to "The social construction process by which 
organizational policies became instilled with value and ultimately taken-for-granted 
among external constituents" (P. 440). From a social constructionist perspective 
"Institutionalization occurs whenever there is a reciprocal typification of 
habitualizecf^ actions by types of actors" (Berger and Luckmann, 1967: 72). 
Thus institutionalization process entails "the process by which institutions are produced 
and reproduced. It is a social process by which individuals come to accept a shared 
definition of social reality that enacts the institution" (Scott, 1987: 496). 
19 "typification entail classifications or categorizations of actors with whom the actions are associated" 
(Tolbert and Zucker, 1996: 174). 
^^  "Habitualized actions reflect behaviors that have been developed empirically ... such behaviors are 
habitualized to the degree that they evoked with minimal decision-making effort" (Tolbert and Zucker, 
1996: 174). 
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As such the institutional theory emphasizes the influence of meanings and 
"construction and maintenance of institutional realities within organizations" (Mason 
etal, 2007:292). 
On the other hand institutionalization as an outcome refers to the final state of the 
institutionalization process (Tolbert and Zucker, 1996). "Something is institutionalized 
when it is unquestioned and taken for granted" (Hasselbaldh and Kallinikos, 2000 cited 
in Sandhu, 2009: 82). 
Dillard et al, (2004) differentiates between institutionalization as a process and outcome 
on the grounds that the former emphasis the conception of "power of organized 
interests and actors who mobilize around them" (P. 570/While, the latter, neglect the 
role of power and group interests. As an outcome institutionalization puts the 
organizational practices and characteristics out of reach of group interests and politics, 
here organizations passively conform to institutions to maintain their legitimacy and 
survive (ibid). 
2.8.3.2 Legitimacy 
The notion of legitimacy is central to NIST, because of the behaviour constraining 
nature of institutions; they operate through "defining legal, moral, and cultural 
boundaries setting off legitimate from illegitimate activities" (Scott, 2001: 50). 
Legitimacy refers to "a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an 
entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of 
norms, values, beliefs, and definitions" (Suchman, 1995: 574). 
Indeed, organizations actively seek legitimacy as they need more than "material 
resources and technical information if they are to survive and thrive in their social 
environments. They also need social acceptability and credibility" (Scott et al, 2000: 
237). 
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Furthermore, legitimacy may lead to better access to resources because stakeholders are 
more likely to provide their resources to legitimate rather illegitimate organizations 
(Parsons, 1960). Finally, legitimacy affects how people act towards organization and 
how they perceive them, as such "audiences perceive the legitimate organizations not 
only as more worthy, but also as more meaningful, more predictable and more 
trustworthy" (Suchman 1995: 575). Finally, Legitimacy cannot be a commodity subject 
to exchange; rather it is a condition that reflects "cultural alignment, normative support, 
or consonance with relevant rules of law " (Scott, 2001: 45). 
Organizations may seek three types of legitimacy pragmatic, moral and cognitive 
legitimacy. Pragmatic legitimacy is based on "self-interested calculations" of an 
organization regarding its most direct audiences (ibid: 598). Pragmatic legitimacy can 
be related to these audiences well-being. This can be related to their social, economic or 
political well-being (ibid). 
Moral Legitimacy is based on normative grounds and focuses on the extent to which an 
organization is judged as doing the "right thing" rather than on the extent to which a 
given activity that the organization carry-out benefits the evaluator (Suchman, 1995). It 
reflects how the audience think of the organizations' activities promoting the '''social 
welfare " (ibid: 579). Indeed, Judgment here is framed by the socially constructed value 
system (ibid). 
Cognitive legitimacy is that type of legitimacy that is neither based on serving particular 
interests nor being evaluated as doing right things. It is based on the acceptance of an 
organization "as necessary or inevitable based on some taken-for-granted cultural 
account" (ibid: 582). This type of legitimacy reflects a "preconscious standards" 
related to how organizational activities should be performed (Mason et al, 2007: 293). 
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2.8.3.3 Isomorphism and the Three Pillars of Institutionalism 
Scott (1995, 2001) has developed a usefUl model exposing three types or pillars of 
institutions: Regulative, Normative and Cultural-Cognitive systems (Scott, 2001). He 
has developed this model to illustrate various elements of institutions (Scott, 1995). 
These elements demonstrate "different bases of order and compliance, varying 
mechanisms and logics, diverse empirical indicators, and alternative rationale for 
establishing legitimacy claims" (Scott, 2005c: 464). Moreover, each of the three pillars 
offers an ingredient for explaining institutions. 
Before discussmg the three pillars of institutions, it should be noted that each of these 
pillars in essence discusses a type of institutional change, not in a temporal sense but as 
a manifestation of how various institutional mechanisms brings about structural 
similarity (Isomorphism) between organizations seeking legitimacy. 
Building on Weber (1967), DiMaggio and Powell (1983) are credited with advancing 
the concept of institutional isomorphism. They consider that highly structured 
organizations " provide a context in which individual efforts to deal rationally with 
uncertainty and constraint often lead, in the aggregate, to homogeneity in structure, 
culture, and output"(ibid: 147). 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) consider that although organizations can change their 
objectives or engage in new practices and that new organizations can enter in the field of 
certain profession, in the long-run "organizational actors making rational decisions 
construct around themselves an environment that constraints their ability to change 
further in later years" (ibid: 148). This tendency towards stability is driven by 
legitimacy seeking rather than enhancing performance (ibid). 
This argument is backed by Meyer and Rowan (1977), who consider that formal 
organizations emerge in a highly institutionalized context, where organizations are 
forced to adopt "practices and procedures" defined by the prevailing rationalized 
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concepts of organizational work and institutionalized in a particular society. Moreover, 
they consider that these rational concepts acts as powerful myths that are adopted by 
organizations on ceremonial basis regardless their contradiction with the criteria of 
efficiency that in this context can decrease the degree of legitimacy an organization 
seeks. Finally, Meyer and Rowan (1977:346) have claimed that organizational 
structures are shaped by their environments, to which they tend to be "isomorphic". 
Due to either technical and exchange interdependency or because organizations reflect 
"a social construct reality" as such they are affected by the environments where they 
exist. 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983:150) accept Aldrich (1979:265) argument that the most 
important factors that organization must consider are other organizations. Furthermore, 
they added that competition between organizations is not limited only to customers and 
resources but also for "political power, institutional legitimacy... as well as economic 
fitness" (ibid: 150). As such the concept of institutional isomorphism is well suited to 
explain the processes of achieving such legitimacy and power. 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983:150) identified three types of mechanisms that bring about 
institutional isomorphic change; these are the coercive, mimetic and normative 
isomorphism. Here these mechanisms can be linked together with Scott (2001) three 
pillars of institutions; these mechanisms are utilized by the regulative, normative and 
cultural / cognitive pillars respectively (Scott, 2001). 
Firstly, the regulative pillar gives priority to "rule setting, monitoring and sanctioning 
activities" (ibid: 52). Here the regulatory process includes the capacity to "establish 
rules, inspect others' conformity to them, and, as necessary, manipulate sanctions .... in 
an attempt to influence fixture behavior" (ibid). Regulatory process includes both 
informal and formal mechanisms; the latter can be assigned to specialized actors such as 
police. This pillar utiUzes coercion as its primary mechanism. Indeed, this type of 
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institutions demonstrated how powerful actors can "impose their will on others, based 
on the use of threat of sanctions .... coercive power is legitimated by a normative 
framework that both supports and constraints the exercise of power" (ibid: 53). In 
summary, Scott (2001) indicates that the proper functioning of the regulative pillar of 
the institutions does not occur without unintended effects. Although, rules and laws are 
usually accompanied with surveillance and sanctioning powers. It should be known that 
this system is not "fool proof and that conformity with rules and laws occur seeking 
legitimacy, however, this conformity could be by appearance rather than essence 
(Suchman, 1995). 
The second institutional pillar is the normative pillar. This pillar is based on "normative 
rules that introduce a prescriptive, evaluative, and obligatory dimension in social life 
(ibid: 54). This dimension depends on values^' and norms^^ as the basis of social 
obligation (ibid). 
According to DiMaggio and Powell (1983) normative pressiires can bring institutional 
change to organizations, normative isomorphism occurs from professionalization, which 
is "the collective struggle of members of an occupation to define the conditions and 
methods of their work, to control the production process, set-up a cognitive basis and 
seek legitimacy" (ibid: 152). Forms of professionalization can include formal education 
or professional networks through which new models of organization can emerge. 
Tlurdly, Cultural-Cognitive pillar of institutions focus on the significance of culture as 
the "shared conceptions that constitute the nature of social reality and frames through 
which meaning is made" (Scott, 2001: 57). Here, reality is constructed through 
interaction of individuals to create interpretations of what is going on in the surrounding 
'^ values refer to "conceptions of the preferred or the desirable" (Scott,2001: 54) 
Norms specify how things should be done; they define legitimate means to peruse valued ends" 
(Scott,2001: 54). Effective operation of norms requires their internalization which means that should be 
taken for granted by various organizations (Mizruchi and Fein, 2005). 
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environment (Scott, 2004). Within organizational analysis, this pillar explains how 
organizational structures and behaviour is shaped not only by technical aspects but also 
by cultural rules promoted within the external environment (ibid). Here compliance of 
organizations with these cultural rules occurs because other types of behaviour cannot 
be understood (Scott, 2001). According to DiMaggio and Powell (1983) Meyer and 
Rowan (1977) and Scott (2001) mimetic isomorphism is the mechanism in operation 
under this pillar, as such organizations change overtime to be more like other 
organizations through imitation. Here the wider belief systems and cultural rules are 
adopted by organizations to deal with uncertainty or ambiguity. Organizations tend to 
imitate other successful organizations "to avoid being noticed as different" (Scott, 
1995: 45). Mimicking other successful organizations is perceived as improving survival 
chances (Khadaroo and Shaikh, 2007) as survival is related to achieving legitimacy 
based on cultural support of what is understood and considered correct 
(BenMassoud,2002). 
It must be noted here that, the three pillars of institutions ''may not be aligned ... one 
may undermine the effects of the other" (Scott, 2005c: 466). In practice these pillars 
provide different perspectives, not essentially mutually exclusive, rather dependent on 
the ways through which organizations interact with institutions of various types and 
mechanisms (Coercive - Normative - Culture/Cognitive) and accordingly structure 
themselves in accordance to the institution in operation; then with the 
institutionalization^^ of organizational practices and structures, legitimacy is achieved 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 2001; 2005b; Mizruchi and Fein, 1999). 
Meyer and Rowan (1977) defines institutionalization as a process "fry which social processes, 
obligations, or actualities come to take on a real like status in social thought and action" (P.341). 
Al 
2.8.3.4 Organizations' Strategic Responses to Institutional Pressures 
NIST was commonly considered as a deterministic theory with emphasis made on 
environmental norms as explaining organizational responses (Judge and Zeithaml, 
1992). This underlies that organizations would not have varied strategic responses to the 
institutional pressures imposed by the environment (Greenwood and Hinigs, 1996). 
However, Scholars such as Oliver (1991, 1997) and Greenwood and Hinings (1996) as 
well as Roberts and Greenwood (1997) have argued for the contrary. They indicated 
that though institutions are constraining by nature, organizations can respond differently 
to institutional pressures. 
Greenwood and Hinings (1996) pointed out that institutional pressures can provide 
somewhat inconsistent signals to different organizations leading to variation in 
practices. Moreover, they also indicated that institution's clarity and salience "may 
change overtime " and that intra-organizational dynamics affect acceptance or rejection 
of institutionalized practices (ibid). Lounsbury (2001) has also acknowledged the 
variation of organizational behaviours and practices facing institutional pressures. 
Reiterating Meyer and Rowan (1977), Lounsbury (2001) indicated that variation in 
organizational responses to institutional pressures can be "substantive or merely 
ceremonial" (P.50). 
Oliver (1991:152) provides a framework of various organizational strategic responses in 
response to institutional pressures. These strategies include: Acquiesce, compromise, 
avoid, defy and manipulate. Acquiesce strategy is adopted by organizations that agree 
and comply with the institutional pressures, thus change their structures and procedures 
accordingly. Compromise strategy refers to the second alternative adopted when 
acquiesce seems difficult due to conflict between institutional expectations and 
organizational internal objectives. In essence compromise involves political barging and 
balancing of conflicting interests (Khadaroo and Shaikh, 2007). Another response may 
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be to avoid the institutional pressure. This involves the organizational hiding of their 
non-compliance. This can occur by establishing plans and procedures in response to 
institutional requirements but on ceremonial basis, in essence these organizations do not 
implement these procedures or plans but disguise their non-compliance. 
Dillard et al (2004) indicate that these organizations maintain the appearances of 
institutionalized practices and structures and as such achieve legitimacy; this case is 
referred to as decoupling (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Moreover, organizations can avoid 
institutional pressiures by changing then- activities thus escaping the domain where the 
institutional pressures are exerted. Another organization may adopt dejy strategy this 
involves direct and open challenging, dismissing or even attacking the source of 
institutional pressure. Finally, an organization may manipulate institutions by trying to 
influence or dominate and control them. 
2.8.3.5 Analysing Corporate Governance from a NIST Perspective 
As shown earlier in section 2.8.1 that the traditional corporate governance theorizing 
has been criticized on the grounds that its economic underpinnings are not well suited to 
explain a complex social phenomenon such as corporate governance. At the same time, 
it was criticised because of its limited ability in guidmg policy making and corporate 
governance reform because it is unable to deeply understand the social construction of 
corporate governance phenomenon. As such the need to alternative theorizing venues is 
highly encouraged (Letza and Sun, 2002; Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Letza et al, 2004; 
Kirkbride et al, 2005; Mason et al, 2007; Ardalan, 2007; Letza et al, 2008). 
Departing from this point, NIST theory is argued to offer a more fruitfiil venue for 
corporate governance theorizing. This argument is based on the foUoAving premises: 
1- NIST focuses on the "deeper and resilient aspects of social structure " (Scott, 2005c: 
460). It emphasizes the embeddedness of organizations in social structures such as 
routines, scripts and is attentive to the legitimacy conception as a reason behind 
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organizational change rather than rationality and efficiency (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977). "// inquires how social structures are established, 
diffused, adopted and adapted over space and across time" (Scott, 2005c:460). It is 
interested in organizational conformance as well as conflict and change with such social 
structures (ibid). It looks at organizations as an open system (Scott, 2001, 2003). It 
considers that organizations are social and cultural systems not only production systems 
(Scott, 2001). NIST emphasizes the influence of meaning and institutional realities 
creation and maintenance within organization (Mason et al, 2007). Therefore, NIST is 
well suited to study and examine social phenomenon such as corporate governance. 
This is particularly important for corporate governance theorizing and can offer deeper 
understanding of corporate governance phenomenon. Moreover, the social approach to 
corporate governance is argued to be much more useful than the economic approach 
because it acknowledges that corporate governance is a social dynamic process 
(Ardalan, 2007) thus compatible with the "fluidity and diversity of practical reality" of 
corporate governance (Letza et al, 2004: 257). 
The social approach to corporate governance thus recognizes the diversity of corporate 
governance systems in various contexts, as influenced by 
unique cultural, historical and social circumstances. It acknowledges that each system will 
continue to evolve ... never assume that any single or extreme model can perfectly work in 
practice. A firm is neither a purely private nor a purely public affair. A firm not only consists of 
physical assets, but also of human beings ... views the social reality as fundamentally 
interconnected, interdependent, and mutually influential .... Firm is not independent of its 
constituents... it is a pluralistic approach that realizes corporate governance not only influenced 
by economic logic ... but also by politics, ideologies .... Social conventions .... Cultures does 
not intend to design and specify any ideal model of governance in practice ... that can be offered 
as a once- and for- all solution in a business setting it involves the design and management 
of the organization through Juxtaposition of competing viewpoints in a constant process of a 
gnomic tension with no preset (Ardalan, 2007: 511-512). 
2- Corporate governance is an institution itself (Scott, 1987; Ha, 2001) that is affected 
and affect the wider institutional environment ''organizational governance 
arrangements must take into account wider institutional conditions ... overtime their 
choices feedback to affect environmental conditions, including institutional 
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environment" (Scott, 2001: 103). As such looking at governance within and 
organizational context would be best explored by NIST as a theory addressing 
organizations- institutions interaction within an open systems perspective. 
3- Institutionalization process is essentially attentive about the role of the conception of 
power and actors' interests and how these respective powers mobilize the 
institutionalization process (Dillard et al, 2004). Furthermore, institutional view of 
organizations emphasis formal and informal structures such as "Power Cliques" 
(Mason et al, 2007: 292). Moreover, Power is central to the operation of the regulative 
pillar of institutions (Scott, 2001). From this angle, "Institutionalization is a political 
process, and the success of the process and the form it takes depends on the relative 
power of the actors who strive to steer it" (Powell, 2008: 5). Indeed, power concept is 
central to corporate governance seen as "the exercise of power at the level of the 
corporate entity" (Tricker, 1995: 59). As such, from this perspective NIST is well 
suited to explain corporate governance. Moreover, as NIST pays attention to both power 
and legitimacy conceptions. It can offer interpretations regarding the reasons that led the 
emergence of a particular corporate governance model within a particular context. As 
power indicates whom interests should be protected, indeed, this provides the very basis 
of pragmatic legitimacy '^*. 
4- As NIST acknowledges that various types of institutional pressures (Regulative, 
Normative, Cognitive-Cultural) can bring about institutionalization (Scott, 2001) 
through coercive, normative and mimetic isomorphism respectively (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983). Applying this conceptual framework can clarify the interaction between 
these pressures and identify which of them play more crucial role in a particular context, 
therefore guide corporate governance reform in a more effective way. Moreover, 
'^' Moral and Cognitive legitimacy are based on normative and orthodoxy logics rather than the 
instrumentality basis assumed in flie pragmatic legitimacy. Indeed, the role of power of actors is apparent 
in the case of pragmatic legitimacy than die other two types. 
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utilizing NIST to examine and understand the corporate governance phenomenon is 
quite important to policy makers as the issuance of corporate governance codes is 
generally derived by "legitimation reasons than by the determination to improve 
governance practices of national companies" (Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008:1). As such, 
the institutional analysis can clarify the legitimization process, the types of legitimacy 
sought and the institutional pillar related to corporate governance. Hence better inform 
policy makers what needs to be done on their reform agenda. 
5- Corporate governance studies imdertaken in emerging or less developed countries 
have asserted the ability of NIST in explaining how the corporate governance 
phenomenon occurs and the factors involved per se. For instance Siddiqui (2010) 
investigated corporate governance in Bangladesh, Khadaroo and Shaikh (2007) studied 
Malaysia. Also other researchers have utilized NIST for corporate govemance 
theorizing in other developed countries such as Japan (Yoshikawa et al, 2007), UK 
(Mason et al, 2007) Australia (Deo and Irvine, 2007) and France (Ben-Messaoud, 
2002). In addition to the utilization of NIST framework to examine corporate 
govemance phenomenon in cross-national contexts for example Aguilera and Jackson 
(2003); Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2004) Zattoni and Cuomo (2008). 
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Part Two: Corporate Governance in Banking Organizations 
Literature 
This part discusses corporate governance from a banking perspective. Firstly, it 
discusses corporate governance in banking organisations, where the gap in relation to 
BCG research is highlighted showing that insufficient concern was given to corporate 
governance of banks and in particular in developing countries. Then, it discusses 
corporate governance problems in banks identifying the reasons behind these particular 
problems. Also, it explains the special issues of banks' corporate governance in 
developing countries. Finally, it discusses the corporate governance model that is likely 
to be acceptable internationally by the banking industry. 
2.9 Corporate Governance Significance in Banking: An Overview 
Research into corporate governance has vastly increased during the last two decades. 
Initially, most of it addressed corporate governance in the US and UK along with some 
attention to other developed countries such as Japan and Germany (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997). Recently though, an amount of research has emerged focusing on a wider range 
of countries both developed and developing. Solomon and Solomon (2004) present a list 
of corporate governance research in twenty four countries other than the US and UK.^ ^ 
Though this list does not include Egypt, recently corporate governance research began 
to take place in Egypt such as Bremer and Elias (2007) and Gamal El-din (2006). 
However it can be argued that Egypt is still in its infancy stage of corporate governance 
reform as compared to other countries, with Egypt only committing itself to corporate 
governance reform since 2003 (Gamal El-din,2006). 
Another gap in corporate governance research is that very little attention has been paid 
to the corporate governance of banks (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). This tends to be 
^ Countries list includes: Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Belgium .Canada .Chile .China .The Chez 
republic. France, Germany .Hong Kong, Indonesia .Italy. Japan .Jordan. Malaysia. The Netherlands. 
Nigeria. Poland. Russia, South Africa. South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand. 
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strange taking into consideration the significant attention that has been dedicated to the 
role of banks in the corporate governance of other firms (Macey and O'Hara, 2003). 
Here, Ferri (2003) notes that it is widely accepted that banks are capable of screening 
applicants and borrowers as well as monitoring them, which enable banks to set a 
threshold of corporate governance standards that applicants must comply with. 
This lack of attention to corporate governance of banks is particularly worrying given 
that there are special features of banks that will arguably increase their need for good 
corporate governance as compared to other types of firms. 
Firstly, these special features include an opaque nature of banks that greatly increases 
the agency problem as well as information asymmetries between insiders and outsiders 
(Caprio and Levine, 2002; Levine 2003; Macay and O'Hara, 2003; Mullineux 2006; 
Barth et al, 2007; Kiraly et al, 2007). Although information asymmetries can be found 
in any sector of the economy, evidence shows that it is greater within the banking sector 
(Furfine, 2001). Opacity in banking emerges from the ability of banks to hide loan 
structure and quality for long periods in addition to their ability to change the risk 
composition as well, thus making it problematic to obtain information about bank's 
ongoing operations. One example that shows bank management's ability to hide loans' 
structural problem is their practice of extending additional loans to clients whose 
creditworthiness is low due to having debt troubles; while this decreases the assets 
quality in the long term it improves the activity level of the bank in the short term. 
Another example is the difficulty to interpret an increase of banks' liquidity measures 
because this increase can result from either an improper investing strategy or a prudent 
response by management to a risky environment (Caprio and Levine, 2002; Levine, 
2003). This opaque nat\ire increase the agency problem in banks as information 
asymmetries between insider and outsiders would lead to an increased difficulty for 
monitoring (agents) managers by owners (shareholders and debt holders) and give the 
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former a greater opportunity to exploit incentive contracts. Moreover, it would make it 
easier for managers and large shareholders to enjoy "private benefits of controls " at the 
expense of maximizing shareholders value (Zingales, 1994:4 cited in Caprio and 
Levine, 2002). 
Moreover, Caprio and Levine (2002) and Levine (2003) argue that information 
asymmetry is likely to disable takeover threat as an important governance mechanism; 
this happens due to the poor information available to external bidders. In fact, even bank 
supervisors who are entitled to have access to bank information cannot themselves 
guarantee its accuracy. Finally, banks' opacity leads to lack of information to 
borrowers, a problem to which bankers respond by establishing long-term relationships 
with clients, in essence putting a barrier in front of competition to take place (Levine, 
2003). Indeed, this shows the need for attention to the peculiarity of BCG. 
Secondly, as banks are subject to heavy regulation by governments' fearing banks' 
failure and the possibility of being contagious to other healthy banks (Shull,2007). 
However, still there are "both international and domestic scandals and problems with 
bank governance" (Gup, 2007: xi). 
Regulation interferes to impede natural corporate governance mechanisms. For instance 
Caprio and Levine (2002) and Arun and Turner (2004) indicate that deposit insurance is 
one form of regulation that encourages a minimal level of monitoring by insured 
depositors who do not have the incentive to monitor banks as long as their deposits are 
backed by insurance. Thereby minimising their role m corporate govemance of banks 
and giving bank executives the opportunity to increase their risk taking, thus increasing 
the govemance problem. Yet another regulator mechanism is the restriction on the type 
and number of banks acquirers, as well as making it more expensive and time 
consuming to imdertake a hostile takeover. Consequently, a takeover is less likely in a 
banking industry leaving bank executives less disciplined by takeover threat than 
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executives of non-financial organizations (Prowse, 1995). Restrictions on bank 
ownership is another type of regulatory intervention in the banking industry, where 
regixlators set particixlar ownership concentration ratios, which impedes one of the 
principal governance mechanisms worldwide (Caprio and Levine, 2002; Levine, 2003). 
Furthermore, extensive regulation can potentially lead to a conflict of interests between 
individual banks and the supervisor itself; eventually the regulator may have influence 
on banks' management to attain results that does not match serving shareholders 
interests and their value maximization (ibid). 
Thirdly, government ownership of banks is another feature that mcreases the need for 
better corporate governance, as "state ownership of banks can cause outstanding 
corporate governance problems" (Kiraly et al, 2007:276). In particular, that 
government ownership usually raises the conflict of interests, as here the government is 
playing two roles as an owner and a regulator. In such situation it is unlikely that 
effective corporate governance would exist (Caprio and Levine, 2002). 
2.10 Bank Corporate Governance Significance in Developing 
Countries 
Arun and Turner (2004) , Das and Ghosh (2004), Levine (2003) pointed out that 
although an effective system of BCG is extremely important in any country, its 
importance is higher in developing countries. 
Several reasons can justify this importance namely: the dominant position of banks in a 
developing financial system, the role of banks in the economic growth of developing 
countries and the dominant role of banks in financing business firms given the usually 
underdeveloped financial markets of developing countries (Capri and Leveine,2002; 
Barth et a/,2007). Moreover, the recent liberalization of banking sectors in developing 
countries through privatization and divestment along with the reduction of economic 
regulation has given bank executives more freedom in determining management 
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practices and in setting priorities for interests' serving leading to crisis (Nam, 2007). 
Furthermore, analysis of a number of banking collapses in developing economies shows 
a high correlation between collapses and weak corporate governance in these banking 
systems. This increases the importance of good corporate governance practices in banks 
of developing countries (Gandy et al, 2006:4). More precisely, banking failures in 
developing countries share in common weak corporate governance, an issue that 
requires attention and further understanding. 
While the special features of banks mentioned in the previous section holds in any 
banking organisation, the corporate governance problem associated with these features 
are claimed to be of higher severity in developing countries, for instance the presence of 
conglomerates and the higher domination of few families in many sectors of the 
economy are said to increase the potential power abuse of insiders at the expense of 
outsiders. In such environment the problem of transparency and lack of accurate 
information about banks is likely to be more severe compared to developed economies 
(Caprio and Levine, 2002). Another potential source of corporate governance problems 
is the lack of deposit insurance schemes; although its presence brings associated 
governance problems its absence induces more risk taking given the usual government 
guaranteeing of deposits (Caprio and Levine,2002; Levine,2003). More intensive 
regulation is also more prevalent in less developed countries to the extent that 
encumbers market forces by interference in banking operations in the form of directing 
credit granting, setting portfolio restrictions, and determining liquidity levels (Nam, 
2007). 
MuUineux (2006), adds that directed credit is widespread in developing countries 
coupled with higher government ownership of banks leading to higher chances of 
conflict of interests, especially if the governments' objectives are not maximising public 
economic welfare "Corporate governance is thus embedded in and conditioned by the 
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wider governance system and can only be expected to be effective if the wider 
governance structure is supportive" (ibid: 376). He adds that good corporate 
governance requires the support of an independent supervisory authority, which is 
difficult to find unless there is a strong wider governance system which is "politically" 
independent (ibid). 
Many developing countries have started corporate governance reform in their banking 
sectors such as Pakistan, India and Indonesia. This includes, firstly, increase the 
effectiveness and independence of the regulator (Central bank). Secondly, restructure 
the legal and regulatory framework governing the operations of banks to be in 
accordance with the recommendations of international organisations such as Basel 
committee,^^ and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Finally, issue guidelines for 
good corporate governance practices in banks based on the recommendations of the 
abovementioned organisations but adjusted to the domestic economic and regulatory 
situation of each covmtry (Khalid and Hanif, 2005). 
2.11 Corporate Governance Model in Banks 
Special features of banks including their opaque nature, being subject to heavy 
regulations and the spread of government ownership of banks are factors that not only 
make banks special compared to other types of firms but also make them subject to 
special corporate governance problems, as these features impede natural corporate 
governance mechanisms that can improve corporate governance quality of other non-
*^The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision provides a forum for regular cooperation on banking 
supervisory matters. Its objective is to enhance understanding of key supervisory issues and improve the 
quality of bankmg supervision worldwide. The Committee's members come from Belgium, Canada, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United 
Kingdom and the United States. Countries are represented by their central bank and also by the authority 
with formal responsibility for the prudential supervision of banking business where this is not the central 
bank" (Bank for International Settlements, 2008) [http://www.bis.org^cbs/mdex.htm]. 
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bank organisations, such as market for corporate control and takeover threat (Caprio and 
Levine, 2002; Macay and O'Hara, 2003). 
Unfortunately this makes it easier for insiders (managers and large investors) to "exploit 
private benefits of control rather maximising value for shareholders" (Zingales, 1994:4 
cited in Caprio and Levine, 2002). As such self interest and associated short-termism 
and excessive risk taking will result only in more conflict of interests with shareholders, 
as well as interests of the fixed claimants (depositors) who are risk averse^'. This led 
many researchers to claim that managers of banks have a fiduciary duty to both 
depositors and shareholders (Macay and O'Hara, 2003; Mullineux, 2007; Barth et al, 
2007). In fact the financial crisis and the collapse of more than 105 banks in the USA 
during 2009 gives a good example of the damage and loss bank's stakeholders 
(shareholders and depositors) can suffer as a result of corporate governance failures 
related to inappropriate risk assessment, reckless boards and improper remimeration 
systems that encouraged short-termism rather than long-term value creation 
(Kirkpartick, 2009; De Larosie're et al, 2009). Accordingly, adopting the Anglo-Saxon 
model based on the agency theory to serve the interests of shareholders only is deemed 
inapprop;iate in the case of banking organisations because interests that corporate 
governance should look after in a bank include interests beyond those of the 
shareholders namely: depositors (Mullineux, 2007). Macay and O'Hara (2003) 
recommended that banks should adopt a stakeholder model for solving the corporate 
governance problems of banks. However; adopting a pure stakeholder model of 
corporate governance in banking organisation would face the difficulty of stakeholders' 
identification in addition to other shortcomings of the modeP^ (Nwanji and Howell, 
2007b). Therefore, the pure stakeholder model is also deemed inappropriate because it 
does not provide a concrete identification of stakeholders. 
'^ As such have chosen to deposit their funds in banks, as conceived as a safe place for their savings 
'^ Previously mentioned in section 2.7 
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In this respect Basel Committee '^ on Banking Supervision defines corporate 
governance of banks as the system that involves the setting of corporate objectives that 
include the generation of economic returns to owners, ensuring the accountability 
obligation of management and directors towards their shareholders is met, and taking 
into account "the interests of other recognized stakeholders most importantly 
supervisors, governments and depositors due to the unique role of banks in national and 
local economies and financial systems " (BCBS, 2005:4). 
Therefore, it can be argued that banks being particular and having special needs from a 
corporate governance framework should adopt a corporate governance model that 
serves the interests of shareholders and depositors in the first place, and probably other 
fixed claimants stakeholders such as creditors in addition to complying with the 
regulator guidelines. 
Indeed, this argximent is consistent with the earlier argument made in part one of this 
chapter, where many researchers such as (Ratnatunga and Ariff, 2005; Lubatkin et al, 
2005; Rwegasira, 2000) argue that each institutional environment (Banking 
organizations) has many factors that shapes its corporate governance practice. 
Moreover, it must be noted that although the international banking community calls for 
a pluralistic model of corporate governance to ensure consistency with internationally 
agreed standards for the corporate governance of banks this does not mean that the 
factors shaping the corporate governance have to be similar from one country to the 
other or within various banking sectors, as such this can only be known by empirical 
corporate governance research that examines the institutional environments in which 
these banking organisations operate (Durisin and Puzone, 2009; Letza et al, 2008; 
Smallman, 2007; Ratnatunga and Ariff, 2005; Lee and Yoo, 2008). 
^' Basel committee definition is considered as an authority (See footnote 26 P.58) 
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Finally, it must be noted that the financial crisis has demonstrated that current corporate 
governance models based on the dualistic thinking of corporate governance are 
inappropriate and indeed new perspectives are essential to find new venues of 
improvement. 
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Part Three: Corporate Governance in the Egyptian Banking 
Literature 
This part aims to present the general profile of the banking sector in Egypt. This 
includes briefly reviewing the developments of the banking sector, identifying the 
current structure of the sector and presenting an overall evaluation of the EBS. Then 
gives an overview of corporate governance within the EBS, and finally reviews the 
literature related to assessment of corporate governance practice in the EBS. 
2.12 EBS Profile 
The EBS started its operation in 1856 by establishing the first bank known as "Bank of 
Egypt" by the Armenian community. Later on the Egyptian government has been 
induced to establish the first governmental bank "The National Bank of Egypt" in 1898, 
the National Bank of Egypt had the exclusive authority to issue notes and coins during 
this time, as such it played the central bank role as well. Moreover, Banque Misr was 
established in 1920 as the first Egyptian private bank, founded to compete with the 
National Bank of Egypt (AmCham BSAC, 2005). 
Today's EBS is the product of several transformations that took place during the 
previous decades. These transformations included moving from a banking sector 
dominated by foreign banks, to a system that is purely Egyptian and dominated by state-
owned banks, especially after the wave of nationalization that took place during the 
1950s and 1960s. In essence, these movements had led to a banking sector with obvious 
government involvement and channelling of most of its resources towards financing 
governmental projects and state-owned enterprises regardless of the commercial 
viability of these projects (Mohieldin and Nasr, 2007). Unsurprisingly, this had led to 
the problem of the NPL to explode due to these various forms of directed and connected 
lending^" (ibid). 
^^  This point is discussed in more details in the section 2.13 
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Another major transformation of the EBS took place during the 1974, when the open 
door policy was initiated, giving the chance once again to the private sector to re-appear 
in the EBS but as partners with the Egyptian government, this had materialised in 
establishing many joint-venture banks between the Egyptian government and private 
sector parties (AmCham BSAC, 2005). The first joint-venture bank established in 1975 
was the Commercial International Bank (CIB), established as a partnership between 
NBE and the American Bank Chase Manhattan (ibid). This trend led to enlargement of 
the EBS but was a step towards the liberalisation of the bankmg system in Egypt. 
However, during this period the banking sector has faced hard times due to many 
macroeconomic aspects including imbalances between exports and imports, inflation, 
direct lending and state-ownership dominance over the EBS; this has led to the first 
established joint-venture bank (CIB) to come under a pure Egyptian ownership again in 
1987 after Chase Manhattan decided to withdraw from Egypt (ibid). 
More recently, after such troubles Egypt has initiated the Economic Reform and 
Structural Adjustment Program (ERSAP) in 1991 to transform the Egyptian economy 
fi-om a centrally planned economy to a liberalised one; surely, the liberalisation of the 
fmancial system was part of the ERSAP. This included. 
Developing the monetary and financial instruments to manage liquidity, liberalize 
interest rates and credit, and establish the legal fi-amework for privatization of 
financial institutions. For the first time, the government announced its commitment to 
privatization of banking system, namely the sale of all state-owned shares in joint 
venture banks, and one of the state owned banks. However, very few joint venture 
banks were fully divested, and none of the state-owned banks were privatized... raised 
questions regarding its seriousness and commitment to market-oriented banking 
system (Mohieldin andNasr, 2007:712). 
According to Mohieldin and Nasr (2007) although there were some improvements 
during the 1990s such as including the cleanup of loan portfolios of banks, minimising 
of preferential lending to the state-owned enterprises, many of challenges continue to 
exist including "low levels of competition... dominance of the state-owned banks... poor 
assets quality, weak governance and low profitability" (ibid:712). Later on in late 2004, 
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the EBS faced another cycle of change when the government has armoimced the reform 
of the financial sector (ibid). This reform aims for the consolidation of the banking 
sector through mergers and acquisitions, fiill divestiture of the state stake in joint 
venture banks and the privatisation of the bank of Alexandria the fourth biggest state-
owned bank, with a principal objective to strengthen the supervisory and regulatory 
"apparatus" of the banking system (Mohiledlin,2000; CBE,2008a). 
According to the latest developments in the banking sector reform program, the CBE 
has finalised the first phase of reform that covers the period 2004-2009, this phase 
aimed to improve the efficiency and sovmdness of the EBS, improve its ability to 
manage risks and increase its ability to foster the economic development in Egypt. 
Currently, phase two of the reform has been initiated to restructure the state-owned 
specialised banks, following-up of phase one restructuring of other commercial state-
owned banks; comply with BASEL II accord; focus on small and medium enterprises 
financing; revise corporate governance quality within all banks, and assure compliance 
with the international benchmark of corporate governance for banking organisations 
(CBE,2009). 
2.12.1 Ownership Structure of the EBS 
The banking sector in Egypt has passed through continuous changes in terms of 
ownership structure and the number of banks (AmCham BSAC, 2005). According to 
the CBE the banking sector is composed of a total nvimber of 40 banks, this includes 3 
public commercial banks, 3 public specialised banks, 27 private and joint-venture 
commercial banks and 7 branches of foreign banks as shown in table 2.1 and appendix 2 
(CBE registered banks, 2008b). 
It should be noted that the branches of Foreign Banks '^ are treated differently by law, in 
terms of the minimum capital requirements. Although the new banking law (88/2003) 
'^ These banks do not publish their financial statements (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008) [online]. 
Moreover, as other banks must meet the requirement of 500 million EGP, the branches of foreign banks 
are required to meet the minimum capital requu-ement of 50 million USD (Mohieldin and Nasr, 2007). 
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has brought about these new capital adequacy requirements to improve the soundness of 
the banking sector, with the assumption that capital acts as a cushion against financial 
shocks that help banks to continue meeting their liabilities, however, the state-owned 
banks still suffer fi-om inappropriate capital adequacy ratios (Mohieldin and Nasr,2007). 
Table 2.1 Structure of the Egyptian Banking Sector 
Bank Category 
Commercial 
Specialised 
Commercial 
Commercial 
Owner 
State 
State 
Private and Joint venture 
Branches-Foreign banks 
Total 
Number 
3 
3 
27 
7 
40 
Source: (CBE, 2008) 
While, in terms of the total assets the structure of the EBS is still dominated by the 
state-ovraed banks as shown in table 2.2. 
Table 2.2 Percentage of Total Assets Owned By Various Banks 
Bank 
National Bank of Egypt 
Banque Misr 
Banque du Caire 
Commercial international Bank 
National Societe generale 
Arab African international 
Bank of Alexandria 
HSBC bank 
Faisal Islamic bank 
Creidt Agricole bank 
Egyptian Arab Land Bank 
BNP Paribas 
Barclays Bank 
Principal Bank of development 
Suez canal bank 
The United Bank'^  
Al-Watany bank of Egypt 
Housing and Development bank 
Others 
Owner identity 
State-owned 
State-owned 
State-owned 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
Private 
iiiki \ ix,;^(y^ii:''Whmi-fA\ii^' 
Percentage of the total assetslt 
23 45 % 
15.17% 
5.50 % 
5.41% 
5.38% 
5.02 % 
4.28% 
3.12% 
2.51 % 
2.45% 
2.33% 
2.24% 
2.03% 
1.68% 
1.60% 
1.52% 
1.41% 
1.21% 
10 99% 
' 100,% 1 J"ijjiC 
Source: Researcher based on the comparative data of Bankscope databases (2009) 
This can be depicted as shown in figure 2.1 
This means that on average of an exchange rate of (lUSD/ 5.5 EG?) branches of foreign banks are 
subject to 50% of the capital requirements of banks incorporated in Egypt. This study focus is on 
commercial banks incorporated in Egypt. These 30 banks represent the majority of the EBS structure as 
shown in table 2.1. 
^^  Although this bank is classified by the central bank under the private and joint venture banks, 99.99% 
of the bank's capital is owned by the CBE, after the CBE has merged three failed banks namely the Nile 
bank, united bank of Egypt and Islamic international bank for investment and development (Bankscope 
databases, 2009). So this bank is under the indirect control of the state. 
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others, 13.69%-
Housing and Development 
bank, 1.21% 
AJ-Watany bank of Egypt, 
1.41% 
The United Bank, 1.52%. 
Suez canal bank, 1.60% 
Principal Bank of 
development, 1.68% 
Barclays Bank, 2.03% 
BNPParibas,2.24% 
Egyptian Arab Land Banks, 
2.33% 
Creldt Agricole bank, 2.4S%' 
Faisal Islamic bank, 2.51% 
HSBCbank,3, 
Bank of Alexandria, 4.26%-
Arab African International, 
S.02% 
National Bank of Egypt, 
23.49K 
Banque Misr, 15.17% 
Banque du Caire, 5.50% 
National Soclete generate, 
5.38% 
Commercial International 
Bank, 5.41% 
Figure 2.1 Allocation of the Market Share of Various Banks of the EBS Based On the 
Total Assets Percentage 
Table 2.2 and figure 2.1 illustrates that the state-owned banks represent nearly 45% of 
the EBS in terms of their total assets. This indicates that the majority of the EBS is still 
under the control of the state. However, from a profitability perspective, state-owned 
banks accounts for only less than 7 % of the total income of the whole banking sector in 
2009 (Bankscope databases,2009). This may raise questions regarding the efficiency of 
operations of the EBS. 
2.12.2 An Overall Evaluation of the EBS 
According to Business Monitor International Report on the Egyptian Commercial 
Banking (2008), both the strengths and weaknesses evident in the internal environment 
of the banking sector; as well as the opportunities and threats facing the banking sector 
from the external envirormient (Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats, 
SWOT analysis) were identified. This can be summarized as shown in table 2.3, which 
represents the summary SWOT analysis of the commercial banking in Egypt. 
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Table 2.3 SWOT analysis of the Egyptian commercial banking 
E g ^ t Commcrci^U Banking SWOT 
strengths 
Weaknesses 
Opportunities 
Threats 
Macraeconomlc outtook remains positive 
QDP growth to rise in the short term 
Onooing liberalisation of banlcing sector 
Strong investment growth over the next 5 years 
Relatively strong banking sector in relation to other countries we monitor in the region 
Likely growth in total assets expected to be large 
Past problems have left the industry quite undeveloped 
HIstorlcaily not exposed to foreign competition 
Relatively high levels of corruption and bureaucracy 
Only moderate growth in client loans is expected 
Growth may be more spectacular than foret^st, given the low base 
Government reform is cpening up the sector 
Political instability 
Risk that inflation might spike higlier 
Source: Egyptian Commercial Banking Report, Ql, 2008, Business Monitor International 
It can be observed from table 2.3 that the main weaknesses of the EBS include the NPL 
problem, the relative domination of the state and the isolation from foreign competition 
until recently when the banking law permitted foreign majority ownership of banks 
operatmg in Egypt; most importantly, relatively high levels of corruption and 
bureaucracy evident in the EBS. However, the ongoing government reform of the 
banking sector is likely to offer friture opportunities. Finally, the EBS main strengths 
include the liberalisation started during the last decade, the increase in the sector's total 
assets and the positive macroeconomic outlook. 
2.13 Banks Corporate Governance in Egypt: An Overview 
The global financial crisis has increased the emphasis on corporate governance of 
banking organisations both in developed and developing countries (Kirkpartick, 2009; 
De Larosie're et al, 2009). However, bank governance was crucial in a bank-based 
country such as Egypt before the global financial crisis for a number of reasons: Firstly, 
85-90% of business financing is provided by the banking system (El-said, 2009) which 
means that banks are the principal players in the Egyptian economy. This puts a huge 
burden on the banking sector to be properly governed to avoid failures. Secondly, the 
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current government initiatives that aim to improve the investment climate with strong 
corporate governance structures as its backbone, here the role of banks has been 
materialized in the first Egyptian corporate governance code (2005) which assigned 
banks a major role in ensuring adherence of business organisations to the code 
provisions by considering its standards a precondition for credit extension (Egyptian 
Code of Corporate Governance, 2005). Performing such a role means that banks have to 
be a model of high quality corporate governance themselves, in order to insist on high 
standards from others. 
Thirdly, corporate governance of the Egyptian banks has been central to the reform 
programme of the EBS itself Those reforms were initiated to address many areas of 
improvement amongst is to enhance banks' governance especially since weak 
governance was a main reason for the late 1990s' bank failures and the associated 
problem of NPL (CBE, 2008). Corporate governance is central to this problem because 
of the assumption that behind the NPL was weak governance standards leading to 
improper credit and investment decisions (Oldham and Bennadi,2005), whereby "loans 
were given based on intentionally overvalued assets to fit the collateral base of each 
bank and disregarding the future cashflows of the borrowers" ( Kalhoefer and Salem, 
2008:5). Here, corporate governance failures were evident in many cases especially in 
the state-owned banks which dominated the EBS during this period^ .^ Obviously, credit 
was allocated to "privileged and connected private sector not on commercial basis" 
(Mohieldin andNasr, 2007:711). Many cases of insider lending were reported as board 
members facilitated loans granting to their friends and network of clients, thus 
breaching their supposed supervisory and monitoring role on executive management 
(ibid). Moreover, improper borrowers' screening and insufficient credit study of the 
financed projects was evident (ibid). Another instance of corporate governance failure 
" The state-owned banks holds 45% of the banking sector total assets, so they are still in a dominant 
position 
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was the government influence especially on state-owned banks, to finance national 
mega-projects on the basis of directed lending without taking into account the risk 
profile of these projects. While in the case of private banks corporate governance 
weaknesses were more related to improper risk management, as these banks continued 
granting loans to unprofitable private corporations, simply to prevent them from 
bankruptcy without giving consideration to the detrimental effect on both shareholders 
and depositors funds (ibid). Kalhoefer and Salem (2008) have summarized this situation 
as "corruption in the lending activities". Mohieldin (2000) has added that banks have 
violated prudent credit standards and ineffectively managed risk. However, the 
corporate governance failures cited above can be blamed also on the weak supervision 
of the CBE during this period leading to a heavy NPL problem that reached more than 
30 billion Egyptian pounds in 2004 owed only by the state-owned banks (Kalhoefer and 
Salem, 2008). 
Again, the dominance of the state-owned banks, their distorted incentive systems, poor 
management, weak internal governance, lack of performance incentives, overstaffing 
and inadequate risk management are all facets of failure in corporate governance 
(Mohieldin and Nasr,2007). Furthermore, El-Shazly (2001:16) has indicated that durmg 
this period transparency and disclosure levels were also inadequate, banks' publication 
of their financial statements was only made at the end of the year and even when 
published it was of limited use, especially in the case of state-owned banks. For instance 
their published income statements "were exceedingly brief with a couple of lines on 
revenues and expenditures which do not show the amount of provisions ". He added that 
although the CBE has taken measures to tackle this problem in the form of mandating 
the publishing of monthly results, "market transparency is so far insufficient. For 
instance, there is no published data on such important information as non-performing 
loans, average rates of return, and risk-weighted capitalization" (P. 16). This was also 
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substantiated by the global assessment of bank disclosure practices report which 
classified the EBS as one of the most opaque banking systems around the world 
(Huang, 2006:12). 
To summarize, in Egypt in the late 1990's bank failures can to a great extent be blamed 
on failure of corporate governance that included: corruption in lending, inadequate risk 
management, weak internal controls, improper transparency and disclosure measures 
and imprudent boards. Though the deterioration of the macro-economy has aggravated 
the problem of NPL by increasing the number of bankruptcies (Mohieldin and Nasr, 
2007), still ineffective checks and balances has created the problem. 
Notably, the NPL problem had negative impact on the interests of shareholders, 
depositors and creditors as they jointly suffered from loan defaults. This assumption 
was also reflected in the passing of the new banking Law 88 of 2003 that addressed a 
range of modernization issues, including the need to enhance and monitor corporate 
governance in banks as well as other issues such as setting the objectives and functions 
of the CBE, Management of the CBE, the financial system of the CBE and Management 
of public sector banks (EBI, 2006; LawNo.88,2003). 
Despite this overriding importance the issue of bank governance in Egypt has been 
neglected by the literature, whereas only few researchers (especially those mentioned 
above) have discussed the reform process of the EBS and noted its poor governance 
structures and management. Apart from this no other research to date addressed the 
issue of bank governance in a profound manner. 
As such the next section 2.13 will shed lights on the current status of bank governance 
as reflected by the latest available survey undertaken by the Egyptian banking institute 
(EBI, 2006). 
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2.14 Assessment of Corporate Governance of the EBS 
This sectipn highlights the current status of the corporate governance quality in the 
EBS. It presents the main results of the Egyptian banking Institute (EBI) survey 2006, 
that evaluated corporate governance in the EBS and how far it complies with the widely 
accepted framework of good corporate governance principles in banking industry as set 
by Basel Committee recommendations to enhance corporate governance in banking 
(2005) and principles of corporate governance issued by the OECD (2004) and the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC) (EBI, 2006). Indeed, this highlights the 
corporate governance areas that need further improvement. 
This questionnaire based survey examined various aspects of corporate governance in 
the EBS namely: General framework of good corporate governance, rights of 
shareholders, equitable treatment of all shareholders, the role of stakeholders in 
corporate governance, transparency, board of directors' role in corporate governance 
and external monitoring of banks. 
The general framework for good corporate governance section revealed that although 
there is a good level of iinderstanding of the key principles of good corporate 
governance, there is a need to officially document and publish the level of compliance 
with the governance structures at the level of banks. This requires the availability of a 
set of principles or guidelines of good corporate governance in EBS, against which 
banks can report periodically their levels of compliance. 
Shareholders of the Egyptian banks enjoy to a considerable extent their rights with no 
differential rights offered to a certain shareholders class. Fewer banks allow 
shareholders to obtain redress for violations of their rights. Similarly, few banks keep a 
record of related party transactions which require shareholders' approval. 
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The survey also revealed that the current banking regulations protect different 
stakeholder groups, with the highest protection devoted to clients, employees and 
creditors, while communities and competitors rights are observed but to a lesser extent. 
The surveyed banks show a high level of disclosure of material information and 
financial transparency, supported by independent external auditors' work and strong 
internal audit function; however, more effort is required to enhance disclosure practices 
pertaining to remuneration of senior key executives. 
Another important result of the survey is that few banks have formal training 
programmes that aim to enhance their employees' knowledge about corporate 
governance, compliance and internal control processes. 
A significant number of the surveyed banks indicated that their credit risk assessment 
systems do not include the evaluation of the client's corporate governance practices. 
This issue is not only important to the soimdness of the credit extension process but also 
to improve corporate governance practices in the client's companies. 
The majority of the surveyed banks indicated that their boards include independent 
members; fewer banks however, indicated that they have a determined number of seats 
for independent directors. None of the surveyed banks have a board comprised of a 
majority of independent directors. This is another area that needs further enhancement 
in accordance with Basel committee directives on corporate governance and the OECD 
corporate governance principles. However, still the majority of banks separate the 
chairmanship and the chief executive position. 
Moreover, the majority of surveyed banks have an audit committee. This is not 
surprising as it is a legal requirement for banks to have an audit committee. Likewise, 
the majority have a credit committee; while, only half of the respondents have 
nomination and remimeration committees, with a minority having corporate governance 
committee. Finally, board self evaluation is another area that needs -further 
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enhancement, especially that most of the surveyed boards do not conduct reviews of 
their effectiveness. 
It must be noted here that although this survey provides useful information about BCG 
in Egypt, this information is no more than an overall pictorial presentation of the status 
quo that do not offer a deep understanding of the phenomenon of BCG, it does not 
provide the reasons leading to the survey results. Moreover, the survey does not show 
the role of the CBE in BCG phenomenon or the mechanisms deriving the phenomenon. 
It also does not identify the corporate governance model prevailing within the EBS and 
how it is developed. However, the survey provides a good start to investigate the 
phenomenon in details to understand its nature, identify the factors shaping it and 
clearly determine the future policy recommendations required to enhance BCG in 
Egypt. 
2.15 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to review the literatiire relevant to the thesis. As such it was 
divided into three main parts: part one reviews corporate governance literature, part two 
reviews corporate governance in banking organizations; while part three reviews 
corporate governance within the Egyptian banking sector. 
In part one, the thesis has attempted to highlight that corporate governance body of 
knowledge is somewhat controversial. Indeed this was demonstrated through various 
definitions of corporate governance, for instance the narrow finance perspective 
(Parkinson, 1994), a wider stakeholder perspective (Tricker, 1984) and a balanced 
perspective (OECD, 2004). 
This part has also demonstrated that corporate governance subject has gained more 
momentum following several corporate scandals that occurred as a consequence of 
weak corporate governance, showing that although efforts were directed to improve 
corporate governance systems, the global financial crisis (2007) indicated the need to 
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continue corporate governance reforms in general and of financial institutions in 
particular (Kirkpatrick, 2009; De Larosiere et al, 2009). Part one has addressed another 
debatable area in the literature on the relationship between corporate governance and 
performance and concluded that the literature has been inconclusive in this area. 
Indicating that corporate governance reforms are initiated because of the fear of 
corporate failures rather than hope of corporate success. 
Part one has also discussed corporate governance theorizing based traditionally on 
either the agency theory or the stakeholder theory (Freeman and Reed, 1983; Maher and 
Andersson,2000; O'Sullivan,2000; Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2001; Gamble and 
Kelly,2001; Friedman and Miles, 2002; Omran et a/,2002; Letza and Sun,2002; Letza 
et al, 2004, Chilosi and Damiani , 2007; Carillo,2007; Nwanji and Howell, 2007a, 
Nwanji and Howell,2007b; Letza et a/,2008; Keay,2010). Reviewing the principal 
arguments for and against each corporate governance perspective as each perspective 
supposing primary to the other (Keay, 2010). Nonetheless, both perspectives are 
criticized on many grounds indicating that understanding corporate governance 
phenomenon requires far beyond what is offered by traditional theorizing. Finally, part 
one discuss NIST as an alternative theoretical framework demonstrating that this 
alternative corporate governance theorizing can offer a more fruitful venue for corporate 
governance theory development as well as for guiding practice and policy making. 
Part two of this chapter emphasises the importance and peculiarity of corporate 
governance within the context of banks generally and in developing countries banks' 
particularly. Nevertheless part two identified a gap in the literature discussing corporate 
governance of banks compared with research directed to other types of organizations. In 
the Egyptian banking context, the issue of corporate governance has been completely 
neglected. This part has also demonsfrated that the traditional corporate governance 
models (Shareholding V. Stakeholding) cannot be readily adopted in banking 
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organizations. Showing that Basel committee's model of corporate governance (BCBS, 
2005; 2010) is based on a more hybrid model that aims to serve shareholders and 
selected stakeholders namely depositors and regulators. This supports the need for an 
alternative corporate governance theoretical framework that takes into account the 
context of corporate governance phenomenon. 
The third part of this chapter, reviewed the corporate governance issue in relation to the 
EBS, showing that the issue has never been studied profoundly. This part presents a 
brief profile of the EBS and gives a short summary on the most important developments 
that occurred in the EBS and the main troubles it faced, showing how corporate 
governance weaknesses account for the recent 1990s bank failures. Nevertheless, the 
CBE carried out a survey on corporate governance quality of the EBS. Indeed, the core 
results of this survey are reviewed, as they can be helpfiil to investigate the phenomenon 
deeply and identify its nature and the factors shaping it. 
The next chapter explains the research design of this thesis. Indeed this is done on the 
basis of the knowledge gap and research problem identified in this chapter. 
It will discuss the paradigmatic underpinnings of this thesis and chooses the grounded 
theory methodology to deal with research problem and enable achieving the research 
objectives. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Research Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter identifies the research problem and the nature of the corporate governance 
phenomenon in the light of the Literature review. Accordingly, it explains how a 
qualitative research design fits investigation of this problem, and how it matches the 
nature of the corporate governance phenomenon. Then it reviews various paradigms of 
inquiry within qualitative research and chooses the paradigm of inquiry that underpins 
this research. Finally, it discusses the rationale for choosing grounded theory 
methodology for this thesis, its various versions and its fundamental principles. 
3.2 Qualitative Research Design 
Deciding on the research design is a fundamental aspect of undertaking research. 
Research design refers to the "plans and procedures for research that span the 
decisions from broad assumptions to detailed methods of data collection and analysis" 
(Creswell, 2009:3). Moreover, research design indicates how the research is 
conceptualized as well as the type of contribution it will achieve (Cheek, 2008). 
Qualitative research has evolved during the last century, through complex processes of 
successive stages of "epistemological theorizing" (Denzin, 2008:311). As such the term 
qualitative research has been confusing because it "means different things to different 
people " (Strauss and Corbin, 1990b: 18; Lockyer, 2008). However, qualitative research 
can be defined broadly as: 
a situated activity that locates the observer in the world. Qualitative research 
consists of a set of interpretive material practices that make the world visible. 
These practices transform the world. They turn the world into a series of 
representations, including field notes, interviews, conversations, photographs, 
recordings, and memos to the self... involves an interpretive naturalistic approach 
to the world. This means that qualitative researchers study things in their natural 
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settings, attempting to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the 
meaning people bring to them (Denzin, 2008:311-312). 
The general characteristics of qualitative research can be summarized as follows: 
take place in the natural setting...uses multiple research methods that are 
interactive and humanistic... emergent rather than tightly predefined...fundamentally 
interpretive...researcher views social phenomenon holistically... researcher reflects 
on who he or she is in the inquiry and is sensitive to his or her personal 
biography...uses complex reasoning that is multi-faceted, iterative, and 
simultaneous (Creswell, 2003:181-182). 
The decision to undertake qualitative research is basically related to three issues (1) the 
nature of the research problem, (2) the degree of uncertainty surrounding the 
phenomenon (3) the researcher's theoretical assumptions (Trauth, 2001). Here the 
nature of the research problem determines the choice of qualitative research to pursue a 
particular research project because "what one wants to learn determines how one 
should go about learning it" (ibid: 4). For instance cases such as the "attempts to 
uncover the nature of phenomenon" (Strauss and Corbin, 1990b: 19) are naturally 
studied through qualitative research. In terms of the degree of uncertainty surrounding 
the phenomenon qualitative research is well-suited to "uncover and understand what 
lies behind any phenomenon about which little is yet known" (Straus and Corbin, 
1990b:19). As qualitative research seeks interpretation of phenomena and tries to 
develop a holistic complex account of the issue studied (Creswell, 2007). As such it is 
well-suited to reduce uncertainties surrounding the phenomenon studied. Finally, the 
researcher's theoretical assimiptions are another important aspect to utilize qualitative 
research (Trauth, 2001). Indeed qualitative research can use different theoretical lenses, 
paradigms or philosophies (Schwandt, 2001). It is important here that the qualitative 
researcher identifies the chosen paradigm of inquiry in terms of its ontological and 
epistemological stances. The former is related to '^philosophical assumptions about the 
nature of reality (ontology)" (Creswell et al, 2007:238). While the latter is related to 
assumptions about "the relationship between the inquirer and the known 
(epistemology) " (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000:19, author brackets). 
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Indeed selection of a qualitative research design based on the abovementioned criteria 
affect other decisions related to the research design such as the research methodology 
and research methods (Trauth, 2001). The former refers to the "overall approach to the 
research process" (Collis and Hussey, 2003) it also reflects the ontology and 
epistemology of the chosen paradigm of inquiry (Schensul, 2008). While, the latter 
"refers to the ways in which qualitative researchers collect data" (ibid). 
3.3 Research Problem and the Nature of the Phenomenon Investigated 
in this Thesis 
This section aims to clarify the research problem and identify the nature of the corporate 
governance phenomenon in banking organizations following the study of the related 
literature '^*. Indeed, this will be the basis for conducting qualitative research including 
the selection of the guiding paradigm of inquiry and the associated research 
methodology and methods. 
The literature review has identified a number of gaps in knowledge that this thesis vdll 
try to handle. At the general level, attention given to studying corporate governance of 
banks is negligible compared to corporate governance research of non-financial 
institutions (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). This lack of attention to BCG is particularly 
worrying because banking organizations have special features that increase their need 
for good corporate governance (Caprio and Levine, 2002; Levine, 2003; Macay and 
O'hara, 2003; MuUineux, 2006; Barth et al, 2007). Furthermore, the importance of BCG 
is higher in the context of developing countries (Arun and Turner, 2004; Das and 
Ghosh, 2004; Levine, 2003) such as Egypt. Certainly, in the Egyptian banking context, 
corporate governance is of special importance because weak corporate governance has 
been blamed as a main reason behind the banking scandals in late 1990s and early 
2000s leading to the NPL problem and the loss of depositors' funds (Oldham and 
Bennadi, 2005; Mohieldin and Nasr, 2007). However, given this overriding importance 
'"Chapter 2 
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of BCG to Egypt, this issue has been neglected by the literature, with no research to 
date having investigated the corporate governance of the EBS in a profound manner that 
offers better understanding of the phenomenon and the factors shaping it. Indeed this is 
important to help in minimizing the recurrence of this type of bank failures in the future. 
Additionally, better BCG in Egypt is important to promote corporate governance 
concept amongst other sectors of the economy. 
3.3.1 The Nature of Corporate Governance Phenomenon 
The above mentioned gap in the body of knowledge is affected as well by the general 
nature of the corporate governance phenomenon and usefulness of the ciirrent corporate 
governance theorizing. Basically and as previously mentioned in the literature review, 
the current corporate governance theorizing is incompatible with the nature of corporate 
governance phenomenon, which is a complex social process, dynamic rather static and 
varies with the institutional context where it is embedded (Letza and Sun, 2002; 
Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; letza et al, 2004; Kirkbride et al, 2005; Mason et al, IQQl; 
Ardalan, 2007; Letza et al, 2008) making the traditional shareholder v. stakeholder 
corporate governance perspectives hardly transferable to non Anglo-American markets 
(Rwegarsia, 2000). Even, in Anglo-American markets these traditional corporate 
governance models are under scrutiny following the corporate governance related 
scandals and the global financial crisis (KirkPatrik, 2009; De Larosie're et al, 2009). 
Obviously, the complex nature of the corporate governance phenomenon and 
mcompatibility of the widely accepted corporate governance models (shareholdmg and 
stakeholding) contributes to the research problem of the thesis. Because there is neither 
previous research addressing corporate governance of Egyptian banks, nor the 
prevailing corporate governance models can unconditionally be applied to the Egyptian 
banking context. 
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As such the main objective of this study is to discover and understand the nature of 
corporate governance phenomenon within the EBS, imderstand the factors shaping it 
and how these factors interact and contribute to the occurrence of the phenomenon 
within the institutional environment of the EBS. Towards this end, the study aims to 
build a substantive theory^^ of BCG using an alternative theoretical framework, which is 
the NIST. So, here the research problem represents ''the substantive area of focus for 
the research" (Strauss and Corbin, 1998:35). This substantive area is investigated 
through asking questions that enable developing a substantive theory (ibid). This should 
be carried out in a maimer that provides enough flexibility and freedom to investigate 
the phenomenon in depth. The assimiption in the theory generating studies (Qualitative 
studies) is that: 
All of the concepts pertaining to a given phenomenon have not been yet identified, 
at least in this population or place. Or, if so, then the relationships between the 
concepts are poorly understood... Perhaps there is the assumption that nobody 
ever asked this particular research question in quite the same way, so it is as yet 
impossible to determine which variables pertain to this area and which do not 
This reasoning creates the need for asking the type of question that will enable the 
researchers to find answers to issues that seem important but remain unanswered 
(ibid: 40-41). 
As such the main research question is: 
What is the nature of corporate governance phenomenon within the context of the 
EBS? More specifically, 
1. How the corporate governance phenomenon arises in the context of the EBS? 
2. What factors shapes the corporate governance phenomenon within the EBS 
context? 
3. What are the strengths and weakness of banks' corporate governance practices 
within the EBS? 
4. How the quality of corporate governance practices of the EBS can be enhanced? 
" Substantive theory is the theory that evolves from studying a particular phenomenon in certain 
context or situation (Straus and Corbin, 1998) 
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In conclusion, given the nature of the research problem^^, the nature of the 
phenomenon^^ investigated and the objectives of the study a qualitative research design 
is well-suited to this study. 
3.4 Paradigms of Inquiry in Qualitative Research 
Paradigms of inquiry deal with the philosophical issues underpinning qualitative 
research (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000). A paradigm of inquiry can be generally defined 
as: 
A set of assumptions and perceptual orientations shared by members of a 
research community. Paradigm determine how members of research communities 
view both the phenomena their particular community studies and the research 
methods that should be employed to study those phenomena (Donmoyer, 
2008:591). 
More precisely, a paradigm of inquiry can be identified through three aspects: ontology 
that defines "the nature of reality? "(Denzin and Lincoln, 2000:19). Epistemology that 
identifies "the relationship between the inquirer and the known?" (ibid). While, 
methodology determines "how do we know the world, or gain knowledge of it" (ibid). 
Creswell (2009:5) argues that although these philosophical ideas are hidden in the 
research, they influence the research practice. 
Although, all qualitative research has an interpretive nature, the paradigm of inquiry 
chosen by the researcher puts particular boundaries on the research in terms of the 
questions asked by the researcher and how he/she interprets responses (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 2000). 
^^  Although BCG is of crucial importance to the EBS, it has been neglected by the literature. With no 
research to date investigated the corporate governance of the EBS in a profound manner to enable the 
understanding of the phenomenon and the factors shaping it in order to better protect this vital sector 
against the recurrence of bank failures of the 1990s. 
^' Corporate governance phenomenon is highly complex and varies from one context to another. 
Additionally, the traditional corporate governance theorizing is deemed incompatible to offer deep 
understanding of corporate governance phenomenon. Making it difficult to unconditionally adopt the 
widely accepted shareholding or stakeholding corporate governance perspectives. Rather the nature of the 
corporate governance within the context of EBS need to be well-understood 
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Although the positivist paradigm developed to examine phenomena in physical sciences 
was prevailing in social science research; the last century had witnessed successful shift 
towards non-positivist paradigms and a social scientists' movement to utilise qualitative 
rather than quantitative research (Donmoyer, 2008). Egon Guba and Yvonna Lincoln 
had led the way in qualitative research and introduced a paradigmatic revolution in 
social sciences resembling Kuhn's revolution in physical science (ibid). The new 
paradigmatic view of social sciences included a view with different epistemological and 
ontological grounds than the prevailing views. Here "knowledge is constructed not 
discovered" (ibid: 592). 
It should be noted that, social patterns which are the focus of interpretative research 
(qualitative research) are different from patterns found in nature. The former does occur 
as a result of causal relationships, while, the latter are the result of "contingent and 
criticizable conditions within which actions takes place" (Carspecken, 2008:173). 
Guba and Linclon (2000) have identified five main paradigms of inquiry within 
qualitative research: Positivism, Post-Positivism, Critical theory et al, constructivism 
and participatory paradigms. These paradigms can be differentiated on the basis of the 
three fundamental characteristics of research as follows: 
A-Ontological perspectives of alternative paradigms 
According to Guba and Lincoln (2000), the ontological basis of positivism considers 
that reality exists; it can be fully understood and only needs to be discovered. This is 
known as Naive realism. Post-positivism considers that reality can be only understood 
imperfectly and probabilistically, this is known as critical realism; while the critical 
theory et al. considers that reality is shaped by many factors including social, political, 
cultural, ethnic and gender values, known as historical realism. Constructivism, 
assumes that reality is locally constructed and is specific to a person or a group, which 
is known as relative reality. Finally, participatory paradigm considers that reality is a 
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participative (subjective-objective) reality co-created by the researcher and the 
community involved in the research. 
B- Epistemological perspectives of alternative paradigms 
Guba and Lincoln (2000) indicated that from an epistemological perspective, positivism 
considers that an investigator (researcher) is totally objective, values are overcome by 
scientific procedures and that findings are true. Similarly, the post-positivism assumes 
the objectivity of the investigator. However, it regards it as a partial objectivity and 
considers that arriving at true findings is still a probability. The critical theory et 
a/.paradigm considers that the investigator and the investigated are linked, various 
values affects the inquiry and that findings are meditated and subjective. Constructivism 
is alike the critical theory, however it considers that findings are created as the 
investigation progresses. Finally, participatory paradigm considers that created 
knowledge is characterised by critical subjectivity; here knowledge is derived through 
experimenting, proposing and co-creating of findings. 
C- Methodological perspectives of alterative paradigms 
Guba and Lincoln (2000) indicated that from a methodological aspect positivism 
usually deploys manipulative scientific experiments by which certain hypotheses are 
tested using quantitative methods. Post-positivism also deploys modified manipulative 
scientific experiments, here the objective is to falsify hypotheses, however, qualitative 
methods may be utilised within this paradigm. While, critical theory et al. depends on 
methodologies that require a dialogue between the investigator and the subject of 
investigation; as such the structure within this paradigm may be changeable. 
Constructivism includes consensus creation through participants' as well as the 
investigator's construction. Finally, the participatory paradigm methodologies utilised 
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encompasses analysis of social problems and political participation to satisfy the needs 
of ordinary people (Kemmis and Mc Taggart, 2000). 
In conclusion, Creswell (2009:8-11) confirms that each of the above-mentioned 
paradigms of inquiry fit a particular research situation, problem or objective. For 
instance, the post-positivism paradigm "holds a deterministic philosophy in which 
causes probably determines effects or outcomes. Thus problems studied... reflect the 
need to identify and assess the causes that influence outcomes, such as fi)und in 
experiments". Indeed, this is reflected on the research methodology employed imder the 
post-positivistic paradigm, where the research methodologies begin with theory, 
followed by data collection that either support or oppose the theory leading to further 
modifications if necessary. In contrast, with a constructivism paradigm the aim is to 
understand the world where a particular phenomenon is embedded as well as the 
complexities surrounding participants' views. As such emphasis is given to questioning 
the processes and specific cultural and historical contexts underpinning such 
phenomenon. Here the research methodologies employed aims at inductive generation 
oftheory. 
So bearing in mind the above-mentioned^ characteristics of various paradigms together 
with the research problem, objectives and that corporate governance phenomenon is 
socially constructed^ t^he constructivism paradigm would seem an appropriate paradigm 
of inquiry for this research. Because it acknowledges that there is multiple rather than 
single reality and that reality is socially constructed (Guba and Lincohi, 1989). More 
precisely constructivism paradigm fits understanding socially constructed phenomena 
such as corporate governance. The next section highlights the main features of the 
constructivism paradigm in more details, identifies its various types and differentiates it 
" See Letza and Sun, 2002; Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; letza et al 2004; Kirkbride et al, 2005; Mason et 
al. 2007; Ardalan, 2007; Letza et al, 2008. 
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from the so called interpretive paradigm; especially that both terms are usually used 
interchangeably (Guba and Lincohi,1989). Finally, it concludes with the paradigm of 
inquiry utilized for this thesis. 
3.5 Constructivist'' Paradigm of Inquiry 
The constructivist paradigm has gained momentum as a competing paradigm to the 
traditional positivistic paradigm during the last century (Holstein and Gubrium, 2008). 
The constructivism emphasis was on the dynamic nature of social reality (ibid). A basic 
premise of constructivism is that "the world we live in and our place in it are not simply 
and evidently there for participants. Rather participants... construct the world of every 
day life and its constituent elements " (ibid:3). 
Constructivists argue that to a great extent, everyone is a constructivist if we accept the 
argument that one's mind is "active in the construction of knowledge" (Schwandt, 
2000:197). Here, the knowledge is not passive and humans "do not find or discover 
knowledge so much as we construct or make it" (ibid). 
Moreover, human's construction of interpretation does not occur in isolation but 
intertwined with other factors such as shared "understanding, practices, language and 
so forth" (ibid). For constructivists, human's mind at birth is in a blank state or "Tabula 
rasa", it is the practice of "rational assessment of information provided by our senses 
that we acquire knowledge" (Weinberg, 2008:17). 
^' It is important to note that the terms constructivism and constructionism are used interchangeably by 
sociology scholars (Guba and Lincohi,2000; Holstein and Gubrium,2008; Best,2008; Samra-Fredricks, 
2008; Gergen and Gergen,2008; 2008b;Restivo and Croissant,2008; Sparks and Smith,2008; 
Hosking,2008). However, the distinction that other scholars puts forward is that the earlier is defined in 
terms of meaning within the individual mind (Gergen and Gergen, 2008). The latter consider meaning-
making as a product of human relationships (ibid.). Recently scholars have made it difficult to "sustain 
the distinction between constructivism and constructionism. Constructivists increasingly find mental 
practices to be reflection or embodiments of social process" (ibid.). So in this thesis the terms are used 
interchangeably and indeed, accept that meaning is constructed by the participants in their daily life ( 
Holstein and Gubrium, 2008). 
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3.5.1 Constructivist Paradigm Contrasted to the Conventional (Positivist 
Paradigm) 
In order to clarify the main characteristics of the constructivist paradigm, this section 
contrasts it with the positivist paradigm'*". Firstly, from an ontological perspective the 
conventional paradigm assume a "realist" ontology, which considers that there is a 
single reality which stands as unchangeable natural laws based on cause-effect 
relationships and accepts that truth exists (Guba and Lincohi, 1989). 
In contrast the constructivist paradigm stresses on the existence of multiple realities that 
are socially constructed unboimded to natural laws. As such, this paradigm considers 
truth as "that most informed and sophisticated construction on which there is consensus 
among individuals most competent to form such a construction" (ibid: 86). From an 
epistemological perspective, the positivistic paradigm holds "a dualist objectivist 
epistemology" (ibid: 84), which refers to the ability of the researcher to be completely 
objective from the phenomena studied and exerts no influence on it. In contrast the 
constructivist paradigm assumes a "subjectivist epistemology" (ibid) that accepts the 
interrelation of the researcher and the phenomena. Hence the findings of the 
investigation are created through the process of inquiry. 
Finally, the positivist methodological orientation is "Interventionist... that strips context 
of its contaminating .... Influences... as such, the truth can explain the phenomenon as 
it is, leading to the ability to predict and control" (ibid:84). While, the constructivist 
methodological orientation is hermeneutic by nature, it includes a "continuous dialectic 
of iterations of analysis ... leading to the emergence of a joint..construction of a case" 
(ibid). 
'"' This is particularly useful because these two paradigms can be seen as two extremes on the continuum 
of paradigms of inquiry, also the constructivism paradigm has challenged the premises of the 
conventional positivism paradigm. 
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3.5.2 Social Constructionism 
Constructionism may split into three versions: Social, psychological and radical 
constructionism (Constantino, 2008:116). Firstly, psychological constructivism is 
relevant to the education field; it deals with the issue of how people learn and how the 
instruction process should be carried-out. Psychological constructivism supposes that 
knowledge is not acquired but rather constructed. Secondly, social constructivism 
addresses both the epistemological and ontological questions of constructivism in 
"Describing the bodies of knowledge developed over human history as social constructs 
that do not reflect an objective external world" (ibid: 118). Here everything that an 
individual knows is determined by a number of factors including values, politics, 
religions, ideology and language. 
Creswell (2009) adds that social constructivism utilises a research open-ended 
questioning. Thus, it normally achieves good results as it gives the researcher a chance 
to discover the 
subjective meanings ....negotiated socially and historically...formed through interaction with 
others (hence social constructivism) and through historical and cultural norms that operate in 
individual's lives....they also focus on the specific contexts in which people live and work...the 
researcher's intent is to ... interpret the meaning others have about the world" (P.8). 
According to Schwandt (2000), social constructivism does not only reject the "Naive 
realist" view of representation assumed by positivism. But also goes further and reject 
any interest in the ontology of "the real". As such, social constructivism can be 
considered a non-ontological paradigm with no position regarding "what sorts of things 
exist and what their status is" (ibid: 197). While, epistemologically, social 
constructivism accepts the interaction between the researcher and the subject of 
research, as such the researcher is subjective (Gergen, and Gergen, 2008). 
Thirdly; radical constructivism is an extreme form of the psychological versions, "It 
asserts that any external world is entirely a construction of an individual and exists in 
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that person's consciousness as his or her subjective experience" (Costantino, 
2008:119). 
3.5.3 Distinction between Interpretivist Paradigm and Constructivism 
Interpretivist paradigm is often combined with constructivism (Costantino, 2008; 
Creswell, 2007; 2009). According to Cuba and Lincoln (1989) both refer to the same 
paradigm. They stated that the constructivism paradigm is a replacement for traditional 
positivist paradigm. However, other researcher such as Schwandt (1998, 2000) 
differentiates between interpretivist and constructivism paradigms. He stated that the 
interpretivist paradigm "wrestle with maintaining the opposition of subjectivity and 
objectivity" (Schwandt, 1998:223). Interpretivist accepts the subjective experience, 
however "they seek to disengage from that experience and objectijy it.... They struggle 
with drawing a line between the object of investigations and investigator... to develop 
an objective interpretive science of human experience thus arises" (ibid:224). They 
subscribe to subjective interpretation and objective understanding (Elharidy et al, 
2008:42). Indeed, constructivism paradigm accepts that the interpretation is "the 
inquirer's construction of the constructions of the actors one studies" (ibid: 222). Thus 
it is subjective, therefore both paradigms are ontologically relativists, while the 
interpretivist is epistemologically objectivist and the constructivist is subjectivist. 
3.6 Paradigm of Inquiry for this Research 
Given that qualitative research encompasses various paradigms of inquiry (Guba and 
Lincoln, 2000). The main issue here is choosing the paradigm that best suits the 
research objectives, problem and matches the nature of corporate governance 
phenomenon. Consequently, this research will opt for a combination of social 
constructivism and interpretivist paradigms due to a number of reasons. Firstly, the 
nature of corporate governance phenomenon as a social construction and context 
specific would require the acceptance of the relative reality ontology. Secondly, as yet 
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little is known about corporate governance in the EBS context, one needs to understand 
the phenomenon from the perspective of actors who live in such particular context, who 
are in the position to tell the best about the phenomenon construction. As such the 
research is interested in studying the subjective meanings associated with the corporate 
governance phenomenon. Indeed, the researcher interpretations of these subjective 
meanings will reflect subjectivity of the researcher himself because "it is acknowledged 
that ...objectivity is difficult, as everyone has subjective tendencies. Yet recognizing 
subjectivity is part way to overcoming it" (Howell, 1998:12). Moreover, "Interpretive 
research uses theory to provide explanations of human actions, via logical consistency 
and agreement with the actors' common sense interpretations" (Ryan et al, 2002:42). 
Indeed, the research is interested in the understanding of the subjective meanings held 
by actors within the context and at the same time needs to maintain an open mind 
towards the context studied in order not to place any constraints that obstructs 
discovering the nature of the phenomenon. Moreover, this study intends to utilize a 
formal theory (NIST) to further understand the phenomenon which means it subscribes 
to an objective epistemology. As such, the research through the combination of social 
constructivism and interpretivisim is attempting objectivity through acknowledging 
subjectivity of the researcher (Howell, 1998). This is suitable for this thesis to build a 
substantive theory about corporate governance of banks using the NIST framework. 
3.7 Research Methodology: Grounded Theory 
Research methodology is an overall approach or strategy to the research process (CoUis 
and Hussey, 2003). Research methodology should reflect the ontological and 
epistemological premises of the research (Schensul, 2008). Moreover, research 
methodology affects the choice of research methods or the techniques utilized for data 
collection (ibid). Here, as groimded theory is chosen as the research methodology for 
this thesis, this section will discuss the philosophical underpinnings of grounded theory, 
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its various types. It identifies grounded theory version utilized in this thesis in terms of 
fitting the ontological and epistemological assumptions of the research, as well as, the 
research problem. Finally'*', it highlights the distinctive features of grounded theory. 
What is Grounded Theory? 
Grounded theory aims to develop a substantive theory through comparative analysis and 
coding procedures (Howell, 2000). Glaser and Strauss (1967) argued that substantive 
theory is "developed from a substantive, or empirical, area of sociological inquiry .... 
such as .... organizations" (P. 32). Grounded theory "does not attempt to undermine 
theory but improve it" (Howell, 2000: 28). It considers that "A theory's only 
replacement is a better theory" (Glaser and Strauss, 1967: 28). According to Glaser 
(1978) it "is based on the systematic generation of theory from data, that itself is 
systematically obtained from social research. Thus, the grounded theory method offers 
a rigorous orderly guide to theory development" (P.2). 
Grounded theory is based on comparative analysis and aims to build a theory on the 
basis of "general categories" (Howell, 2000: 28). It does not assume that the mquirer 
knows the substantive areas better than those involved in it; neither assumes that a 
theory will be a finished product (ibid). Indeed, it attempts to generate theory based on 
data collected and analyzed simultaneously as the research progresses (ibid). 
Grounded theory is an "inductive qualitative methodology that allows the researcher to 
identify the main concern of a group of subjects and the behaviors they use to resolve 
their main concern " (Artinian et al, 2009: 3). 
As such it can be contrasted to the logico-deductive theory which aims to verify 
deductibility driven hypothesis (Howell, 2000), it attempts to develop theory 
inductively (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Reiterating Glaser and Strauss (1967), Howell 
(1998) indicated that 
"" Chapter Four starts with discussing the research methods used m this thesis discussing how various 
research methods are utilised during stages of grounded theory methodology. 
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grounded theory is inductively derived from the study of the phenomenon it represents. Data 
collection, analysis and theory are reciprocal with each other; one does not start with a theory 
which is then tested but an area of study from which what is relevant to the area becomes 
apparent. Induction needs to be grounded in social phenomenon or observations and 
experience; hence the link between inductive and grounded theory (P. 38). 
Indeed, theory generation woiild include 
verifying as much as possible with accurate evidence as possible is requisite while one discovers 
and generates his theory but not to the point where verification becomes so paramount as to 
curb generation (ibid:28). 
As such, it may be possible to criticize a generated theory on the basis of missing data. 
But here and for those who may excessively be concerned with evidence Glaser and 
Strauss (1967) argued that "If each debunker thought about the potential values of 
comparative method (as the main strategy for generating theory) ... they would realize 
that he has merely posed another comparative datum for generating another theoretical 
property or category" (ibid: 22, author brackets). This would only help to develop the 
theory rather than falsify it, because "a theory's only replacement is another 
theory...theories are modified rather than proved" (Howell, 1998: 282). 
3.7.1 Type of Theory Developed By Grounded Theory Methodology 
Reiterating Strauss and Corbin (1990b), Howell (2000) stated that grounded theory's 
main objective is to construct substantive theory which has to meet four central criteria: 
Fit, comprehension, generality and control: the theory should be induced from diverse data and 
be faithful to reality (it should fit). Secondly, the fit should be comprehensible; thirdly, the data 
should be comprehensive and interpretations conceptually wide (there should be generality, it 
should be made clear when conditions apply to specific situations and phenomena (there should 
control) (P. 25). 
According to Merriam (1988) theories can be classified into three types: "grand 
theories, which are most often found in the natural sciences; middle-range theories, 
which are placed higher than mere working hypotheses but do not have the status of 
grand theory; substantive theories, which are developed within a certain context" 
(Cited in Collis and Hussey, 2003:123). Laughlin (1995) has added that it is almost 
impossible to develop grand theories in social sciences where it is more likely to 
develop "skeletal theory" which is open for empirical data to give more enrichment in a 
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particular context. Howell (2004) adds that substantive theory is derived from the study 
of a specific area, while grand and meso theories are of more abstract and highly 
conceptual nature. He added, as substantive level theories being more specific it is easier 
to identify the "cause and effect or dependent and independent variables " but harder to 
give "full understanding and explanation" (ibid: 7). However, this does not mean that 
the value of substantive theories shall be undermined, as a substantive theory may have 
"important general implications and relevance, and become almost automatically a 
spring-board or stepping stone to the development of a grounded formal theory" 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967:79). Still the aim of grounded theory is to develop a 
substantive level theory, Strauss and Corbin (1990b) clearly outlined this when they 
indicated that 
Levels and types are sometimes confused... one can have theory about a given phenomenon ... 
about an organizational or biographical phenomenon... a theory about a phenomenon... can still 
be substantive theory ... note that any substantive theory evolves from a study of a phenomenon 
situated in one particular situation context.. A formal theory, on the other hand, emerges from a 
study of a phenomenon examined under many different types of situations... when developing a 
formal theory you might study status in several types of situations, say status of persons within 
families, the status of socialites within a given city, and the status of various professional ranks 
within academic institutions (P. 174). 
3.7.2 Philosophical Origins of Grounded Theory 
Since the introduction of grounded theory by Glaser and Strauss (1967), it has evolved 
as its originators have fiirther articulated and adopted the very method of grounded 
theory (Locke, 2003). Moreover, their students have also contributed to its evolution and 
though these students have tried to stick to the core concepts and tenets of grounded 
theory, nothing have stopped them to develop their own style of grounded theory (ibid; 
Gurd, 2008). One example is Kathy Charmaz a student of Glaser and Strauss, who 
developed her own style of constructivist grounded theory (Mills et al, 2006; Charmaz, 
2006; Gurd, 2008). Additionally, substantive researchers who learned and utilized 
grounded theory and incorporated it in their work have also "further interpreted its 
research practices" (Locke, 2003: 2). 
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Indeed, this has created some confusion in relation to the variety of methodological 
stances of various models labelled grounded theory (Heath and Cowley, 2004; Elharidy 
et al, 2008; Parker and Roffey, 1997; Jones and Noble, 2007; Mills et al, 2006; Gurd, 
2008; Tan, 2010). 
Notably, various grounded theory models or versions have taken various paradigmatic 
stances, for instance the original Glaser and Strauss grounded theory has its roots laying 
in American pragmatism and the symbolic interactionism school, which indicates that 
grounded theory could be located within the interpretive paradigm (Lock, 2001, 2003; 
Howell, 2000; 1998; Gurd, 2008; Heath and Cowley, 2004). As such, it assumes a 
relativist ontology and objectivist epistemology. However, others such as Denzin and 
Lincoln (1994) consider that the classic grounded theory has reality ontology and 
objective epistemology and thus belongs to post-positivist paradigm (Lock, 2003; 
Annells, 1996). 
Later variations of grounded theory, such as Glaser (1978, 1992) can also be related to 
post-positivism orientation (Moghaddam, 2006). While Strauss and Corbin version 
(1990b; 1994; 1998) are more associated with the interpretive paradigm tradition 
(Locke, 2003). It should be noted that the literature includes somewhat confusing 
opinions about the paradigmatic orientation of Strauss and Corbin version of the 
grounded theory (Mills et al, 2006). However, their acknowledgement of the importance 
of multiple realities and truth locates them in the interpretive paradigm (ibid), especially 
that they assume the objectivity of the researcher (Moghaddam, 2006). Finally, Charmaz 
(2000, 2002, 2006) has developed another variant of grounded theory: constructivist 
grounded theory. Charmaz addressed the position of the researcher as a co-producer of 
data jointly with participants; as such she acknowledges that grounded theory should 
maintain a relativist ontology (Mills et al, 2006); but with a subjectivist epistemology, 
because "theory depends on the researcher's v/ew; it does not and cannot stand outside 
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of it" (Charmaz, 2006:130). Obviously, this locates Charmaz grounded theory in the 
constructivist paradigm (ibid). 
In conclusion, the above discussion clarifies that in grounded theory "paradigm lines 
are not always clearly drawn ... they are determined more by the commitments of 
individual researchers than by the operational practices of a research approach" 
(Locke, 2001:13). 
However, researchers who identify clearly their ontological and epistemological stances, 
can then "choose a point on the methodological spiral of grounded theory" (Mills et al, 
2006:7). Grounded theory as such "transcends a simple categorization of methods and 
involves deeper assumptions about the philosophical basis of doing research " (Elharidy 
et al, 2008:148). 
In this thesis, the paradigm of inquiry is a combination of interpretive and social 
constructionism. As such it regards groimded theory as trying "to understand reality 
through social constructions and an attempt at objectivity through recognizing the 
subjectivity of the researcher and researched in terms of their interpretive nature" 
(Howell, 1998: 13). Therefore this thesis will attempt to build a substantive theory of 
BCG phenomenon based on the subjective meanings associated with those who live the 
phenomenon, thus investigating the phenomenon as it is socially constructed. 
Acknowledging that the interpretations of the phenomenon will essentially be affected 
by the researcher subjectivity ''as no one would claim to enter the field completely free 
from the influence of past experience and reading" (Heath and Cowley, 2004:143). But 
through the comparative analysis (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) which is a fundamental 
canon of groimded theory the study will not only approach the research with an open 
mind, but also will attempt to minimize subjectivity'* .^ To achieve this, the thesis shares 
*^ More realistically is "to acknowledge that a researcher's perspective can shape then- inquiry without this 
perspective simply being applied to the data" (Hardling, 2006: 132). 
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the paradigmatic orientation of a combination of the following versions of grounded 
theory: 
• Strauss and Corbin (1990b, 1998) version of grounded theory with a relativist 
ontology and objectivist epistemology as in the interpretive paradigm. 
• Charmaz (2000, 2002, 2006) version of groimded theory with a relativist 
ontology and subjectivist epistemology as in the constructionist paradigm. 
3.7.3 Reasons for Utilizing Grounded Theory Methodology 
In the light of the research problem, the nature of the phenomenon investigated and the 
philosophical stances of this thesis, grounded theory research methodology is chosen on 
the following grounds: 
• Grounded theory allows the generation of a substantive theory that "offers 
insight, enhances understanding, and provides a meaningful guide to action" 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1998: 12). Obviously, this matches the research objective 
of imderstanding the nature of corporate governance phenomenon to effectively 
enhance corporate governance practices. Moreover, groimded theory "is more 
likely to resemble the reality" (ibid) as it is grounded on data from the 
substantive area (ibid). It builds theory faithful to the situation investigated 
(CoUis and Hussey, 2003). As such it can provide an understanding of the 
corporate governance phenomenon taking into consideration the particular 
characteristics of the context in which it is embedded. This qualifies groimded 
theory to offer the understanding of corporate governance phenomenon within 
the EBS, identify its critical aspects and how it is shaped within this context. 
• Grounded theory provides the opportunity for generating a substantive theory 
that can be compared to formal theory, towards generating more formal 
substantive theory. Hence, this also matches another aspect addressed by this 
research. That is to demonstrate how the NIST can be used as an alternative 
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corporate governance theoretical framework. 
• The philosophical assumptions of this thesis using a combination of interpretive 
and social constructionist paradigm can be met with a combination of grounded 
theory versions of Strauss and Corbin (1990b, 1998) and Charmaz (2000, 2002, 
2006). This is quite important because it safeguards against the danger related to 
"that the focus of the researcher could be on how to verify/ the emerging codes 
rather than on how to understand the nature of the phenomenon being studied: 
(Elharidy et al, 2008:148). 
• As grounded theory is based on the canons of the comparative method, the 
systematic analysis and concurrent data collection; in addition to being 
acknowledged as a rigorous approach that 'forces the researcher to look beyond 
the superficial, to apply every possible interpretation before developing final 
concepts, and to demonstrate these concepts through explication and data 
supported evidence" (Goulding, 2004: 297). It provides a faithful attempt to 
develop substantive theory that reflects socially constructed reality. Moreover, 
grounded theory has been selected by many researchers in numerous empirical 
studies where the emphasis has been on studying the phenomenon within a 
particular social construct (Locke, 2001; Bourmistrov and Mellemvik, 2002). 
This includes in the area of Accounting Gurd (2008), in Management 
Accounting Elharidy et al (2008), in Management Research Locke (2001). Also, 
in Corporate Governance Goddard and Assad (2006) and Nwanj (2006); and in 
Political Sciences and specifically in studying of European integration in 
financial institutions Howell (1998, 2000, and 2004) has used the grounded 
theory methodology. This confirms the suitability of grounded theory for this 
study. 
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3.7.4 Alternative Approaches to Grounded Theory Procedures 
Although grounded theory was mtroduced by both Glaser and Strauss (1967), two well-
known approaches to grounded theory procedures emerged fi:om their original work: 
Glaser (1978, 1992) and Strauss and Corbin (1990b, 1998). Contrasting these 
approaches was an area of interest for many researchers such as Parker and Roffey 
(1997); Howell (2000); Heath and Cowley (2004); Jones and Noble (2007); Gurd (2008) 
and Elharidy et al (2008). However, Parker and Roffey (1997) provide a comprehensive 
summary of the principal differences between the two approaches as shown in table 3.1. 
First, Glaser determines an area or an organization for undertaking the study and allows 
the research issues to emerge during the course of the research process, while Strauss 
and Corbin allow for a more specific identification of the research issue or phenomenon 
that is to be studied. For Glaser, research issues become visible through "observations 
in the field through the detailed process of coding leading to theoretical saturation" 
(Elharidy et al, 2008:145). His emphasis is on the development of research issues 
during coding procedures "as perceived by the people being observed in the study" 
(ibid). While to Strauss and Corbin, the researcher can determine before hand to direct 
the data collection and sampling towards a "particular issue " or phenomenon'*^ (Parker 
and Roffey, 1997:223). 
Second, the analytical procedures identified by Glaser (1992) and Strauss and Corbin 
(1990b, 1998) are different. While, Glaser (1992) requires that the analytical 
methodology be more general with less structured framework, Strauss and Corbin 
(1990b, 1998) have developed a more structured analytical framework composed of 
three types of coding (Open, Axial and Selective coding) and a paradigm model that 
interrelates various categories (conditions, actions / reactions, consequences) pertaining 
*^ Such as studying BCG phenomenon within the EBS 
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Table 3.1 Alternative Approach to Conducting Grounded Theory 
Aspect 
Research Issue 
Procedures 
Ease of 
Operations 
Theory 
Formulation 
Use of Existing 
Literature 
Glaser approach 
• What are the chief concerns / 
Problem people in the area 
under study? 
• What category does the concern 
indicate? 
• The problem emerges and 
should not be forced by the 
methodology. 
• Categories and their properties 
"emerge" through constant 
comparison of incident to 
incident. 
• Can be difficult to 
operationalize 
• Generates concepts and 
their relationships to 
explain and / or interpret 
variations in behaviour in 
the substantive area under 
study. 
• Produces a theoretical 
conceptual hypothesis. 
Testing is left to other 
researchers interested in 
such work. 
• Should not review the 
literature 
Strauss and Corbin 
• The research question is a 
statement that identifies the 
phenomenon to be studied. 
• Researcher need help with 
the interpretation process: 
procedures and techniques 
need to be spelled out. 
Subcategories are linked to 
categories that denote a set 
of relationships (i.e. casual 
conditions, action / 
interaction strategies, and 
consequences). 
• Easier to operationalize 
• Generates an 
inductively derived 
theory about a 
phenomenon comprised 
of interrelated concepts. 
• Undertakes continual 
verification and testing 
to determine likely 
validity of concepts and 
relationships between 
them. 
• Literature review can 
stimulate theoretical 
sensitivity, can be 
source of data, stimulate 
questions, direct 
theoretical sampling. 
Source: Based on Parker and Roffey (1997) 
to the phenomenon studied aiming to produce a-substantive theory. However, Strauss 
and Corbin (1998) have stressed that the procedures they set out in their book aimed to 
provide "some standardization and rigor to the process...these procedures were 
designed not to be followed dogmatically but rather to be used creatively and flexibly by 
researchers as they deem appropriate "(P. 13). Glaser (1992) advocates open and 
theoretical coding approaches which are purely emergent. Glaser (1992) considers that 
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Strauss and Corbin's coding procedures as forcing rather than emergence of theory. He 
considered that using of axial coding, paradigm model and conditional matrix as 
departure from the original version of grounded theory introduced by Glaser and Strauss 
in 1967 (Charmaz and Bryant, 2008). 
Although, coding procedure are seen as a key divergence point between the two 
approaches (Jones and Noble, 2007), the fact that both approaches make use of constant 
comparison of incidents and apply theoretical sensitivity to develop theory, make the 
issue of divergence debatable. 
Glaser would argue that whereas his essentially neutral and passively executed in order to 
ensure the emergence of the underlying reality within the data, the Straussian approach results 
in the forcing of data into pre-determined categories and obstructs the emergence of what the 
data really saying. However, the actual difference for the practising grounded theory researcher 
may be difficult to discern (Jones and Nobel, 2007:92). 
Third, Glaser (1992) and Strauss and Corbin (1990b) agreed on that Glaser's general 
framework is difficult to operationalise when compared to the more structured detailed 
steps provided by Strauss and Corbin (Parker and Roffey, 1997). 
Fourth, Glaser's version of groimded theory focuses on hypothesis development and 
integration of these hypotheses "grounded theory is not verification... hypothesis need 
not be verified, validated or be more reliable" (Elharidy et al, 2008:144). Here the 
verification of the emergent hypothesis is left to other researchers who are interested in 
the substantive area. On the other hand, Strauss and Corbin's version seeks verification 
of the emergent categories and their relationships (Parker and Roffey, 1997). 
Lastly, Glaser believes that the researcher should not review the literature before data 
collection and analysis to avoid any sort of forcing or having preconceived ideas, 
interpretations, bias or pre-conceptions about the studied phenomena. He said: 
In GT there is no preconception of being too broad or global or too narrow at whatever stage... 
the emerging questions simply tap the variables that work whatever the field ...in contrast the 
dictum in grounded theory research is: there is a need not to review any of the literature in the 
substantive area under examination (Glaser, 1992:25-31 cited in Elharidy et al, 2008:146). 
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Conversely, Strauss and Corbin consider that it is practically impossible to discard the 
knowledge, training and professional experience of the researcher when conducting 
grounded theory; they reiterate Dey (1993:63): 
there is a difference between an open mind and an empty head. To analyze data, we need to use 
accumulated knowledge, not dispense with it. The issue is not whether to use existing knowledge, 
but how (Dey, 1993: 63 cited in Strauss and Corbin; 1998: 47) 
Strauss and Corbin (1998) put it forward as follows: 
As we come across an event of interest in our data, we ask, what is this? Later, as we move 
along in our analysis, it is our knowledge and experience... that enables us to recognize 
incidents as being conceptually similar or dissimilar and to give them conceptual names. It is by 
using what we bring to the data in a systematic way that we become sensitive to meaning without 
forcing our explanations on data (Strauss and Corbin, 1998:47) 
Strauss and Corbin (1990b) argue that at a certain stage of the research the researcher 
will encoimter an issue with background in the literature in such situation: 
It is important to acknowledge and use that...however, there is no need to review all of the 
literature beforehand as is frequently done by researchers trained in other approaches, because 
if we are effective in bur analysis, then new categories will emerge that neither we, nor anyone 
else had thought previously... since discovery is our purpose, we do not have beforehand 
knowledge of all categories relevant to our theory (P. 50). 
Strauss and Corbin (1990b) identified that technical literature can be valuable in a 
number of ways: it can be used to stimulate theoretical sensitivity by providing concepts 
and relationships that can be checked against actual data collected, it can be a secondary 
source of data, it can stimulate questions, direct theoretical sampling and act as a source 
of secondary validation. 
3.7.5 Rationale for Using Strauss and Corbin Version of Grounded Theory 
This study adopts Strauss and Corbin's (1990b, 1998) groimded theory approach for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, as Strauss and Corbin (1990b, 1998) is located within the 
interpretive paradigm, it shares the same ontological stance (relativism) assumed here in 
this study. 
Secondly, before conducting the study the researcher identified the phenomenon to be 
investigated (corporate governance in the EBS), whereas Glaser advocates conducting 
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the study without predetermining the phenomenon to be studied as this will emerge 
during the research process as implied by interaction with the participants. 
Thirdly, the researcher has reviewed the literature to establish the importance of the 
research while the research themes were left to emerge during the course of research. 
Fourthly, this approach provide a more structured and practically oriented method for 
generating theory which can be helpful to understand large volume of data collected 
"yet they are not restrictively prescriptive "; this practicality is crucial especially in the 
case of time constrained studies (Parker and Roffey, 1997:223). 
Fifthly, Strauss and Corbin approach has been used in many management studies, for 
instance Gurd (2008) reviews grounded theory research in the discipline of accounting 
and concluded that Strauss and Corbin procedures to grounded theory has been adopted 
in most of these studies. 
3.7.6 Fundamental Principles of Grounded Theory Approach 
Grounded theory is based on a number of fundamental principles, most importantly this 
include simultaneous collection and analysis of data, constant comparative method and 
coding procedures (Charmaz, 2000:510-511). This can be further discussed as follows: 
I. Simultaneous collection and analysis of data 
Unlike other qualitative researches that collect most of their data prior to analysis, the 
grounded theory analysis procedures begin as soon as the "first bit" of data is collected. 
The simultaneous collection of data and analysis is fundamental to grounded theory and 
the development of the emergent substantive theory (Strauss and Corbin, 1990a; 
Howell, 2003a). Strauss and Corbin (1990a) determine that the rationale of this 
principle is that analysis guides the next data collection; the grounded theorist enters the 
field with some questions or areas in mmd, while simultaneous data collection and 
analysis either confirms these questions or areas as relevant to the theory generation or 
irrelevant and have to be discarded (ibid). Moreover, being open and analysing for cues 
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and hunches protect against missing "anything that may be salient.. All seemingly 
relevant issues must be incorporated into the next set of interviews and observations" 
(ibid: 6). Strauss and Corbin (1990a) reassure that 
This Process is a major source of the effectiveness of the grounded theory approach. The 
research process itself guides the researcher toward examining all of the possibly rewarding 
avenues to understanding. This is why the research method is one of discovery and one which 
grounded a theory in reality...Every concept brought into the study or discovered in the research 
process is at first considered provisional. Each concept earns its way into the theory by 
repeatedly being present in interviews, documents, and observations in one form or another—or 
by being significantly absent...grounding concepts in the reality of data thus gives this method 
theory-observation congruence or compatibility(P.6-7). 
II. Constant Comparative Method 
The grounded theory analysis employs a constant comparison method where incidents 
are compared one to another and the subsequent concepts emerging are also compared 
with one another. This process leads to discovering concepts, their characteristics and 
the range of these characteristics (Strauss and Corbin, 1990b). Moreover, constant 
comparisons help ''guarding against bias, for he or she is then challenging concepts 
with fresh data. Such comparison also helps to achieve greater precision (the grouping 
of like and only like phenomena) and consistency (always grouping like with like) " 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1990a). 
III. Coding Procedures 
According to Strauss and Corbin (1990a, 1990b, 1998) coding is the principal analytical 
process within grounded theory research. It is "the analytical processes through which 
data are fractured, conceptualized, and integrated to form theory" (Strauss and Corbin, 
1998:3). There are three types of coding processes: open, axial and selective coding. 
Open Coding 
Open coding is the "interpretiveprocess by which data are broken down analytically" 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1990a: 12). Open coding aids the researcher to view the 
phenomenon studied in a non-traditional approach. Within the open coding the 
researcher compares instance one another grouping similar concepts that emerge from 
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the data collected to form higher level abstract categories and sub-categories (ibid). 
Then these emerging categories and their characteristics become the basis for theoretical 
sampling. By asking questions and comparing categories more specificity is achieved 
and any ambiguities encountered in the data are resolved. Moreover, this guard against 
subjectivity, bias and forcing. Also errors will be identified as it wall not fit within the 
emerging concepts (Strauss and Corbin, 1990a). 
Axial Coding 
It refers to "bringing the analysis together and provides unity" (Howell, 2000:33). In 
axial coding data are put back together in new ways by making connections between 
categories. This is done by utilizing a coding paradigm which provides a fi-amework to 
identify the phenomenon and link it with sub-categories namely: conditions, context, 
action/interactional strategies and consequences (Strauss and Corbin, 1990b). 
During axial coding the concern to develop categories is still present but in terms of 
their relationships within a paradigm model, rather than in terms of their dimensions 
and properties; it should be noted that during axial coding "we are not talking about 
relating of several main categories to form an overall theoretical formulations, but the 
development of what will eventually become one of several main categories (Strauss 
and Corbin, 1990b:97). Although, open and axial coding are two distinctive analytical 
procedures within grounded theory analysis, researcher can move back and forth 
between them, as such axial coding is not necessarily subsequent to open coding. 
Finally, relationships developed during this stage must be considered provisional till 
evidence, incidents and events confirm or refute these relationships, and while these 
relationships are not necessarily refuted additional scrutiny against incoming data adds 
variation and depth to the understanding of the phenomenon studied (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1990b). 
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Again, it is obvious that coding procedures explained above exemplifies the move 
between induction and deduction thinking. Where, relationships, properties and 
dimensions appertaining to a particular category are derived by induction from data, 
they are verified (by deduction) by comparing them to incoming data. There is 
"constant interplay between proposing and checking. This back and forth movement is 
what makes our theory grounded!" (Strauss and Corbin, 1990b:111). 
Selective Coding 
It is defined as "The process of selecting the core category, systematically relating it to 
other categories, validating those relationships, and filling in categories that need 
further refinement and development" (Strauss and Corbin, 1990b: 116). It involves 
identifying of the core category which reflects the "central phenomenon of the study... 
the other categories will always stand in relationship to the core category as conditions, 
action/interactional strategies, or consequences" (Strauss and Corbin, 1990a: 14). 
Selective coding involves the important aspect of relating categories to the core 
category; this should take place by the means of the paradigm model (ibid), it should be 
noted that during axial coding some integration should have taken place, while in selec-
tive coding the set of conceptual relationships will be refined around the identified core 
category, this may include going back to the field to saturate missing details; the focus 
at this stage is to develop "all interpretive work done over the course of... research" 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1990b: 142). 
Finally, coding within grounded theory approach should take into account process, 
Strauss and Corbin (1998:163) defined process as "sequence of evolving action/ 
interaction, changes in which can be traced to changes in structural conditions". 
Moreover, process is the "sequence of action / interaction that occur over time and 
space, changing or sometimes remaining the same in response to the situation or 
context" (ibid: 165). Processual analysis should work at the micro and macro levels, 
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Strauss and Corbin (1998:179) identified that the process and structure should be linked 
as the former represents the "dynamic and evolving nature of action / interaction " while 
the latter "creates the context for action / interaction and, as such, is what gives the 
(process) rhythm, pacing, form, and character "(ibid). Process provides the difference 
between a "snapshot and a moving picture " (ibid). 
3.8 Conclusion 
On the basis of the research problem, the thesis theoretical assumptions (ontological and 
epistemological stances) and the degree of uncertainty surrounding the investigated 
phenomenon of BCG (Trauth, 2001), this thesis has chosen a qualitative research 
design. This thesis attempts to fill the gap identified in the literature review concerning 
the general lack of research of BCG, especially, within the Egyptian context. Moreover, 
the thesis attempts to demonstrate how an alternative theoretical underpinning of NIST 
can explain the complex phenomenon of corporate governance. Yet provide a rich 
understanding of the corporate governance phenomenon compared with the limited 
views offered by the traditional corporate governance theorizing (shareholding v. 
stakeholding). Indeed, this chapter indicated that much uncertainty surrounds the 
corporate governance phenomenon in the Egyptian context. Thus, both the research 
problem and the nature of the investigated phenomenon support the selection of a 
qualitative research design. 
This chapter explained various paradigms of inquiry within qualitative research and 
differentiated between them on the basis of their ontological, epistemological and 
methodological stances. A combination of interpretive-social constructionist paradigms 
is selected to underpin the methodology of this research; reflecting a relativist ontology 
and an attempt to objectivity through acknowledgement of subjectivity (Howell, 1998). 
Indeed, the basic objective of this thesis is to build a substantive theory of BCG using 
an alternative theoretical framework of NIST. The combination of the interpretive-
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social constructionist paradigms permit that, while both paradigms look at the 
subjective meanings of socially constructed phenomenon. The interpretive paradigm 
through its subscription in the objective epistemology permits the use of formal theory 
to offer explanations of human activities and actions. Overall, overcoming the 
subjectivity associated with social constructionism is attempted in this thesis through 
acknowledging subjectivity. 
Moreover, through the discussion of the nature of grounded theory methodology, the 
type of theory it develops and its philosophical origins. This chapter chooses grounded 
theory methodology to build the substantive theory of BCG based on the following: It 
can provide the understanding of the corporate governance phenomenon reflecting the 
context where it is embedded and as such meet the research objectives. It permits the 
generation of substantive theory that can be compared to formal theories to give it more 
formality. As such it fits the attempt to explain the substantive theory using NIST as an 
altemative theoretical framework for corporate governance. Moreover, a combination of 
Strauss and Corbin (1990b, 1998) and Charmaz (2000, 2004, 2006) versions of 
grounded theory matches the philosophical underpinnings of this thesis, this mitigates 
the danger of altering the focus of the researcher on verification of emerging codes 
rather than on understanding the phenomenon investigated (Elharidy et al, 2008: 148). 
Grounded theory is a rigours qualitative methodology (Goulding, 2004). Additionally, it 
has been the choice of qualitative researchers across various disciplines including 
corporate governance (See Goddard and Assad, 2006 and Nwanji, 2006). 
This chapter has also presented the altemative approaches for grounded theory 
procedures namely the Glaserian approach (1978, 1992) and Strauss and Corbin 
approach (1990b, 1998). It highlights the core differences between the two approaches; 
and presents the rationale for selecting Strauss and Corbin approach in this thesis. 
Strauss and Corbin's version is located in the interpretive rather the post-positivist 
106 
paradigm as such it shares the same ontological stance of this thesis (relativist). It 
permits determining the phenomenon to be investigated before entering the field as well 
as reviewing the literature beforehand; it also focuses on the emergence of research 
themes during the research process (Parker and Roffey, 1997). It is more structured but 
not restrictively prescriptive as such useful in time restricted studies (ibid). Finally, it 
has been very popular in many management studies (Guard, 2008). 
Data collection methods used in this thesis and theoretical sampling techniques are 
discussed in the following chapter. In addition to the analysis of the survey 
questionnaire which highlights important areas and issues that should guide further data 
collection using semi-structured interviews (A). 
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Chapter Four 
Data Collection, Sampling and Analysis of Survey 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter explains data sampling and research site selection applied within this 
thesis. It discusses the concept of theoretical sampling and how data collection methods 
are related to its different types. It also discusses grounded theory coding procedures 
applied in this thesis and their relation to data collection. Finally, this chapter presents 
the survey analysis and concludes with the important areas that enlighten semi-
structured interviews (A) questions formulation within open coding stage which is 
covered in the next chapter. 
4.2 Data Sampling and Research Site Selection 
The research scope included commercial banks operating in Egypt. These included both 
State-owned and privately owned banks. All these banks'*'* are registered with the CBE 
which is the sole authority regulating the banking industry in Egj'pt. In order to obtain 
rich data and accovmt for variation as much as possible all commercial banks were 
approached. 
This research was based on grounded theory technique of theoretical sampling. 
As advocated by Strauss and Corbin (1990b, 1998), theoretical sampling is an 
important process within grounded theory to construct rich categories that are 
well related to each other. It is sampling 
on the basis of concepts that have proven theoretical relevance to the evolving theory. 
These concepts are deemed significant because (1) they are repeatedly present or notably 
absent when comparing incident after incident, and (2) through the coding procedures 
they earn the status of categories. The aim of theoretical sampling is to sample events, 
incidents and so forth... those are indicative of categories, their properties and 
dimensions, so that you can develop and conceptually relate them (Strauss and Corbin, 
1990b: 177). 
44 Appendix 2 
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There are important features that should also be kept in mind during the investigation 
process namely: to be cimiulative as "concepts and their relationship also accumulate 
through the interplay of data collection and analysis" (ibid). Be consistent where data 
is gathered "systematically on each category" (ibid). Moreover, it should ensure 
"'variation and process as well as density" (ibid). Finally, theoretical sampling should 
balance between advance planning and flexibility to avoid breaking a fundamental 
condition of grounded theory method that is sampling on the basis of the evolving 
theoretical relevance of concepts (ibid: PP. 177-178). 
Three types of theoretical sampling were utilized in this thesis according to the purpose 
of various coding stages of grounded theory. First, open sampling is related to open 
coding and aims developing relevant categories as much as possible. This would entail 
that the researcher should be open to sampling choices rather than specific. However, 
this does not entail inconsistency in data collection; conversely, consistency should not 
be compromised (Strauss and Corbin, 1990b, 1998). 
Second, relational and variational sampling related to axial coding, here the emphasis of 
sampling is to "relate categories in term of the paradigm conditions, context, action / 
interaction, and consequences" (Strauss and Corbin, 1990b: 185). A main issue is to 
discover the dimensional differences of categories. 
Third, discriminate sampling is related to selective coding. Here sampling focuses on 
validation of the relationships discovered by analysis as well as filling any categories in 
case they need fiirther development (ibid). Essentially, this requires that sampling 
become "directed and deliberate " (ibid). This would require returning to old research 
sites, docimients and persons where the required data can be gathered. 
Reaching this stage of sampling means that it will continue till theoretical saturation 
happens when (1) no new or relevant data seems to emerge regarding categories, (2) the 
category development is dense, and all of the paradigm elements are accounted for, 
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along with variation and process; (3) the relation between categories are well 
established and validated (Strauss and Corbin, 1990b, 1998). 
The research has mainly targeted commercial banks where the phenomenon of 
corporate governance is taking place. Being guided by the concept of theoretical 
sampling and as the research progresses, additional sources of data emerged. Indeed the 
application of theoretical sampling technique led to approaching these additional 
research sites. These research sites were: CBE, the International auditing firms, the 
Egyptian stock market, the Egyptian Banking Institute and the Egyptian Institute of 
Directors. Approaching these sites added to the theoretical richness of the categories. 
4.3 Data Collection Methods in Relation to Theoretical Sampling 
A combination of data collection methods was employed which makes it possible to 
discover categories, understand their characteristics and allow building relationships 
between categories. Indeed, data collection methods are linked to various types of 
theoretical sampling as will be shown in this section. 
The data collection methods used in this thesis are survey and semi-structured 
interviews'*^. The role of the survey was to identify important areas related to the 
phenomenon under investigation and hence enlighten questions formulation in 
subsequent semi-structured interviews (A). Indeed, the semi-structured interviews (A) 
are the flmdamental data collection method used during the stages of open and axial 
coding in order to develop categories and explore the relationships between them. More 
precisely, in open coding the semi-structured interviews (A) are the fundamental 
method that contributes to the discovery of open categories in terms of their properties 
and dimensions; while, in axial coding it contributes in identifying main categories as 
*^ Two rounds of Semi-Structured interviews were implemented in this study. Semi-Structured 
interviews (A) related to Open, variational / relational and Discriminate Sampling. While semi-structured 
Interviews (B) is linked only to discriminate sampling. The latter was implemented at the stage of 
selective coding, while, the former was principally implemented during the stages of Open and Axial 
Coding. 
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well as discovering the relationships between these categories. Semi-structured 
interviews (B) were utilized at the stage of selective coding to select the core category 
and verify its relationships with other categories (Strauss and Corbin, 1990b). 
Although the intention of the researcher was to utilize focus groups at the selective 
coding stage, this was infeasible because the participants' were reluctant to participate 
in focus groups sessions because they thought that this would impair their anonymity. 
This was fiilly respected, especially that the research has guaranteed their anonymity at 
all times. However, the researcher has asked them for participating in semi-structured 
interviews (B) as an alternative data collection method. Various data collection method 
can be discussed in more detail in the following sections. 
4.3.1 Accessibility to Data 
To understand the phenomenon of corporate governance it was necessary to approach 
bank executives and directors and other government officials and professionals as 
deemed necessary guided by theoretical sampling technique. Indeed, corporate 
governance is the ultimate responsibility of board directors and the executive managers 
of banks (BCBS, 2010). 
Here, it should be noted that accessibility to data for this research was a major 
challenge, in particular because executive managers and board directors were reluctant 
to participate in any research. Also, it was difficult to get in-touch with them to ask for 
participation in a research project. As such, beside the formal contact with banks by the 
means of the university approach''^ letter and the follow-up phone calls, networking 
with influential highly respected bankers known to the researcher^^ facilitated access to . 
46 The University letter states the purpose of the research and the data collection requirements and clearly 
guarantees that tiie research will be operated on anonymous basis. The letter is in appendix (1) 
Whom the researcher has worked with through his current position in a well-known research institute 
in Egypt. Or, whom the researcher knew during his training in the Egyptian banking sector. Also, a 
governmental official was amongst the participants of this research and showed interest to facilitate 
accessibility to senior managers and board members in various banks. However, confidentiality of 
interviewees was always observed. 
I l l 
bank employees and other participants in this research. Most of participants approached 
gave their consent to participate in the research. It must be noted that all participants 
were handed a copy of the university letter before asking them to fill the survey or 
participate in the Semi-Structured interviews to give them an idea of the research 
objectives and data required and assure them that the research is administrated on 
anonymous basis where their confidentiality is fully guaranteed. It can be argued here 
that the difficulty to gain access to directors and executives of various banks is one 
obvious reason that corporate governance of Egyptian banks has not been researched to 
date. 
4.3.2 Survey 
A survey "provides a quantitative or numeric description of trends, attitudes, or 
opinions of a population" (Creswell, 2003:153). As such surveys play an "ambiguous 
role" within grounded theory methodology (Howell, 2000:40). Reiterating Strauss 
(1987), Howell (2000) demonstrates that adopting grounded theory methodology 
requires flexibility from the researcher as to data collection and use in order to be able 
to generate theory. This flexibility denotes the fireedom to use quantitative data but 
relaxing the "rules of verification and accuracy of evidence to enable further theory 
generation" (ibid). Moreover, Strauss and Corbin (1990b; 19) add that "one might use 
qualitative data to illustrate or clarify quantitatively derived findings... Or, one could 
use some form of quantitative data to partially validate one's qualitative analysis". 
Although, "surveys are not purely grounded theory techniques, used in certain ways 
they may benefit theory generation. In this context, surveys may be utilized in a 
grounded theory study and eventually they may be considered as part of the technique " 
(Howell, 2000:40). In agreement with Glaser (1992), Howell (2000) agrees that 
qualitative data analysis can utilize quantitative or qualitative data or a combination of 
both depending on the nature of the research itself 
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This study has employed a survey at the early stage of research; the survey aims to 
explore the quality of corporate governance practices at various banks. Thus the survey 
is considered an initial stage of data collection that would facilitate asking more precise 
questions at the semi-structured interview (A). Indeed, the survey contributed in early 
formulation of semi-structured interviews questions. The survey is related to the 
research question: what are the strengths and weaknesses of bank's corporate 
governance practices within the EBS? 
This survey was distributed to all commercial banks totalling 30 banks ''* along with the 
official approach university letters. The survey was sent to the chairman's office and 
followed up by a phone call seeking a contact person to follow-up the completion of the 
survey. Networking with bankers was effective in this respect as mentioned above. 
The survey is composed of 14 statements addressing corporate governance practices 
quality of banks. Here the survey has focused on some of the corporate governance 
aspects that the only previous survey conducted by the EBI (2006) '*' had identified as 
corporate governance strengths and weaknesses of the EBS and as shown in part three 
of the literature review^°. This is acceptable in grounded theory studies especially at the 
early stages of open sampling where ''initial questions or areas for observation are 
based on concepts derived from literature or experience" (Strauss and Corbin, 
1990b:180). Moreover, Strauss and Corbin (1990b, 1998) added that grounded theorist 
need to recognize that 
•*' According to the official list of banks registered with the central bank of Egypt on 14* May 2008 
(Appendix 2). 
49 The EBI (2006) survey has included numerous factors to express corporate governance quality of the 
EBS. It was based on international corporate governance principles of flie OECD and Basel committee 
report on enhancmg corporate governance of banking organizations (2005). However, this survey 
reported its results in an aggregate format without distinguishing between various types of banks 
(Foreign, private, state). Although, the few available literature entries about corporate governance of the 
EBS, consistently regarded that state owned banks have low corporate governance quality (Mohieldin, 
2007; Mohieldin and Nasr, 2007). As such the survey utilized in this study has used the areas questioned 
in corporate governance structures of the EBS and aimed at exploring them on an individual brnik basis. 
To be able to gain richer data and identify the tentative areas for the semi-structured interview questions. 
"^Chapter 2 
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Whether... want to admit it or not... cannot completely divorce from who we are or from what we 
know...But insights do not just occur haphazardly; rather they happen to prepared minds during 
interplay with the data... To quote Dey (1993)... there is a difference between open mind and 
empty head. To analyze data, we need to use accumulated knowledge, not dispense with it, the 
issue is not to use existing knowledge but how (Strauss andCorbin, 1998:47). 
Analysis of the survey has opened important areas which were addressed during the 
semi-structured interviews (A). A total of 21 responses have been received representing 
opinions of participants from 21 banking organization equivalents to 70% of the whole 
population of banks. 
4.3.3 Semi-Structured Interviews (A) 
Semi structured interviews (A) questions were developed informed by the surveys and 
informal conversations with the participants in many occasions including when 
contacting them to ask for the participation of the study. Semi-structured interviews 
aimed at understanding the phenomenon of corporate governance from the perspective 
of bank directors and executives and other relevant professionals or officials who live 
the phenomenon. It is worth noting that as simultaneous analysis proceeds, some of the 
earlier developed concepts required modification, whereas others had proven theoretical 
relevance and were taken to subsequent interviews for confirmation and discovery of 
more characteristics or variation if any, this happens by continuous questioning and 
comparison of interviews one to another with respect to the emerging concepts. This 
was compared against Sfrauss and Corbin's (1990b, 1998) criteria of significance. As 
such these interviews contributed to various sampling stages of sampling including 
open, relational, variational and discriminate sampling. 
A total of 44^ ^ interviews were conducted with 34 participants, indeed, five participants 
were interviewed twice. These participants included 27 from various banking 
organizations; all interviews took place either with bank directors or executive 
management participants. Targeting these senior level participants was essential to 
'^ The total number of interviews is 44 interviews. These included 34 participants, however, 5 of these 
interviews were not incorporated in the analysis because it was discovered from the interviews that the 
participants do not know what corporate governance is? So 34+5 bad+5 interviewed twice = 44 
interviews. 
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acquire useful information firom those who are in direct contact with corporate 
governance issues. During the course of the study the need to interview other 
participants outside banking organizations was deemed essential, as such 7 participants 
from sites such as the CBE, the Egyptian Banking institute. International auditing firms 
and the Egyptian stock market were approached. All participants had long experience in 
the EBS in their respective positions, their experience ranged from a minimum of 17 
years of experience to 40 years. Appendix 4 shows the participants for every type of 
banks as well as other research sites included in this study, while appendix 3 shows 
banks included in this study. 
All participants did not permit recording of the interview, but agreed that the researcher 
could take notes during all interviews. 
Interviews durations ranged from 1.5 to 2.5 hours per interview. The interviews were 
carried out during the period from August 2008 till July 2009. 
Confidentiality was a fundamental issue for those participants to give their consent to 
participate in the research. This was carefully watched and respected and the approach 
letter guaranteed the anonymity of both their names and their corresponding banking 
organizations affiliations. 
All interviews questions were formulated in English language and checked for clarity 
by two academics in the UK who are experts in corporate governance. However, to 
accommodate for gaining rich data all questions were translated into Arabic and 
checked by two bilingual academics in Egypt who are also experts in corporate 
governance. 
25 interviews were fully transcribed, the decision not to transcribe the rest of interviews 
was based on the fact that they occurred towards the end and almost the entire aspects 
'^  This classification is based on the result of open coding that identified four types of banks based on 
their ownership type (Foreign, Arab, Private domestic, state) further details on this classification can be 
found in chapter five. 
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raised during these interviews were raised before with other participants. As such the 
reference used for analysis was the comprehensive notes taken during the interviews. As 
a quality measure all interviews notes were reviewed at the end of each interview to 
make sure nothing significant had been left out or misunderstood. This occurred by 
reading the main points in the notes to the interviewee and making sure they reflected 
his/ her own opinion. 
Beside the formal interviews discussed above, informal interviews were also used to 
collect data from various participants from the EBS. This occurred as casual 
conversations during meetings with ex-colleagues with whom the researcher had 
worked together during his training in various banks in Egypt as well as during events 
attended by the researcher such as the "corporate governance in the EBS seminar" held 
in Egypt where the researcher met the top speakers about corporate governance in 
Egypt. 
4.3.4 Semi-Structured Interviews (B) 
Semi-structured interviews (B) were employed again at the stage of selective coding, 
when discriminate sampling was in process. These interviews were based on the main 
categories and their interrelationships identified at the stage of axial coding. As such the 
interviews included 8 statements set on a Likert scale of (1-5) with 1 corresponding to 
strong disagreement and 5 denoting strong agreement. At this stage the objective was to 
identify the core category, confirm the significance or lack of significance of the main 
categories emerging from the preceding codmg and data collection procedures as well 
as verifying their interrelationships with the core category. The 34 participants 
interviewed earlier during the semi-structured interviews (A) stage were approached 
again for participating in this interviews round. Gaining their consent to participate 
again was a challenge; as such 14 of them agreed to participate in this round of the 
semi-structured interviews (B).Who stated their opinion regarding the statements based 
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on axial coding in addition to discussing additional related aspects. Indeed, this was the 
reason for selecting semi-structured interviews at this stage to gain rich data. It must be 
noted that discussions contributed to identification of the properties and dimensions of 
the core category. While the participants' opinions regarding the statements contributed 
to verifying the relationships between the core category and other sub-categories. 
During the interviews notes were taken, and further analysis occurred directly from the 
field notes. Responses to the statements were analysed using frequency tables to 
evaluate the extent of agreement on the stated relationships. This is fully discussed in 
chapter seven: selective coding and substantive Theory. Figure 4.1 shows the data 
collection scheme and its relation with various stages of sampling as discussed earlier in 
this chapter. 
Figure 4.1 Summarizes the Data Collection Scheme 
Survey: A survey of the quality of corporate governance practices at banks allows access to data and 
important areas identification and facilitates questions formulation at the semi-structured interviews 
(A). 
Semi-Structured interviews (A): A total of 44 Interviews with 27 Board director and executive 
manager from various banks operating in Egypt; In addition to another 7 interviews v^ dth governmental 
officials, CBE officials and auditors. These interviews were fundamental to open and axial coding 
stages. Open sampling, relational sampling and variational sampling, discriminate sampling. 
Semi-Structured Interviews (B): 14 semi-structured interviews were carried out with participants 
from the first round of semi-structured interviews (A). Participants were asked to give their opinion 
regarding propositions related to relationships verification and identification of the core category. 
Discriminate sampling 
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4.4 Theoretical Coding 
Strauss and Corbin (1990b; 1998) advocated that grounded theory analysis encompasses 
three types of coding: Open, axial and selective coding. Open coding refers to "the 
analytic process through which concepts are identified and their properties and 
dimensions are discovered in data" (Strauss and Corbin, 1998:101). Axial coding 
refers to 'T/je process of relating categories to their subcategories, termed "axial" 
because coding occurs around the axis of a category, linking categories at the level of 
properties and dimensions" (ibid: 123). While, selective coding refers to "The process 
of integrating and refining the theory" (ibid: 143). Howell (2003a) indicates that these 
three types of coding are referred to as "Theoretical coding" which is related to the 
theoretical sampling techniques discussed above and it is the basis of conducting 
grounded theory (Howell, 2003a). 
In this thesis open coding included data collection using semi-structured interviews (A) 
with bank directors and executives, government officials and other professionals. This 
was informed by data collected using a svirvey about corporate governance practices of 
banks within the EBS, which was carried out with the objective to open-up data and 
identify important areas of questioning. Thus the survey enlightened subsequent data 
collection. Through semi-structured interviews (A), open categories were identified and 
enriched through simultaneous data collection and analysis. This has allowed the 
emergence of nine open^ ^ categories whose projierties and dimensions were identified. 
As open coding main purpose was to develop categories in terms of their properties and 
dimensions, axial coding aimed to reassemble the data firactured in open coding and 
focuses on relating the open categories and arranges them to form a coherent overall 
system (Howell, 2000). Open and axial coding occurred both concurrently and 
" Discussed in details in Chapter five 
118 
sequentially, they proceeded together, as such sampling through the semi-structured 
interviews (A) contributed to both stages. In axial coding the nine open categories were 
subsumed into five main^ '* categories. Axial coding focus was to identify a phenomenon 
that can explain "what is going on? " (Strauss and Corbin, 1998: 125). As such the five 
abovementioned main categories were related by the means of the paradigm model 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1990b; 1998). Indeed, axial coding focus was to link process with 
structure to capture as far as possible complexities of the real life (Strauss and Corbin, 
1998). This has provided the basis of selective coding. 
As the final coding stage, selective coding aimed to select the core category and validate 
its relationship with other subcategories to form "a larger theoretical scheme that the 
research findings take the form of theory" (Strauss andCorbin, 1998:143). As such on 
the basis of patterns lied down during axial coding, selective coding has identified the 
core category and verified its relationship with subcategories by utilizing the paradigm 
model again. Initially, sampling was variational and relational during open and axial 
coding; however, diu-ing selective coding it became discrimmate. This allows 
identifying those to be interviewed, leading to utilizing a second round of semi-
structured interviews (B) with participants from various bank types and the CBE. 
Selective coding identified the core category in terms of its properties and dimensions 
as well as verified the relationships between the core category and subcategories led to 
the formulation of the substantive theory of BCG. 
4.5 Analysis of Survey Statements 
The first data collection method utilized in this thesis is a survey of corporate 
governance practices quality. The survey is composed of 11^ ^ statements addressing the 
most significant corporate governance issues related to corporate governance practices 
of the EBS as previously mentioned in this chapter. 
^* Discussed in details in Chapter six 
^^  Statement number two includes four sub-points. 
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The survey asks participants to express the extent to which their respective banks 
observe or implement each corporate governance issue. The survey was distributed to 
the whole population of banks (30 banks), of which participants from 21 banks 
completed and returned the survey; as such the completion rate was 70%. As previously 
stated those who filled the survey were banks' executive management or directors. 
The survey questions were based on a likert scale of (1) to (5). The choice (1) denotes 
that the bank does not consider the corporate governance issue at all, while the choice 
(5) denotes that the corporate governance issue is observed and implemented to the 
greatest extent. 
The survey was analyzed through constructing frequency tables^^ at the level of each 
statement to determine the answers distribution amongst the 21 banks. The output of 
this analysis and the associated chart are shown in Figure 4.2. For each statement the 
percentage of various responses is shown in the table and depicted on the figure. 
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Figure 4.2. Summary of the Survey Results and the Frequency of Participants' Responses to Each Statement 
*^ Frequency tables were generated using Microsoft Excel software. 
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The main purpose of the survey was to open the data and aid in formulating questions of 
the semi-structured interviews (A) carried out in the subsequent stage of data collection, 
as well as gaining an overall understanding of the current corporate governance 
practices quality at the level of individual banks. 
To facilitate analyzing the survey results and determine important areas of further 
inquiry, statements were grouped into three broad groups as shown in table 4.1 namely: 
• Stakeholders' Interests. 
• Board of Directors Corporate Governance Practices. 
• Communication of Corporate Governance Information to Stakeholders. 
The analysis of the responses to each statement under each of the above mentioned 
groups can be discussed in the following sections. 
4.5.1 Stakeholders interests 
Statement 1: The bank's current structures serve the interests of shareholders. 
57% of the respondents stated that their respective bank's corporate governance 
structures serve the interests of the shareholders to the greatest extent, with 29% stating 
that shareholders interests are served to a great extent, while 14% of the respondents 
stated that they are materially served as shown in figure 4.2. 
This indicates that in general^ ^ all responding banks' corporate governance structures are 
directed towards serving their respective shareholders interests. 
This matches the corporate governance definition from a banking perspective as 
indicated by Basel's Committee definition (2010:5) 
From a banking industry perspective, corporate governance involves the manner in which the 
business and affairs of a bank are governed by its board and senior management, including how 
they meet shareholders obligations (BCBS, 2010:5) 
^^ For the purposes of giving a clear and more objective indicators the Likert scale answers can be 
converted to two way (Yes / No). Here the materially extent, great extent and greatest extent choices are 
considered equivalent to the answer (Yes), while not at all and little extent choices are equivalent to the 
answer (No). 
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Obviously, the EBS definition of banks' corporate governance is also based on the Basel 
committee definition (EBI, 2006:1). 
Table 4.1 Grouping of Survey Statements for Analytical Purposes 
Group 
Stakeholders' Interests 
Board of Directors 
corporate governance 
practices 
Communication of 
Corporate Governance 
Information to 
Stakeholders 
Related Statements 
1. The bank's current corporate governance structures serve the interests 
of shareholders. 
2. The bank's current corporate governance structures serve the interests 
of the following non-share ovraing stakeholders. 
a. Depositors 
b. Employees 
c. Local society 
d. The Environment 
3. The banks' board functions include over-sight and approval of 
corporate governance practices. 
4. The Bank's key executives and broad members regularly attend training 
courses on issues of corporate governance. 
5. The board of director's conducts self evaluation or reviews of its 
effectiveness. 
6. The bank's chairman is independent of the CEO. 
7. The bank utilized specialized board committees in relation to corporate 
governance e.g. Audit/ corporate governance, nomination, remuneration 
committees etc. 
8. The specialized committees are composed of independent directors. 
9. The banks overall risk strategy requires the evaluation of the clients' 
corporate governance quality. 
10. The bank's corporate governance structures are disclosed in the annual 
report along with latest financial results. 
11. The bank publishes corporate governance information and 
announcements on its website. 
It should be noted that the high ownership concentration ratios prevailing in the 
responding banks empower the shareholders with iriore dominance over boards and 
senior management thus affecting the overall strategies of the bank including corporate 
governance structures that serve their interests. Table 4.2 shows the ownership 
percentages of the top three shareholders at each of the responding banks. It can be 
observed that in 15 of the 21 banks the top three shareholders own more than 90% of 
bank's capital. 
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Table 4.2 The Ownership Percentage of the Top Three Shareholders in the 
Responding Banks 
Serial 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
Based on 
Bank 
THE UNITED BANK 
BLOM BANK 
CREDIT AGRICOLE 
BANK OF ALEXANDRIA 
AUDI BANK 
ARAB AFRICAN 
cm 
NSGB 
FAISAL ISLAMIC 
BARCLAYS 
NATIONAL BANK OF EGYPT 
BANQUE DU CAIRE 
BANQUE MISR 
MISR IRAN DEVELOPMENT BANK 
HSBC 
BNP-PARIBAS 
SUEZ CANAL BANK 
PIRAEUS BANK - EGYPT 
AHLI UNITED BANK - EGYPT 
EGYPTL\N SAUDI FINANCE BANK 
AL WATANY BANK OF EGYPT 
Bankscope (2009) 
Ownership Percentage 
100% 
99.3 % 
93% 
100% 
100% 
98.5% 
49% 
78% 
52% 
100% 
100% . 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
95.19% 
72% 
94% 
73% 
83% 
100% 
Statement 2: The banks' current corporate governance structures serve the 
interests of the following non-share owning stakeholders. 
Depositors: Figure (4.2) shows that in 38% of the cases, bank's corporate 
governance structures serve the interests of depositors to a great extent, while the 
other 62% of the banks serve depositors interests to the greatest extent. Stated in 
(Yes/No) format 100% of the responding banks serve the depositors interests. 
In fact, banks do not have a choice but to serve depositors interests as an overall 
business strategy because depositors are the main source of banking organization's 
funds, the CBE has clearly initiated the EBS reform program to protect depositors' 
interests. In this respect the CBE has considered improving corporate governance 
practices in banks as a top priority, given the 1990s failures and the subsequent NPL 
crisis (CBE, 2008a). Here the CBE has "exercised its rights to protect depositors' 
interests and introduced changes in management of some private and joint venture 
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banks" (CBE 2003:4). Therefore, the CBE itself has seen improving corporate 
governance as a tool of better serving and protecting the depositors' interests. As 
such banks cannot overlook serving depositors' interests due to their position as a 
source of funds as well as to regulatory reason (CBE stresses on depositor's 
interests). 
Finally, Basel committee's definition of corporate governance clearly stated that 
corporate governance should "protect the interests of depositors" (BCBS, 2010: 5). 
Again the EBS accepts this definition and considers that depositors' interests must 
be served by corporate governance structures (EBI, 2006). 
II. Employees, Local society and Environment 
Employees, local society, environment can be grouped further into one group as other 
stakeholders. Grouping these stakeholders is based on that the response of banks 
regarding the extent to which corporate governance structures serves them is relatively 
similar, and more skewed to the no side. 
The results shown in Figure 4.2 indicate that 33% of the banks tend to serve employees' 
interests materially, while 24% in the case of local society and 29% in the case of 
environment. Also 24% of banks serve employees interests to a great extent, 14% of 
banks serve local society to a great extent. Finally, 5% of banks serve employees 
interests to the greatest extent and 10% in the case of both local society and 
environment. 
In other words, few banks serve the interests of these stakeholders to the greatest extent. 
This indicates that the interests of these stakeholders are subordinated to the interests of 
other stakeholders namely shareholders and depositors. One would argue that these 
stakeholders' interests are still important to banks but serving them is not mandatory as 
the case of shareholders and depositors. 
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Simply, shareholders and depositors have significant power over boards and 
management, making their interests as top priority that cannot be overlooked. 
4.5.2 Board of Directors Corporate Governance Practices 
Statement 3: The Bank's board functions include oversight and approval of corporate 
governance practices. 
The board of directors has a vital role in banking organizations. This role is vital 
because if the board is effectively involved in various strategic aspects of the bank 
including its governance; it is more likely that the bank will be safer. It will also better 
serve its shareholders and other recognized stakeholders such as depositors. Basel 
committee not only confirms this argument but consider that it is the board's overall 
responsibility to "approving and overseeing the implementation of .... corporate 
governance" (BCBS, 2010:7). 
According to the survey results shown in figure 4.2, the majority of banks have their 
boards involved in approval and oversight of the bank corporate governance practices. 
24% of the banks' boards are engaged in corporate governance to the greatest extent, 
24% to a great extent and the 38% materially engaged. Although these results would 
suggest that most of the boards are engaged in overseeing their respective banks 
governance, it also shows the variability between banks in terms of the extent of this 
engagement. Moreover, 5% of banks' boards are not engaged in corporate governance. 
As such one could identify board role in corporate governance and the effectiveness of 
this role as an important aspect that needs further investigation. 
Indeed, the effectiveness of the board role in coiporate governance is not only stressed 
by Basel committee guidelines (BCBS, 2005; 2010) but also the latest global financial 
crisis has demonstrated that the insufficient ''oversight or control" by financial 
institutions boards has led to corporate governance failures and consequently 
contributed to the crisis (De Larosie're et al, 2009: 10). Moreover, a survey undertaken 
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within Middle East and North Africa by the IFC^^  (2008) has also indicated that "bank 
director do not always follow ... best practices" (ibid:64) in relation to the functions 
that bank board's approve and oversee; including credit operations, credit policy, 
regulatory compliance etc. (IFC, 2008). 
Statement 4: The Bank's key executives and board members regularly attend training 
courses on issues of corporate governance. 
Board members and senior executive managers are responsible for designing and 
changing a bank's corporate governance structure. Indeed it is the board's responsibility 
to oversee executive management to assure the sound implementation of corporate 
governance strategies. Essentially, board members should be competent in relation to 
corporate governance to have the ability of setting appropriate strategies and carry-out 
their responsibilities. Similarly executive managers should also be competent in order to 
implement corporate governance strategies. 
In this regard the BCBS guidelines (2005; 2010) stress on the importance of training to 
enhance competence especially at the board of director's level "Board members should 
be and remain qualified, including through training, for their positions they should have 
a clear understanding of their role in corporate governance" (BCBS, 2010:9). Also the 
global financial crisis demonstrated that the lack of competence and knowledge by 
executive managers and board members of financial institutions had contributed to 
corporate governance failures (De Larosie're et al, 2009: 10). 
Here the survey results have indicated that in 57% of the banks key executives and 
board members do not receive corporate governance training at all, while in 24% of the 
banks, they receive it to a little extent, vdth only 19% of the bank directors receive 
training to a material extent. As such, this means that in 81% of banks they do not 
receive proper corporate governance training. This highlights a serious weakness area in 
*^ A corporate governance survey of listed companies and banks across Middle East and North Africa. 
This survey was commissioned by the IFC and HAWKAMAH Institute (Dubai) 
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the overall corporate governance system in Egyptian banks, given that incompetent 
directors and executives cannot effectively set and implement proper corporate 
governance strategies. 
These results agree with the IFC (2008) survey results that stated that although most of 
bank managers and directors in the Middle East and North Africa are aware of the 
BCBS guidelines, they lack the proper understanding essential to its implementation. 
Finally, this agrees as well with the EBI survey (2006) that indicated that "more effort 
needs to be geared towards designing and implementing special training programs on 
corporate governance and internal control practices " (EBI, 2006:4) 
Statement 5: The board of directors conducts self-evaluation or reviews of its 
effectiveness in relation to corporate governance. 
Given the vital role the board should have in corporate governance of the bank as 
previously discussed, it is necessary that every board become engaged in self-review of 
its effectiveness in supporting sound corporate governance practices. Obviously, this is 
important given the dynamic business environment that is changing at a great pace 
introducing new challenges to the banking industry. 
Banking failures related to weak corporate governance such as the Asian financial crisis 
(1999) and the global financial crises (2008) are examples of imbalance that occurs 
between the systems and practices adopted at one point of time and prevailing 
challenges. BCBS (2010) guidelines has captured this issue and introduced a board's 
own practices principle covering the aspect of self-evaluation: 
The board should define appropriate governance, practices for its own work and have in place 
the means to ensure such practices are followed and periodically reviewed for improvement... 
the board should structure itself in a way ... so as to promote efficiency, sufficiently deep 
discussion of issues ... To support board performance, it is a good practice for the board to 
carry out regular assessment of both the board as a whole and of individual board members 
(BCBS, 2010:10-11). 
According to the survey results shown in figure 4.2 the board self-evaluation is not 
practiced at all in 57% of the banks, to a little extent in 33% of the banks and practiced 
significantly in 10% of the banks. 
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So in general one can conclude that 90% of the banks do not review their own practices, 
one would argue here that this is related to the nature of ownership structure in Egyptian 
banks, where few block holders (less than 3 shareholders) control the bank in more than 
70% of the cases. Indeed, controlling shareholders influences the bank overall activities 
(BSBC, 2010) including the practices of the board. As long as the shareholders' 
interests are served as shown by the survey results (statement 1), boards are less likely 
to review their performance because the main stakeholder that would initiate this 
practice is already satisfied (shareholders). This result agrees as well with the EBI 
survey (2006) that identified the practice of board self assessment" as requiring further 
enhancement. 
Statement 6: The banks chairman is independent of the CEO (Executive management). 
The importance of the chair of the board is derived from the importance of the board of 
directors. The chairperson should provide leadership as to the whole board. Most 
importantly, and as encouraged by BCBS (2010), the chairperson should allow and 
encourage critical discussions in the best interest of the bank. Moreover, it is a trend 
now amongst banks to separate the two positions of the chair and the CEO. In case, the 
same person plays the two roles, a bank should have good reasons to this duality or to 
have particular measures that would minimize any negative impact of duality (ibid). 
Here the result of the survey indicated that 43% of the banks consider the chairperson 
independent of the CEO to a great extent, while 14% consider the chairperson to be 
materially independent. So, in aggregate'57% of banks consider their chair to be 
independent of the CEO, while 43% do not have this independence. Because 
independence of the chair is perceived as affecting the independence of the whole 
board. Lorsh and Maciever (1989 cited in Baliga et al, 1996) argued that this case 
would "reduce the possibility that the board can properly execute its oversight and 
governance role" (P. 42) which can endanger the long-term success of the organization. 
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But here the interpretation would not rely too much on this aspect. As in the light of the 
previous statements, it has been clear that the engagement of the board in governance 
matter, competence of the board members and the board corporate governance practices 
are questionable and require reform in order to meet the international benchmark. So, 
the survey results of this statement would complement the above mentioned measures 
that a corporate governance reform especially in what is related to the board of 
directors' practices is required. 
Statement 7: The bank utilities specialized committees in relation to corporate 
governance. 
Statement 8: The specialized committees are composed of independent directors. 
Having Board committees are one of the good practices that should enhance corporate 
governance at banking organizations as indicated by the BCBS (2010). Here the BCBS 
(2010) argue that utilizing board committees "increase efficiency and allow deeper 
focus in specific areas" (P. 11). These committees should include an audit committee to 
undertake the following responsibilities 
financial reporting process; providing oversight of the bank internal and external auditors; ... 
ensuring that senior management is taking necessary corrective actions in a timely manner 
to address control weaknesses, non-compliance with policies, laws and regulations and other 
problems identified by auditors. In addition, the audit committee should oversee the 
establishment of accounting policies by the bank (ibid: 12). 
Additionally specialized committees should include a compensation committee that 
design and oversee the bank compensation system, ensiires that compensation is 
matching the "banks culture, long terms business and risk strategies performance and 
control environment, as well as with local or mandatory requirement" (ibid: 12). 
Moreover, a bank should have nomination- and governance committees; these 
committees would be involved in giving the board recommendations regarding new 
board members and senior management selection. Additional scope of work of these 
committees can include oversight and assessment of the board of directors and senior 
management effectiveness as well as oversight on the bank's personal and hiunan 
resources policies (ibid). 
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Finally, BCBS (2010) guidelines recommend that the board should form these 
specialized committees through appointment of competent, experienced and 
independent members. To be able to understand and "objectively evaluate and bring 
fresh thinking to the relevant issues " (ibid: 13). 
According to the survey results 62% have specialized committees to a little extent, 
while 14% have specialized committees to a significant extent, 19% of the banks have 
indicated that they have specialized committees to a great extent and finally 5% have 
indicated that they have these committees to the greatest extent as shown in figure 4.2. 
However, it must be noted that the high percentage of banks that selected the "little 
extent" choice is based on the legal requirement that all banks must have an audit 
committee (LawNo.88, 2003). 
The results of the survey regarding the utilization of specialized committee, indicates 
that banks have different preferences towards forming specialized committees, indeed, 
this contributes to having varying levels of corporate governance quality in banks. 
However, all banks do comply with legal requirements. At least all banks have an audit 
committee as required by law. This reflects that a rule based corporate governance 
requirements may bring about more compliance in the EBS. 
On the other hand the survey results also show that banks' specialized committees are 
not composed totally of independent directors in 38% of the cases. While 43% of banks 
have their specialized committees composed of independent directors to a little extent. 
Still 10% of banks appoint independent directors for these committees to a significant 
extent. Moreover, 5% of banks appoint independent directors to a great extent. Finally, 
only 5% of banks compose their specialized committees wholly of independent 
directors to the greatest extent. 
Evaluating the two statements together (statements 7 and 8), one would argue that the 
EBS needs to pay attention to board specialized committees to increase the effectiveness 
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of the board of directors role in the banks' corporate governance. Similarly, banks need 
to compose these committees of more independent directors to enhance the objectivity 
of these committees. 
Statement 9: The banks overall risk strategy requires the evaluation of the client's 
corporate governance quality. 
It is the ultimate responsibility of the board to oversee and approve the risk strategy of 
the bank including "overall risk strategy, including its risk tolerance; risk policy, risk 
management" (BCBS, 2010:7). 
As such screening of borrowers' corporate governance quality based on the 
comprehensive concept of corporate governance is a necessity. Here Azab (2007) 
indicates the importance of assessing corporate governance of borrowing companies due 
to its importance in evaluating their non-financial risks. Such as operational, 
reputational, environmental and compliance risks of the company and above all the 
borrowing company's board of directors practices. He adds that including corporate 
governance assessment to credit decisions would tell a great deal about the ability of the 
company to pay back the loan (ibid). 
According to the survey results 14% of the banks do not assess clients' corporate 
governance at all, 67% assess it to a little extent, 10% to a significant extent, 5% to a 
great extent and finally 5% of the banks do assess their client's corporate govemance to 
the greatest extent. This reflects that the majority of banks do not assess their clients' 
corporate govemance. 
Indeed, this shows another defect in the current board of director's corporate govemance 
practices within the EBS. Obviously, this result agrees with the EBI survey results 
(2006) "Which revealed that the role banks play in external monitoring of client is quite 
limited. Little monitoring and emphasis is placed on clients' adherence to good 
corporate governance practices, specifically as related to monitoring borrowers" (P. 
26). 
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In fact, the assessment of clients' corporate governance is of special importance not 
only for the safety and soundness of the banking system and better protection of 
shareholders and depositors per se. But also for the promotion of corporate governance 
amongst different sectors of the economy, given that Egyptian economy is bank-based. 
Notably, the ECOCG (2005) has clearly indicated that 
Moreover, banks... should take the articles listed in the code into consideration when doing 
business with or evaluating corporations to determine the extent to which the provisions and 
content of these rules are upheld. It should be expected that all those in charge of managing ... 
financial institutions... implement and promote the provisions of this code; they should be 
expected to consider the implementation of these provisions an indicator of success (ECOCG, 
2005:4). 
In conclusion, the survey analysis in relation to board of directors' corporate 
governance practices indicates that the board of directors role in corporate governance is 
limited given the board members' inadequate level of corporate governance 
competence, self evaluation and limited utilization of independent board committees. 
Indeed the absence of clients' corporate governance evaluation is quite normal given the 
above mentioned constraints. As it is less likely that boards with the above mentioned 
corporate governance characteristics would promote corporate governance amongst 
clients. However, if the separation of chairmanship and CEO positions would indicate 
independence. The EBS would be in a good position. However, it can hardly be assured 
given the current corporate governance practices at the boards' level as indicated. 
4.5.3 Communication of Corporate Governance Information to Stakeholders 
Statement 10: The bank's corporate governance structures are disclosed in the annual 
report along with latest financial results. 
Statement 11: The bank publishes corporate governance information and 
announcements on its website. 
Conducting corporate governance properly is not only a matter of complying with 
relevant national codes or international benchmarks but a matter of doing so 
transparently. Because "zY is difficult for shareholders, other stakeholders and market 
participants to effectively monitor and properly hold accountable the board of directors 
132 
and senior management when there is a lack of transparency" (BCBS, 2005: 15). 
Obviously, transparency gives various stakeholders the ability to judge how efficient 
and effective are the board of directors and senior management in governing the bank. 
Indeed this enables an informed judgment on the safety and soundness of these banks 
(ibid). 
BCBS (2005) has recommended that banking organizations should provide timely and 
accurate disclosures on the bank's website and its annual reporting covering a number of 
areas namely: Board structure, basic organizational structure information about the 
incentive structure of the bank and the bank's code or policy of business conduct (ibid: 
15). However, in the latest edition of the BCBS (2010), the committee has widened^^  
the scope of disclosures to match not only the above mentioned scope advised in BCBS 
(2005) but to include more areas as indicated by the OECD (2004) principles of 
corporate governance. Here the OECD (2004) indicates in its "Disclosure and 
Transparency" section. The organization should disclose, but not limited to material 
information on 
the financial and operating results of the company, company objectives; Major share ownership 
and voting rights; remuneration policy for members of the board and key executives, and 
information about board members, including their qualifications, the selection process, other 
company directorships and whether they are regarded as independent by the board; related 
party transactions, foreseeable risk factors; issues regarding employees and other stakeholders; 
governance structures and policies, in particular, the content of any corporate governance code 
or policy and the process by which it is implemented (OECD, 2004: 22). 
According to the survey results 10% of the banks do not publish any corporate 
governance information in their annual report, 24% publish this information to a little 
extent, and also 24% publish corporate governance information to a material extent, 
while 38% of the banks publish corporate governance information to a great extent. 
Finally 5% only publish corporate govemance information to the greatest extent. On the 
other hand, 5% of the banks do not publish any corporate govemance information or 
announcements through their website, 38% publish information to a little extent, while 
' ' The reason is that BCBS (2010) has been issued post the global financial crisis, as such it is more 
conservative and been addressing aspects that mostly contributed to the crisis. 
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38% publish significant corporate governance information on their websites. Finally, 
19% of the banks publish corporate governance information on their website to a great 
extent. 
Based on the above results, one would argue that transparency and disclosure of 
corporate governance information is not a conmion practice amongst the majority of the 
banks. In fact, transparency is a prerequisite of accountability (BCBS, 2005; 2010). 
Moreover, lack of transparency or opaqueness can at least indicate that banks do not 
have proper corporate governance structures and practices in place. Also, it may even 
indicate malpractices. 
4.5.4 Comparison of Survey Results of Private V. State Owned Banks 
According to the CBE list of banks, two types of banks exist within the EBS: private 
and state-owned banks. To gain better understanding of the survey results and better 
inform the next stage of data collection (Semi-structured interviews A), this section 
compares the results of the survey between the two types of banks. This is deemed 
important due to two reasons. First, the BCBS (2005, 2010) guides indicate that state 
ownership of banks "has the potential to alter the strategies and objectives of the bank" 
(BCBS, 2010: 6). Second, it is already well established, that state-owned banks in Egypt 
do have inferior corporate governance quality compared to private banks. They are 
characterized by distorted incentive systems, poor management, weak internal 
governance, lack of performance incentive, overstaffing and inadequate risk 
management, in short overall weak corporate governance (Mohieldin and Nasr, 2007). 
Given the nature of data collected through the survey, the median as a measure of 
central tendency can be useful in showing the central tendency^° of private banks to 
select a particular answer to each statement compared with the choice of state-owned 
banks. Thus higher median reflects better corporate governance from the particular 
^ Small population of banks (30 banks), and a response ratio of 21 banks. The survey is based on ordinal 
data 
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aspect raised by the statement. Figure 4.3^' indicates that median for the degree of 
serving shareholders, depositors, employees and environment, the board role in 
Figure 4.3 Comparison of the median of survey results according to ownership of the bank (Private V. State banks). 
corporate governance, corporate governance training, and chairperson independence, 
website and annual report disclostire are higher in the case of private banks, while, the 
median was the same in case of the degree of serving local society, utilization of 
specialized committees and assessment of borrowers. Finally, in terms of the boards' 
self evaluation state banks show higher median. 
Although, this analysis does not tell much about the reasons of differences, indeed, it 
indicates that the ownership type have soniething to do with corporate governance 
quality of banks. As such given the objective of this stirvey to inform the semi-
structured interviews (A), this would be a useful hunch to follow and investigate in 
more details in next stage of data collection. 
*' The mode as a measure of central tendency for ordinal data was considered, but because of huge 
difference m number of state banks (4) compared to (17) private banks and the existence of multiple 
modes, the median is more meaningful 
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4.5.5 Concluding Remarks of the Survey Analysis 
This section has provided a detailed analysis of the corporate governance practices 
quality at various banks within the EBS, as expressed by banks' top management or 
banks' directors. Corporate governance at any bank is the ultimate responsibility of the 
board of directors and senior management responsible for implementing corporate 
govemance strategies set by the board (BCBS, 2010). 
The survey has focused on areas of significant importance, related to three groups: 
Stakeholders' interests. Board of directors' corporate govemance practices and 
Communication of corporate govemance issues to stakeholders. Analysis of the 
responses to the 11 statements of survey has been carried-out by developing a frequency 
table and a bar chart in order to arrive at the overall quality of corporate govemance in 
banks of the EBS. However, it must be noted that the survey's main objective is to 
identify areas of significance that are carried forward to enlighten the next stage of data-
collection (semi-stmctured interviews A). 
It can be seen from tables 4.1 and 4.2 and figures 4.2 and 4.3 that Banks' corporate 
govemance stmctures do serve the interests of stakeholders especially shareholders and 
depositors. Obviously, these two groups are the most powerful amongst other 
stakeholders. High ownership concentration ratios increase the relative power and 
domination of Shareholders on the board of directors. While, depositors enjoy this 
position as the CBE does not compromise their interests at any time and has initiated a 
wide corporate govemance reform to enhance their protection. Other stakeholders such 
as employees, society and environment interests are served but they are subordinated to 
the interests of shareholders and depositors. Indeed, they are less powerful. 
Regarding the second group: board of directors' corporate govemance practices, the 
survey results has shown that the board of directors' role in corporate govemance needs 
reinforcing. Obviously in most of the banks corporate govemance quality is not up to 
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the standard of benchmarks. Also, banks' role of corporate governance promotion 
amongst bank clients is nearly absent. This indicates another deficiency in the board of 
directors' role in setting the overall bank risk strategy. 
As shown by the survey results, low corporate governance competence indicated by 
lack of training on corporate governance issues, absence of self-evaluation, limited 
utilization of independent specialized committees such as nomination , remuneration 
and corporate governance committees all indicate the limited role of the board in 
corporate governance issues. 
Regarding, the communication of corporate governance information section of the 
survey have shown that disclosure of banks' corporate governance information through 
the websites or the annual report is not a common practice, meaning that transparency 
level is low. As such this indicates that holding board members and senior managers 
accountable become more difficult. Most importantly, this leads to more complexity in 
enacting reforms of corporate governance. However, reforms lead by the CBE to protect 
depositors or lead by shareholders would overcome this barrier but essentially this 
requires competent and active shareholders and regulator. 
Finally, the survey analysis has shown variation of corporate governance practices 
between the state ovmed banks and private banks. Indicating a relationship between 
type of ownership and corporate governance. 
The findings of the survey can then be grouped into four areas: shareholders and 
stakeholders interests, board's role in corporate governance practices, transparency 
and disclosure and ownership type of the bank. These four areas will be the focus of 
questions formulation in the next stage of data collection (Semi-Structured Interviews 
A). 
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4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter aimed to present sampling and research site selection as well as the data 
collection scheme. Indeed, this thesis follows the logic of theoretical sampling, which 
seeks obtaining data that are theoretically relevant, as such it assists the researcher to 
predict where and how to find necessary data to fill gaps and saturate emergent 
categories (Charmaz, 2006). Regarding research sites, commercial banks were the 
primary research site for conducting this research, but application of theoretical 
sampling has guided the researcher to other relevant research sites namely: CBE, 
auditing firms, the Egyptian stock market, the Egyptian banking institute and the 
Egyptian institute of directors. 
A combination of data collection methods are used to generate the substantive theory of 
bank corporate governance within the EBS. Firstly, a survey was implemented to assess 
the BCG practices of banks. This was important to allow access to data and inform 
questions formulation in the semi-structured interviews (A). The semi-structured 
interviews (A) with bank directors and executives firom various banks and governmental 
officials and auditors was the basic data collection method employed in this thesis and 
contributes in open, relational / variational, and discrimmate sampling. Finally another 
round of semi-structured interviews (B) were carried at the stage of selective coding to 
identify the core category, discover its properties and dimensions and verify its 
relationship with sub-categories. Indeed, this semi-structured interview (B) is related to 
discriminate sampling. 
The second objective is to provide a detailed analysis of corporate governance practices 
of various banks based on the survey implemented. This chapter has analysed the 
survey results. This has been carried out by grouping the 11 likert- scale statements into 
three groups: Stakeholders' interests, board of directors corporate governance practices 
and communication of corporate governance issues. 
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Frequency tables and charts were constructed to clearly compare corporate governance 
practices of various banks. This has indeed furthered the understanding of the corporate 
governance within the context the EBS and informed questions formulation in the 
subsequent semi-structured interview (A). The important issues that the survey has 
identified as major areas of investigation in the semi-structured interviews (A) are: 
shareholders and stakeholders' interests, board's role in corporate governance 
practices, transparency and disclosure and ownership type. The main conclusions of 
this chapter can be summarized as follows: banks' corporate governance structures do 
serve the interests of stakeholders' especially shareholders and depositors given the 
power conferred to the former because of high ownership concentration, while the latter 
is the backed by the sole regulator of the banking sector. The survey has shown that the 
board of directors' role in corporate governance needs reinforcing and that competence 
of directors is highly questioned. Similarly, corporate governance disclosure is limited 
and as such accountability is difficult. The survey has also shown difference in bank's 
corporate governance quality based on whether the bank is state-owned or privately 
owned. 
Based on the output of this chapter which contributes in formulation of the semi-
structured interviews (A) questions; the next chapter will discuss open coding based on 
the data collection from the semi-structured interviews (A), towards discovering open 
categories in terms of their properties and dimensions. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Data Analysis of Semi-Structured Interviews (A): 
Open Coding 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents open coding based on data collected using semi-structured 
interviews (A). It is worth noting that the semi-structured interviews (A) target 
investigation of unportant areas identified by the survey analysis as shown in the 
previous chapter. Additionally, interviews target other areas arrived through informal 
conversations with participants. Based on simultaneous data collection and analysis, 
open coding has arrived to nine open categories and identified their properties and 
dimensions. 
Open coding can be seen as an "Interpretive process by which data are broken down 
analytically" (Strauss and Corbin, 1990a: 12). The objective of open coding is to break 
data into concepts by using theoretical coding procedures and constant comparison 
method. Emerging codes then are tested for theoretical relevance, only concepts that 
show persistent occurrence in data collected, form open categories. Conceptually similar 
data that are deemed important to the participants are collected together to form these 
open categories (Strauss and Corbin, 1990a). 
5.2 Semi-Structured Interview Questions 
The semi-structured interview questions analysed in this chapter aims to explore and 
understand the nature of the corporate governance phenomenon within the context of 
the EBS. These questions are enlightened by the survey*^ of BCG practices analysed in 
the previous chapter. At the same time, questions were also enlightened by informal 
conversations with bank directors and executives in many occasions including when 
*^  The survey analysis outlined in chapter 4 has led to the development of four significant areas: 
shareholders' and stakeholders' interests, Boards' role in corporate governance practices, 
transparency and disclosure, bank ownership type. Which enlighten questions formulation at semi-
stractured interviews (A). 
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approached them to ask for the participation in the study. The main aspect in 
formulating the semi-structured interview questions in this grounded theory study was 
to provide the research with "flexibility and freedom to explore a phenomenon in 
depth" (Strauss and Corbin, 1998) to discover as much concepts as possible in relation 
to the corporate governance phenomenon in the context of the BBS. Indeed, asking 
questions in the light of the survey analysis and mformal conversation facilitated asking 
more precise questions that are believed to increase the likelihood of discovering 
relevant concepts. 
To utilize the comparative method, all interviewees were asked the same questions. This 
also contributes to the attempt of objectivity that this research is seeking. Certainly the 
comparative analysis of the responses for each of these questions had contributed 
towards the generation of theoretically significant concepts (Strauss and Corbin, 1998) 
and the development of categories in terms of their properties and dimensions. Finally, 
during the course of the semi-structured interview process the need to interview other 
participants in new research sites was discovered. Participants from the CBE, EBI, 
EIOD, and Egyptian Stock Exchange were approached and interviewed. 
The semi-structured interview questions were as follows*^: 
1. To what extent does the bank's ownership type affects its quality of corporate 
governance practices? (ownership type of the bank) 
2. To what extent do laws and regulations effectively promote bank's corporate 
governance?(shareholders and stakeholders interests) 
3. To what extent corporate governance affects competitiveness of the bank? 
4. What are the mechanisms used by the CBE to enhance bank's corporate 
governance practices? (shareholders and stakeholders interests) 
5. On what basis a bank considers corporate governance reform? (shareholders 
and stakeholders interests) 
6. What bodies play an important role in bank's corporate governance? What are 
these roles? 
^^ The relationship between survey areas and questions investigating these respective areas is disclosed in 
front of each question. However, informal interviews with bank directors and executives had contributed 
to all questions with varying degrees. A table showing the significant areas arising from survey analysis 
and related semi-structured interview questions is shown in appendix 5 
141 
7. Whose interests do banks' corporate governance mechanisms protect? 
(shareholders and stakeholders interests) 
8. What role does the board have in the corporate governance of the bank? To 
what extent is this role effective?(Boards' role in corporate governance 
practices) 
9. How the board ensures that board members understand their role in corporate 
governance? (Boards' role in corporate governance practices) 
10. What are the corporate governance mechanisms that banks utilize? (Boards' 
role in corporate governance practices) 
11. To what extent the bank insists on good corporate governance in the credit 
operations? What benchmark the bank uses in this respect? (Boards' role in 
corporate governance practices) 
12. What impact does the Egyptian business culture have on corporate governance 
of banks? 
13. What is the basis to determine the risk management policy of the bank? (Boards' 
role in corporate governance practices) 
14. To what extent does the accounting standards adopted enhance 
transparency?(Transparency and Disclosure) 
5.3 Analysis of Semi-Structured Interviews Questions and Developed 
Open Categories 
This section presents open coding based on the analysis of data collected from the semi-
structured interviews (A). Indeed, the main output that occurs cumulatively as data 
collection and data analysis took place was open concepts. According to Strauss and 
Corbin (1990a) theory cannot be built using raw data, therefore, as soon as data analysis 
starts, events and incidents that have theoretical significance to the participants are 
given "conceptual labels" (P.7). As the. study progresses these open concepts are 
transformed to open categories which are a more abstract classification (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1990a, 199b). 
In conducting open coding data collected through semi-structured interviews (A) were 
the fundamental data used. Interview transcripts were analyzed using the line-by-line 
approach advocated by Strauss and Corbin (1990a; 1990b; 1998). Firstly, the transcript 
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was read thoroughly, and then a more in-depth line-by-line analysis took place, trying to 
find out concepts that correctly capture the meanings as expressed by the participants. 
The focus was given to discover the properties and dimensions of concepts as perceived 
by the participants^ "* in relation to the phenomenon studied. 
The line-by-line analysis was also accompanied by writing theoretical memos and 
visual representation of the emerging concepts^ .^ This included developing a list of 
emerging concepts and issues that were taken to the next interview. Finally, as coding 
and data collection progress together, grouping of open concepts took place to form 
open categories. In doing so and as recommended by Strauss and Corbin (1998) the 
open category was labelled in a way that logically describes "what is going on?" 
(P.114). 
This section presents the open categories which are the final result of the open coding 
stage. Each open category is linked to one or more interview question. Open categories 
presented in the following sections are explained in terms of their properties and 
dimensions. 
5.3.1 Corporate Governance Identity 
This open category emerged in relation to the analysis of responses to the following 
questions: 
Ql: To what extent does the bank's ownership identity affects its quality of corporate 
governance practices ? 
QS: On what basis a bank considers corporate governance reform? 
The term identity refers to the questions of who are we? What kind of business are we 
in? And what do we want to be?" (Albert and Whetten, 1985). It is a self reflection 
question that refers to the 'features that distinguish the organization from others with 
^ Participants here refer to bank directors and executives, Central bank officials, Egyptian Institute of 
directors' officials, Egyptian Banking Institute officials, and Egyptian Stock market officials. 
*' This was carried out to express the emerging concepts visually, this help to increase the theoretical 
sensitivity of the researcher. 
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which it may be compared ... (or) features that exhibit some degree of sameness or 
continuity overtime" (ibid, author brackets). According to Williamson (1998): 
Things are identical if they are one thing, not two. We can refute the claim that they are identical 
if we can find a property of one that is not simultaneously a property of the other. The concept of 
identity is fundamental to logic. Without it, counting would be impossible, for we could not 
distinguish in principle between counting one thing twice and counting two different 
things...Knowledge of what directions are involves knowledge that parallel lines have identical 
directions (Williamson, 1998:3841). 
In the context of the EBS, the category corporate governance identity reflects what 
various participants from the banking field^^ refer to when they express their opinion 
regarding similar corporate governance practices prevailing in a particular group of 
banks. Indeed, this is based on the four ownership types^^ of banks within the EBS: 
Foreign, Private, Arab and State. Because "identity has to exist in relation to some 
other thing" (Howell, 2003b:5) as advocated by Hegel (1971). Corporate governance 
identity exists in relation to the ownership type. This was clearly asserted by 
participants from the banking field, the following quotes reflect this: 
"Yes, for sure ownership identity affects the quality of corporate governance" 
(Director, Foreign bank). Similarly an executive manager of a State bank mentioned 
that "corporate governance quality is related to the ownership type of the bank". 
Another executive manager of a Private bank adds "Yes, the bank type does affect the 
quality of corporate governance". As such this indicates that the same banking type 
shares similar corporate governance practices and as such the term corporate 
governance identity refers to similar corporate governance features shared by a 
particular banks' type. 
^ Bank directors and executives, Central bank officials, Egyptian Institute of directors' officials, 
Egyptian Banking Institute officials, and Egyptian Stock market officials. 
*' Foreign banks are banks owned and affiliated to foreign banking organizations; principally there 
headquarters are located in Western or Asian countries. Similarly, Arab banks are banks owned by 
banking organizations of headquarters in Arab countries. Private Banks are owned by domestic banking 
organizations with no affiliation to external banking organizations. Finally, State banks refer to banks 
owned by state. 
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To summarize, bank directors and executives from various banks agreed upon four 
corporate governance identities corresponding to the four bank ownership types 
(Foreign, Private, Arab, State). This reflects that every ownership type shares common 
corporate governance features that distinguish it from other types. As such it reflects a 
particular corporate governance identity. 
Here the participants spoke of the Foreign bank corporate governance identity as the 
best and most committed to high quality corporate governance practices, followed by 
Private and Arab banks. While, State banks are perceived as the least committed to high 
quality of corporate governance practices. An executive manager from a State bank 
admits this reality when he/she says: 
Corporate governance quality is related to the type of the bank, foreign banks have the best 
corporate governance practices, private banks are okay but to a lesser extent, followed by Arab 
banks, while we come at the end of the list (Executive, State Bank). 
Another Foreign bank board director agrees to the same categorization of corporate 
governance identities. 
V 
Ownership identity affects the quality of corporate governance; you will find that the State-owned 
banks have the least corporate governance quality (Director, Foreign bank). 
Another executive manager from a Private bank confirms the categorization of 
corporate governance identity based on banks' ownership type as follows: 
The bank type does affect the quality of corporate governance, so if we divide the present structure 
of the EBS according to the ownership type, you will find that Foreign banks have the best 
corporate governance practices and State owned banks have the worst practices, while other 
banks (Arab and Private) come in between (Executive, Private bank). 
The open category corporate governance identity was observed in terms of its 
conceptual properties of management control, organizational perception of corporate 
governance and directors' and executives' competence. These properties can be 
discussed in the following subsections. 
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I. Management Control 
Management control refers to "the means by which the actions of individuals or groups 
within an organization are constrained to perform certain actions while avoiding other 
actions" (Encyclopaedia of Management, 2009:510). Management control was 
observed as a main property of Ihe corporate governance identity category with 
dimensions ranging from loose to tight management control. Indeed, bank directors and 
executives from various banks have indicated that tight management control is essential 
for high quality corporate govemance practices. 
Bank directors and executives have agreed on the vital role that management control 
plays in defining the corporate govemance identity of the bank. In fact this agrees with 
the basic definition of corporate govemance as "how companies are directed and 
controlled" (Cadbury report, 1992: Para: 1.9). Thus absence of control indicates that a 
basic feature of corporate govemance is missing. An EBI official stated "Lack of 
control provides individuals with the chance to behave in unfavourable way". 
Participants from the banking field emphasized the importance of management control 
m defining corporate govemance identity, referring to banks with low management 
control that had collapsed during the late 1990s. Indeed, behind failures was poor 
corporate governance^* based on weak management control. This facilitated 
transgression especially in loan granting function. The following quote shows this 
meaning: 
Lack of control was a main reason behind the famous banking failures in the 1990s, at these times 
a loan was granted by a phone call to a bank manager from a high-rank official (CB official). 
Bank directors and executives from various banks commented on their corporate 
govemance systems in terms of management control system. This reflects their own 
*' Here, corporate govemance failures were evident in. many cases especially in the state-owned banks 
which dominated the EBS during this period. Obviously, credit was allocated to "privileged and 
connected private sector not on commercial basis" (Mohieldin and Nasr, 2007:711), many cases of 
insider lending were reported as board members facilitated loans granting to their friends and network of 
clients, thus breaching tiieir supposed supervisory and monitoring role on executive management (ibid). 
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experience from two perspectives: as employees whose behaviour is controlled by 
management control systems, and as the personnel responsible of running the control 
system of the bank. For instance a Foreign bank director states: 
Foreign banks have effective corporate governance became these banks know how to 
put good controls in place. Foreign banks are very serious about corporate governance 
and control On the contrary, the reason why state banks have ineffective corporate 
governance is because they suffer from relaxed control systems (Director, Foreign 
bank) 
Another important aspect here is the phenomenon of widespread corruption in Egypt. 
According to the Transparency International Organization, corruption is an incident that 
occurs when individual with public powers uses these powers for private benefits 
(2010) [online]. 
This include...bribery of public officials, kickbacks in public procurement, embezzlement of 
public funds, and questions that probe the strength and effectiveness of public sector anti-
corruption efforts, thereby covering both the administrative and political aspects of 
corruption (ibid). 
Indeed, banking organisations are very sensitive to such activities; this was obvious 
from the CB official quote mentioned above. Essentially, this reflects a case of 
government officials abusing their public power^^ exploiting the weak control 
environment in State banks to commit corruption. According to corruption perception 
index'" (2009) Egypt was ranked at the world rank of 111* in terms of freedom from 
corruption. This index indicates that in Egypt ''corruption is widespread, where bribery 
of low-level civil servants seems to be apart of their daily life and there are allegations 
of significant corruption among high-level officials" (lOEF, 2009:58). 
Bank directors and executives considered that corporate governance identity is highly 
affected by management control, because in such corrupted environment constraining 
*' This refers to the methods managers and leaders utilize to influence their employees, basically power 
in this case can be coercive power: "the ability of a manager to force an employee to comply with an 
order through the threat of punishment" (Encyclopaedia of management, 2009:460). Or reward power, the 
case in which the manager or the leader will reward the employee for complying with a certain order. 
Here, the case of state banks, the earlier base of power coupled with weak control, can lead to corruption. 
Additionally, the latter coupled with weak control can tempt the employee to take a course of action that 
serves his/ herself interest like being promoted for instance. 
™ The survey includes 180 countries with the rank 1 indicating the best country in terms of freedom from 
corruption, while rank 180 signifies that the country is the worst country from the same respect. 
147 
individuals' behaviour is crucial to have successful corporate governance. The 
following quote reflects this meaning: 
Having effective control system in a bank makes the differences in corporate governance practices 
of the four banking organizations types. This occurs because banks with relaxed control are not 
protected from the negative aspects in the business environment, while banks with good controls 
have higher immunity to these types of infections (Executive, State bank). 
This also explains the CBE's emphasis to improve banks' control function by setting it 
as a primary objective of the banking sector reform. This became obvious foUoAving the 
1990s bank corporate governance failures related to weak controls especially in State 
banks. It also explains the reason why newly hired management of State banks consider 
reforming the control fimction as a first priority. An EBI official clarifies this "They 
consider that control system is their eye on the whole bank, as such improving control 
system was their first move before they sit in their positions " (EBI Official). 
II. Bank Directors' and Executives' Competence 
Board of directors and executive management of a bank have crucial roles in corporate 
governance. The board of directors: 
is ultimately responsible for the soundness of the bank... Continue to develop and maintain an 
appropriate level of collective expertise as the bank grows in size and complexity... Select, 
monitor and, where necessary, replace key executives... Promote bank safety and soundness... 
Provide sound and objective advice, and recommend sound practices gleaned from other 
situations... Contribute special expertise in overseeing a bank's activities" (BCBS, 2005:10). 
Similarly, the executive management consisting 
...of a core group of individuals responsible for the day-to-day management of the 
bank...contribute a major element of a bank's sound corporate governance by overseeing line 
managers in specific business areas and activities consistent with policies and procedures set by 
the bank's board of directors" (BCBS,2005:12). 
Therefore, competence of both board members and the executive management team is 
essential for effective corporate governance of a bank. Competence'' refers to "the 
degree of fit between the ability requirements of a certain task and the corresponding 
abilities possessed" by the person in charge of this task (Brinckman, 2007:20). 
' ' Competence can be seen as the sum of knowledge and skills accumulated during a person's lifetime 
(Pickett, 1998 cited in Brinckman, 2007:21). 
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Here, Bank directors, executives and external auditors have agreed upon the important 
role that competence of board members and management play in the quality of 
corporate governance. They mentioned that competent board and management will be 
capable of putting into place proper arrangements whether it is corporate governance 
related or not. As such, the identity differences and the associated variation in corporate 
governance practices quality can be explained in terms of the notion of bank directors' 
and executives' competence. 
From the due course of his work auditing various banks in Egypt, an auditing firm 
executive has explained the variation between bank types in terms of board and 
management competence. This signifies that it is not only corporate governance systems 
that impact corporate governance quality but also the competence of those responsible 
of implementing these systems counts. This is shown by the following quote: 
One reason why Foreign banks come on the top of the list in terms of their corporate 
governance practices is that the application of systems adopted by their headquarters is 
carried out here in Egypt by professional and competent management (Executive 
manager, International auditing firm). 
In fact, executives' and directors' competence level is affected by the recruitment 
practices of the bank. Banks of the same type with similar recruitment practices are 
likely to attract staff of similar competence level; the following quote clarifies this 
meaning: 
Foreign banks have high level of corporate governance, one reason is that they employ 
high calibre employees, in State owned banks they do not have such high standards of 
corporate governance, people they employ needs much training and education to be 
able to deal with corporate governance issues. These banks need to change their 
recruitment policies and their management ityle in general. Concerning us J think we 
are following foreign banks and now we are doing much better (Executive manager. 
Private bank). 
Another Arab bank director mentioned that: 
We have a problem that 90% of directors and key executives are opportunists, while 
10% are competent and do their job" (Director, Arab bank). 
'^  Here the auditor was focusing more on executive management, however, board members competence 
are covered in more details separately under question 8 of the interview analysis. 
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These quotes would indicate that Foreign banks are characterized by high competent 
staff'^  followed by Private, Arab and State banks. However, attracting competent 
employees is not enough for maintaining high level of effectiveness, but training and 
further development is quite important as well. A Foreign bank director asserted this 
perspective by stating: 
Employees are offered training courses when they are recruited and as needed during 
their career with us, to make sure that they imderstand their jobs' responsibilities and 
are able to carry them out, this point is important when we speak about corporate 
governance (Director, Foreign Bank). 
In the context of State and Private Banks corporate governance improvements started 
with changing the recruitment policies especially in relation with directorship and key 
executive positions. Indeed, new directors and executives were more competent. This 
indicates that competence can be a driver towards better corporate governance. 
Corporate governance reform started in state banks by selecting highly competent people 
who were well trained in American and British banks. Now they are known by name in 
the EBS, they are on the top of State banks while others hunted by Private Banks (EBI 
official). 
As such competence of board members and executive managers is one factor that 
affects the corporate governance identity of a bank, and because banks of the same type 
(Foreign, Private, Arab, State) share relatively similar recruitment and training policies. 
This leads to attracting and maintain employees of a particular level of competence that 
in turn determines how successful a bank is in implementing corporate governance 
system. 
III. Organizational Perception Of Corporate Governance 
Organizational perception refers to the image of an organization (Elsbach, 2006). Here, 
an image refers to a "relatively current and temporary perceptions of an organization, 
held by internal audiences, regarding the fit of an organization with particular 
distinctiveness categories" (ibid: 14). Notably, legitimacy is one of the most studied 
'^  Here competence is related to corporate governance responsibilities 
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forms of organizational images, it refers to "a generalized perception or assumption 
that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially 
constructed systems" (Suchman, 1995:574). 
Organizations can achieve pragmatic legitimacy when they are perceived as legitimate 
because they serve some practical interests, such as increasing shareholders' wealth. 
Also, organizations can achieve moral legitimacy "because their actions are in line with 
social norms "(ibid). 
Bank directors and executives have identified that achieving a legitimate organizational 
image is a main reason for adopting corporate governance by various banks. Obviously, 
banks of the same type of ownership adopts corporate governance to signal a certain 
organizational image (legitimacy) to a particular group of stakeholders, on such basis 
the organizational perception of corporate governance is another property of the 
corporate governance identity. In other words, banks agreed that corporate governance 
is important to them because it conveys a message to particular stakeholders that they 
are legitimate. 
Thus banks' organizational perception of corporate governance can vary on the basis of 
the legitimacy type sought. It can be either pragmatic legitimacy or moral legitimacy. 
Notably, participants from the banking field have all agreed that corporate governance 
is not well-known in Egypt "Corporate governance is a new concept in Egypt and its 
banking sector" (EBI official). This indicates that corporate governance has recently 
begun to gain attention of professional and academic circles. As for customers or the 
general public it is not positioned to affect the organizational image of the bank. For 
them what is more important is that their funds are protected. As such in the case of the 
EBS the prevailing type of legitimacy is pragmatic rather than moral legitimacy. This 
can be discussed within the context of every bank type as follows. 
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Firstly, State banks' directors and executive managers have agreed that their banks 
consider that adopting corporate governance is a way to show pragmatic legitimacy to 
the CBE especially that the CBE'''* has considered "enhancing and monitoring 
corporate governance of all banks as an objective of the wide EBS reform" (CBE, 
2004:3). A state bank executive stated that: 
State banks, such as our case, just started to improve corporate governance and use this 
term in the banking life. This is apart of a wider policy of the CBE to reform the State-
owned banks (Executive, State bank). 
State banks focus on achieving pragmatic legitimacy as they serve the interests of the 
CBE by following its directions. While the moral legitimacy here is not applicable as 
corporate governance as abovementioned is a new issue and does not yet constitute a 
social norm of appropriateness'^. As such state banks are perceived by the public as 
legitimate and safe regardless of their corporate governance practices. More precisely, if 
moral legitimacy do exist, we would see that state banks have small market share based 
on the perception that they are illegitimate, however, the contrary is true and state banks 
have a relatively large share of the market equivalent to 35% regardless of their poor 
corporate governance practices. The following quote clarifies this issue: 
Although State banks have poor corporate governance quality, they have a market share of about 
35% of total deposits. People consider these banks as secured by the government which is not true, 
there is no legislation that guarantees this backup for any bank It is just a myth. But this can be 
understood as corporate governance is new in Egypt and is not well-known to the public. 
Overtime, corporate governance awareness would be developed. But now it makes no difference 
for the public if you have high quality corporate governance or not! (Director, Foreign bank). 
Secondly, Arab banks' directors and executives have agreed that these banks also seek 
achieving pragmatic legitimacy. So corporate governance is adopted to serve 
'" There is no distinction between the CBE and the Egyptian government, especially that article 24, 
Chapter 5 of the banking law 88/ 2003 states that "The central bank shall act as a financial advisor and 
agent for the government". This defies the CBE independence totally. 
Moral Legitimacy is based on normative grounds and focuses on the extent on which organization is 
judged as doing the "right thing" rather on the extent a given activity that the organization carry-out 
benefits to the evaluator (Suchman, 1995). So taking into consideration that corporate governance has 
been introduced to the Egyptian context recently, it is not yet established as a norm or value equivalent to 
"right thing". As such, it is too early that banking organizations seek achieving moral legitimacy when 
adopting corporate governance. 
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shareholders interests who want to maximize their wealth and indeed this can only 
happen through compliance with the corporate governance requirements enforced by the 
CBE. 
In our case, the most important aspects is to maximize profits to satisfy the owners and 
this cannot happen without following the CBE instructions (Executive, Arab bank). 
Thirdly, Private banks' directors and executives have seen their banks proactive and 
keen to increase their expansion potential. Therefore adopting corporate governance is 
not limited to meet the regulator requirements or meet the shareholder wealth 
maximization only, but includes adopting corporate governance in a more 
comprehensive manner, beyond the CBE requirements, thus, signalling to international 
investors that their investments will be protected. 
There is no choice for banks but to adopt CBE corporate governance requirements. But 
in our case, we strive to have stronger corporate governance structures beyond the 
CBE requirements. I consider we are successful in this respect because to us, corporate 
governance is important to protect current and potential shareholders (Executive, 
Private bank). 
So, to private banks, it is also pragmatic legitimacy that drives corporate govemance 
adoption. They seek pragmatic legitimacy towards the CBE as well as current and 
potential shareholders. 
Finally, Foreign banks also adopt corporate govemance to achieve pragmatic 
legitimacy, but in this case the practical interests include their home coimtry owners 
(headquarters) and indeed the CBE. 
Talking about the case of (name omitted), Egypt The bank has an in-house corporate 
governance system, applied in all branches world-wide, but with certain aspects 
customized to some local differences. Here in Egypt we must comply with this corporate 
governance system. It is a comprehensive system that includes much more than that 
what is required by the CBE. However, sometime we need to restate how things are 
done to match the CBE requirements (Director, Foreign bank). 
To summarize, the open category corporate govemance identity has emerged to signify 
the existence of features that are shared between banks owned by the similar type of 
ownership (Foreign, Private, Arab, State). Three properties were observed to 
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significantly characterize each banking group: Management control, directors' and 
Executives' competence and organizational perception of corporate governance. 
5.3.2 Laws and Regulations 
This open category has emerged in relation to the following question 
Q2: To what extent do laws and regulations effectively promote corporate governance 
in banks! 
This open category refers to laws and regulations governing the banking sector in 
Egypt. Here regulations refer to those issued by the CBE as the sole regulating authority 
of the banking industry. 
In particular, this category discusses these frameworks and how the participants from 
the banking field consider them effective in driving banks towards high quality 
corporate governance. According to Basel committee (2005) governments can play a 
vital role in promotion of good corporate governance in banks, specifically through 
"laws, regulations, enforcement" (BCBS: 2005:19). 
This category was observed in terms of two properties corporate governance content 
and enforcement These properties can be discussed as follows. 
I. Corporate governance Content 
An effective legal and regulatory framework is essential to promote good corporate 
governance practices within any banking sector (BCBS, 2005). Here, participants from 
the banking field have evaluated the current legal and regulatory framework on the basis 
of its corporate governance content. Most of them have referred to the law of Central 
Bank, The Banking Sector and Money number &8/2003 as the principal legal document 
governing the banking sector. 
The leading document governing the banking industry in Egypt is the new 
banking law number 88/2003 and its executive rules. In addition, to the 
regulations issued by the CBE in the form of board decrees and governor 
decrees (CB official). 
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However, with most of the participants focusing only'^  on the banking law niimber 88, 
the particularity of the banking sector is signified. So if a legal framework is to promote 
corporate governance of the banking sector it should explicitly be issued for the banking 
sector. Most of the directors and executives from various bank types mentioned the 
requirement of the law number 88/2003 that banks should have an audit committee as 
an example of corporate governance regulations "The unified banking law has some 
aspects that deal with good corporate governance such as the requirement to create an 
audit committee in every bank" (Director, Private bank). 
Notably, none of the participants have mentioned the ECOCG (2005), which is 
applicable to the banking sector "/if is also applicable to... Banks, insurance companies, 
and real-estate financing companies" (ECOCG, 2005:5). This indicates that corporate 
governance regulations that address the banking sector amongst a number of 
organizations do not have a strong impact, especially if they are voluntary and not 
endorsed by the CBE, whereas those endorsed or enforced by the CBE are more 
effective in bringing change. 
Reviewing law number 88/2003 and its executive regulation indicates the absence of the 
term corporate governance from both documents. With few aspects that can be 
considered corporate governance related such as ownership rules, audit committee 
formation, the role of auditors in reviewing internal controls of banks. Meanwhile, some 
new corporate governance related regulations are enacted by the CBE such as the 
guidelines of evaluation of creditworthiness of customers and the control and 
supervision manual. However, none of these regulations deal with BCG in a 
comprehensive manner. An executive manager from a private bank indicates this "Laws 
*^ Few participants have considered other laws such as commercial laws for instance as influential on the 
banking sector as well "other laws may be considered as part of the regulatory framework governing 
banks, improvements in these laws would also affect the corporate governance banks. For example 
upgrading the commercial laws would affect the regulations regarding checks " (Executive, State bank). 
But this opinion was not popular amongst various participants. 
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and regulations touch the concept of corporate governance lightly; corporate 
governance needs to be dealt with in a more comprehensive manner". This clarifies that 
the corporate governance scope within the current banking laws and regulations is quite 
limited. 
On the other hand, a Foreign bank executive states that "The role of the CBE is to set 
standards that equally applies to all banks, it is the minimum standards, and this is 
expected due to the variation between banks ". This would indicate that it is less likely 
that the CBE introduces a compulsory comprehensive corporate governance rules, 
rather it can be in a more voluntary or comply or explain based regulations. This is 
meant to accommodate the differences between banks in terms of size and capabilities 
necessary to adopt comprehensive corporate governance principles. 
Still some bank directors and executives see that a corporate governance code is needed 
to fill the current corporate governance gap in the applicable regulations. Moreover, 
participants agreed that this code must be endorsed by the CBE 
// is essential to have a unified code of corporate governance for the EBS to be applicable 
on all banks. This code should be issued and backed by the CBE (Director, Foreign bank). 
However, opinions conflict even between the participants fi^om the same type of banks 
(Foreign bank) indicates the sort of problem expected by the CBE if a comprehensive 
compulsory corporate governance rules are issued. This issue is discussed in more 
details in the following section. 
II. Enforcement 
According to Electronic Longman dictionary enforcement refers to the ability to achieve 
obedience to a rule or a law. Enforcement reqmres having coercive power that refers to 
the ability to force someone to comply with an order (law) through the threat of 
punishment (French and Raven, 2001). Here, enforcement refers to the ability of the 
CBE to force banks to comply with relevant corporate governance laws and regulations. 
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Indeed, participants from the banking field spoken of enforcement as an essential 
property of laws and regulations required to promote good corporate governance within 
the EBS. The following quote refers to this meaning: 
In my opinion laws and regulations play an important role in corporate governance reform 
of banks, however, this should not be taken for granted because it can be dealt with by what 
is known as "tick the box" phenomenon. Here enforcement and examination are essential 
components that bring about compliance with corporate governance (Corporate 
11 Governance Expert ) . 
Directors and executive managers from various bank types have clarified the need for a 
corporate governance code in the EBS. In fact, and as abovementioned, issuing such a 
code without proper enforcement would not bring about compliance. To these 
participants enforcement begins with issuing a compulsory code, then supervising 
implementation. However, participants from the CBE oppose this opinion because they 
claim that the concept of enforcement is seen differently from the CBE perspective. 
/ cannot produce a compulsory code, enforced on banks, because this will create many 
practical problems. This is also against the approach of the central bank, after law 88 has 
been issued the perception of enforcement has changed towards setting boundaries but 
keeping flexibility. We are very serious about improving corporate governance within the 
banking sector (CB official). 
This two conflicting points of views regarding issuing a compulsory code of corporate 
governance for banks, reflects the compromise that the CBE wants to achieve. The CBE 
seeks enhancing corporate governance quality in banks, as a prerequisite to achieve 
better protection of depositors, especially that weak corporate governance have caused 
bank failures previously in Egypt and lead to a major NPL problem (Oldham and 
Bennadi, 2005). 
However, still the CBE faces another pressures from the government to achieve the 
political agenda as an agent, this includes sustaining the stability of the banking sector. 
From a CBE point of view this would be affected if they enforced too tight corporate 
governance measures. So, the CBE tries to achieve the balance between the banking 
" This is one of the foreign bank executives who worked for an international agency involved in 
corporate governance reform. But here he / she was speaking about his / her capacity as a corporate 
governance expert. This participant is counted once. 
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sector safety and stability. Adopting Basel II in the EBS is a good example that clarifies 
the CBE approach towards enforcement. One central bank official stated "If we enforce 
the adoption of Basel II in the EBS, banks will be unable to lend a single pound". This 
reflects that although, Basel II is quite important to mitigate risks faced by banks, the 
CBE is reluctant to enforce the accord rigidly because they fear operational problems 
that may arise. They tend to be realistic as they know that not all banks have the 
capabilities to apply advanced concepts such as risk management or corporate 
governance. 
In this respect the CBE signed a technical assistance from the European Central bank to 
prepare the EBS to comply with the Basel II. So, the approach of the CBE is to 
modernize the bank sector, endorse good practices guidelines but do this gradually after 
assuring that the CBE itself have the capabilities to support the new concepts. This is 
essential to avoid collapses or technical problems in the EBS. So on a dimensional 
range of rigid to flexible enforcement, the CBE favours a flexible approach. 
Consistent with this gradual approach, the CBE has recently shifted their role from only 
supervising the compliance with banking laws and regulations to include a forward 
looking risk based component, this is clarified by a CB official as follows: "Now, The 
CBE emphasis is on adopting a more forward looking approach of assessing the risks 
associated with banks they supervise, in the way that helps avoiding problems before 
they rise ". As such one government official refers to a proposed corporate governance 
code "we are working with an international agency experienced in corporate 
governance, to prepare corporate governance code for the banking sector. This code 
will be issued soon; will be endorsed by the CBE, but we are still thinking whether it 
will be issued on voluntary basis for initial period then be compulsory, or it will be 
issued on a comply-or-explain basis " 
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So, the CBE is keen to enhance corporate governance in the EBS to protect depositor 
and maintain safety of the banking sector, while avoiding operational problems that 
would be encoimtered if the code is compulsory. Alternatively the CBE will follow the 
same flexible approach followed in enforcing credit operations for instance, where 
every bank is allowed to have its own credit rules, which are approved by the CBE 
(Law 88, 2003), and depend on other mechanisms such as on-site examination and the 
external auditors' scrutinizing of the adequacy of control systems of every bank and the 
compliance with the regulations (Law 88,2003: article 84). 
Moreover, CBE considers that corporate governance should be based on mutual 
collaboration between the regulator and banks "we want to see banks trying to improve 
their corporate governance practises and the CBE will of course offer help and 
guidance "(CBE official). 
5.3.3 Upgrading Supervision 
This open category has emerged in relation to the following question: 
Q4: What are the mechanisms used by the CBE to enhance bank's corporate 
governance practices ? 
Upgrading supervision has emerged to indicate the processes or mechanisms undertaken 
by the CBE to enhance BCG practices within the EBS. Supervision generally indicates 
that someone "make sure that things are done in the correct way" (Electronic Longman 
Dictionary). In an organizational context supervision indicates the act of "oversight that 
is necessary ... to prevent wrong doing that may go unnoticed" (Encyclopaedia of 
Management, 2009:20). This open category has. emerged to demonstrate supervision as 
the principal mechanism utilized by the CBE to make sure that banks comply with 
corporate governance laws and regulations. As such enhance BCG practices. It is a 
measure of safety and soundness in banks. Moreover, this function is being upgraded by 
the CBE to bring about more compliance with corporate governance laws and 
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regulations. This open category is observed through its properties supervision processes 
and efficiency and effectiveness of supervision. This can be discussed as follows. 
I. Supervision Processes 
"The CBE is an autonomous public legal entity which regulates monetary, credit and 
banking policy, and supervises its implementation in accordance with the banks and 
credit law, the law of the central bank and banking system, and the regulations of the 
Board of the CBE promulgated under these laws" (CBE, 2010) [Online]. Therefore, 
one of the CBE's main functions is to supervise the implementation of laws and 
regiilations. The focus here is corporate governance practices and what supervision has 
to do with it. 
According to BCBG (2010), the role of enhancement of BCG practices is related to the 
supervisory role of the regulator. As 
Supervisors should provide guidance to banks on expectations for sound corporate governance 
.... (Through) establish guidance or rules... especially ... where national laws, regulations, 
codes, or listing requirements regarding corporate governance are not sufficiently robust to 
address the unique corporate governance needs of banks... (Meanwhile) Supervisors should 
regularly perform a comprehensive evaluation of a bank's overall corporate governance policies 
and practices and evaluate the bank's implementation of the principles" (BCBG, 2010:29). 
In fact, the previous quote reflects what the CBE is trying to do regarding corporate 
governance of banks, given the limited corporate governance scope within the current 
laws and regulations. The CBE is trying to gviide banks in .relation to corporate 
governance through issuing a code for the banking sector as previously mentioned. But 
issuance of a corporate governance code or guidelines is not enough and does not 
automatically mean bank compliance with Such regulations. As such supervision plays a 
crucial role in this context. It should include regular and comprehensive evaluation of 
banks' overall corporate governance policies and practices (BCBG, 2010). 
Additionally, regulators should "supplement their regular evaluation .... By monitoring 
a combination of internal reports and prudential reports .... require effective and timely 
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remedial action by a bank to address material deficiencies in its corporate governance " 
(ibid). 
CBE officials have indicated that the CBE supervises the implementation of the current 
corporate governance aspects covered by laws and regulations through a number of 
processes "we have more than one mechanism fijr effective supervision namely: on-site 
examination, off-site examination and surveillance" (CB official). 
On-site supervision includes "on-site examination at least once every 2 years, in 
addition to some limited examinations which are done when necessary .... the objective 
to verify the soundness of the financial position of banks and that they are in 
compliance with banking laws and regulation" (CBE, 2010) [ONLINE]. 
While, off-site analysis represents "An important segment of the CBE's 
supervision...conducted through the review and examination of numerous reports... 
financial reports and prudential reports ... these covers a broad range of bank's 
operations " (ibid). 
Finally, prudential surveillance includes ^ fit proper test for CEO, board members and 
senior management; bank strategy and board oversight, stress testing; compliance & 
internal audit effectiveness; scrutinize external auditors work" (CBE, 2007: 7) . 
Moreover, the CBE has a range of corrective measures in case of banks' violation of 
laws and regulations ranging from reduction or suspension of credit facilities of a bank 
till dissolving the board of directors of the violating bank and appointment of a 
commissioner. (CBE, 2010) [Online]. 
hi conclusion, supervision processes implemented by the CBE consists of three 
functions or mechanisms: on-site examination, off-site examination and prudential 
surveillance. These processes oversee banks' compliance with applicable laws and 
™ A presentation of the CBE on corporate governance and the role of the CBE (May, 2007). This 
presentation has been handed by a CBE official to summarize more precisely what she/he wants to say. 
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regulations including corporate governance. Indeed, this demonstrates that the CBE has 
in place the mechanisms to enforce corporate governance; however, how successful is 
the CBE in performing this role is another aspect discussed in the following subsection. 
n. Efficiency and Effectiveness of Supervision 
Efficiency and effectiveness of supervision complement the previous sub-category of 
supervision processes. It aims to show how the supervision function has been subject to 
upgrading and how this will affect corporate governance of the EBS. 
"Efficiency is doing things right and effectiveness is doing the right things" 
(Encyclopaedia of Management, 2009: 217). In the context of the supervision 
operations efficiency, bank directors and executives especially from non-state banks 
have questioned the competence of the CBE Examiners ''The CBE has the principal 
role in supervision of banks in Egypt, but a main problem is that the examiners are not 
competent enough; they are superficial" (Director, Foreign Bank). This would certainly 
affects the efficiency of supervision, as incompetent examiners would not be able to do 
"things right". 
Additionally, participants from the banking field considered that independence of the 
CBE is crucial to maintain the objectivity of supervision and hence its efficiency. It 
must be noted here that the banking law 88/2003 considered the "The central bank of 
Egypt (CBE) is an autonomous public legal entity" (Law 88, 2003: article 1:1). 
However, a CB official has commented that: 
The independence of the CBE that the banking law 88/2003 has advocated is not real. If 
the CBE is really independent then the government should not interfere in its roles. But 
the opposite is true. Because of the co-ordinating council. This council is responsible 
for setting the monetary policy, it is chaired by the Prime Minister, while the CBE 
governor is only a member in this council with other Ministers " (CB official). 
In fact, the banking law 88/2003 states that "7%e central bank shall set, in agreement 
with the government, the objectives of the monetary policy, through a coordinating 
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council to be formed by decree of the president of the republic" (Law 88/2003, article 
5:5) 
Moreover, the executive regulations states that "meetings of the council shall not be 
valid without the presence of at least two thirds of its members, including a 
representative of the central bank and a representative of the government (Executive 
regulations of law 88/2003: chapter one. Article 10: 4). Furthermore, the presidential 
decree Number 17/2005 has assigned the chairmanship of this council to the Prime 
minister. As such, this makes the CBE independence debatable. 
The degree of independence of the CBE has been studied previously by Farrag and 
Kamaly (2007), they concluded that "the CBE enjoys a moderately low degree of 
independence " (P. 21). They added that their study has captured discrepancies between 
the degree of independence conferred to the CBE by law and actual practices. Indeed, 
this would have an adverse effect on the supervisory role of the CBE and its efficiency 
in addressing corporate governance issues. Because lack of independence could impair 
objectivity of supervision and hence its efficiency. Notably, reduction of government 
interference in the CBE issues is essential to achieve CBE's independence (ibid). 
On the other hand, CB officials have indicated that the on-site examination occurs by 
the aid of systematic forms of evaluation called CAMEL '^ similar to that used in the 
USA (CBE, 2010) [Online]. However a CB official commented ^'Examiners should not 
only work according to the CBE examination manual only because this will not lead to 
discovering real problems. An examiner should have a six-sense to enrich the 
examination process" 
^' CAMEL rating is a rating system designed to assess the financial soundness of the bank based on five 
components "Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management competence, Earnings, and Liquidity" 
(Gasbarro et at, 2002: 248) 
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Another bank executive added: 
Examination process of the CBE is not so frequent it occurs once every two years, 
moreover, it does not evaluate the contemporary emerging issues but focus on recurrent 
issues examined every time " (Executive Manager, Foreign bank). 
This indicates that the scope of the examination does not cover crucial things that 
emerge, also its frequency is low and examiners may not stick to the CBE manual. All 
this would decrease the effectiveness of the supervision. 
For all mentioned above, the CBE has decided to upgrade the supervision function as 
part of the overall banking sector reform. This was part of various stages of the EBS 
reform. During the first stage of reform the objective was to "upgrading of the 
supervision sector of the CBE" (CBE, 2009:17). While, during the second stage*° of 
reform the CBE has been more specific in addressing the crucial issues to an effective 
and efficient supervision. Now, the CBE has added qualitative standards that ensure the 
safety of depositors' funds rather than depending on quantitative measures only. For the 
first time "good governance rules, information system efficiency and the appropriate 
competency standards for officials and managers of banks' key sectors" (ibid: 13) will 
be areas to be assessed within the supervisory framework. This will directly affect 
effectiveness and efficiency of supervision in relation to corporate governance. Firstly, 
including corporate governance explicitly to the scope of supervision will enhance 
effectiveness. While, addressing competency of both officials (CBE examiners) and 
bank management teams will affect efficiency. 
Moreover, the CBE signed a memorandum of imderstanding with the European Central 
bank to assist in reforming the supervision sector with the application of Basel II 
standards (ibid), which is another upgrading to both efficiency and effectiveness. 
Because the European Central bank will fransfer technical knowledge regarding what 
should be done? (Effectiveness) and how? (Efficiency). Finally, the CBE has announced 
'" Covers the period of 2009-20011. 
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a plan to expand its on-site examination, increase the number of banks inspected, and 
increase the frequency of inspection to be on a yearly basis. In parallel, this included the 
efforts to recruit "highly qualified banking staff (CBE staff) acquainted with new 
technology, enhance the efficiency of human cadres to be capable of managing this key 
sector (supervision)" (ibid: 17). This wide reform is expected to assist in "take 
immediate corrective actions in this regard" (ibid). As such, the CBE is exerting more 
efforts to improve the scope and frequency of supervision. At the same time, it is trying 
to provide competent staff capable of implementing this new framework. Indeed, this 
should be reflected on the efficiency and effectiveness of supervision. However, it 
seems that the independence issue will continue to exist limiting the impact of these 
reforms. . 
5.3.4 Bank Competitiveness 
The open category Bank Competitiveness has emerged from the analysis of the 
following questions: 
Q3: To what extent corporate governance affects competitiveness of the bank? 
Qll: To what extent banks insist on client's corporate governance in credit 
operations? What benchmark the bank uses in this respect? 
Competitiveness refers to the strategies that every organization sets to achieve the best 
possible strategic advantage (Cunliffe, 2008). Competitiveness can be considered as an 
organizational value that "identify where the organization is headed and how to get 
there" (ibid: 59). These values should be held by all employees (ibid). Indeed, 
organizational values represent a component of the organizational culture that shapes 
the image that the stakeholders have of the organization (ibid). 
In context of the EBS, bank durectors and executives from various banks have spoken 
about the competitiveness of their banks as related to corporate governance practices. 
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The open category bank competitiveness can be explained in terms of two properties 
observed, the time horizon and banking segment as follows: 
I. Time Horizon 
Bank directors and executives from various banks have differentiated between corporate 
governance and competitiveness relationship based on time horizon. They have 
indicated that banks with values that do not support strong corporate governance are 
those banks with focus on achieving short-term success. However, they agreed that 
short-termisim can lead to failure m the long-term. As, short term success is based on 
seeking risky business such as offering credit to high risk profile clients, unconcerned 
with good corporate governance. The following quote clarifies this meaning: 
Banks deal with all types of people from which there is a percentage that are bad clients, 
some banks lower their conditions to attract this percentage. This means that banks with 
good corporate governance will lose this type of client because the client is not up to the 
standards of the bank In conclusion, bad corporate governance practices may lead to 
gaining more clients in the short term but in the long-term these banks will suffer. Banks 
have to comply with effective corporate governance in order to continue to exist and protect 
their reputation and name (Executive, Private Bank). 
Other banks with more corporate governance compliance tend to be selective in terms 
of accepted customers. These maintain their corporate governance practices regardless 
of any short-term losses incurred from adopting this strategy. 
In the short-run the impact of good corporate governance is negative on the bank 
competitiveness. However, the impact in the long-run is surely positive. Because the low 
quality banks that accept low quality clients will definitely suffer later-on and accordingly, 
lose their market to the high quality banks with stringent corporate governance practices 
(Executive, Foreign banks). 
So two Strategies exist in the BBS in relation to competitiveness. On the one hand some 
banks set their objective achieving short-term competitiveness and meet the 
requirements of the shareholders. These banks accept high risk profile clients that are 
more likely to be refused by banks with stringent corporate governance standards. This 
sfrategy is currently successftil given that these banks attract new clients with low credit 
worthiness who wants to satisfy needs falling beyond their purchasing power. 
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Nowadays many banks are focusing on individuals who do not have enough money but 
seeks a higher social status by owning goods that give them this status such as cars, 
laptops, mobile phones (CBE Official) 
On the other hand, other banks are conservative and maintain compliance with high 
corporate governance standards regardless of the negative short-term effects it may 
have. These banks focus is achieving competitiveness in the long-term. 
According to our standards we never get into competition through reducing our 
conditions in favour of winning a low quality client. Conversely, if the client deserves 5 
millions we give him 1 million only. However, there are other banks in the market that 
choose to be more flexible and approve offering this client the loan. But later on this 
will turn to be a NPL and they will regret it!! (Executive, Foreign bank). 
Indeed, banks focusing on short-term profits regardless of the associated high risks 
signify an obstacle for good corporate governance promotion. Here, the only solution 
seems to be in the hands of the CBE as the sole authority responsible of issuing further 
corporate governance regulations addressing this aspect in addition to implementing 
more stringent supervision. 
II. Banking Segments 
Banking segments refer to the various business lines in commercial banks. Two 
business lines can be identified, firstly, is retail banking. It refers to "financial services 
such as lending and collecting deposits from individuals and small businesses" (Bessis, 
2002). Secondly, is corporate banking related to the financial services with "identified 
borrowers and relationship banking" (ibid), this includes dealing with big corporations 
for instance. 
Bank directors and executive managers have indicated that corporate governance 
competitiveness relationship discussed in the previous section can be easily observed in 
the retail banking segment more than corporate banking. This is because the banking 
penetration rate in Egypt is quite low i.e. most of the population has never transacted 
with a bank. However, these days this ratio is increasing. 
Banks nowadays focus on retail segment because it is easy to run and very profitable and is 
more growing. They are not concerned with corporate governance at all I think this will 
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continue for some time because all what you see represents 4% of the population in Egypt, 
still 94% do not have any dealing with banks (Director, Arab Bank). 
This means that these clients are unaware of banking and indeed corporate governance. 
So they are less likely to transact with banks with tight corporate governance. Because 
these banks will normally require collaterals and more information '^ to satisfy 
themselves that the client can repay the loan. Finally, retail clients are much happier 
with banks that do not seek too much information. A private bank executive tells the 
experience of his/her bank which started reforming their corporate governance system 
and describes the troubles with retail customers, signifying that changes in corporate 
governance can affect competitiveness. 
Lately, we introduce some changes to our new accounts application form, the changes we 
introduced was directed to better know our customers through certain measures and 
information such as other banking accounts held, average salary, membership of social 
clubs, car ownership, spouse details ect. You cannot imagine the problems we had because 
of the new application form, people were unhappy to supply any information. We lost many 
customers in this move (Executive, Private bank) 
On the other hand this is less evident in the corporate banking segment because the 
focus of this segment is large corporations which are well positioned and more inclined 
to reputable bank that can deal with them on a win-win scenario. Not with banks that 
could cause them future troubles. 
The case is much better when we talk about corporate banking, because by definition 
companies falling within this category are big enough and strong enough to satisfy the 
conditions of banks with proper corporate governance in place. Big corporations are 
looking for a strong bank that can satisfy its demands in terms of better interests rates, 
service quality and safety. (Executive, Arab bank). 
However, because there is still a type of corporations that are not up to the standard and 
because many banks do not deal with corporate governance in an explicit and a 
comprehensive way as previously mentioned. Instead, they look at cash flows abilities 
of the company, its management team and reputation. It is likely to find some banks that 
consider how proper corporate governance can affect their competitiveness. Still this 
segment is better than the retail segment. 
*' This may include a prove of tlie origin of funds to avoid being involved in money laundering or 
terrorism financing. 
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/ have worked in 3 different banks, in this segment the credit officer consider that every loan to 
be a management loan. We also look at typical issues like financials, reputation, inventory and 
cashflow generation ability. In addition we ask for proper collateral But still we don't have an 
explicit corporate governance requirements (Executive, State bank). 
5.3.5 Pressure Groups 
The open category pressure groups has emerged in relation to the following question: 
Q6: What bodies play an important role in bank's corporate governance? 
Pressure groups refer to the various entities, institutions and bodies that exert a pressure 
on banks to improve or reform their corporate governance practices. Participants from 
the banking field have agreed on a number of groups that have impacted the corporate 
governance phenomenon. 
The open category pressure groups can be discussed in terms of its properties sources 
of pressure and the impact of pressure as follows: 
I. Sources Of Pressure 
Participants from the banking field have agreed on two types of groups that have 
influence on corporate governance practices of banks within the EBS namely: 
independent and governmental groups. These can be discussed as follows: 
Independent Groups 
Independent groups include those who do not have any business interest or connection 
with banks. These include the regulator, external audit firms and international 
organizations such as the World Bank and Basel committee. 
Both the CBE and the external auditors should be independent according to law 
88/2003. Which states that the CBE is "a public legal person, directly subject to the 
president of the republic" (Article 1:1). Similarly, the same law requires that auditors 
must be independent and prohibits that the auditor or any of his/her family be engaged 
in any transaction that would impair this independence. An governmental official 
asserts that "Bodies that play important roles are the CBE as the sole regulating 
authority and the external auditing firms" (Governmental Official). 
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Another Executive added: 
This would include the World Bank, the CBE, and auditors. These bodies have an influence on 
shaping corporate governance of banks. Especially, International organizations such as Basel 
Committee because they set international guidelines for corporate governance of banks which 
should be adopted by banks in both developed and developing countries (Executive, Foreign 
bank). 
Moreover, a corporate governance expert adds that 
Donors such as IPC, World Bank, CIPE have a significant role in BCG because they require 
banks' compliance with internationally accepted governance standards to qualify for receiving 
donations. 
Here various participants from the banking field have agreed that the CBE, auditors and 
international organizations have influence on corporate governance of the EBS. This 
signifies that these bodies exert certain types of pressure. The CBE as the regulator has 
the authority to issue and enforce corporate governance related regulations. The 
foliowmg quote clarifies this: 
The main body that have an important role in banks' corporate governance is the central 
bank which is the only authority responsible for the regulation of the banking sector in 
Egypt (Executive, Arab bank). 
As such the CBE here is exerting coercive pressures on the banking sector. The CBE 
can punish or delist any non-complying bank by the powers entitled to the CBE by law 
as follows: 
The CB shall take the means with which it ensures the realization of its objectives and 
discharge of its functions. It shall, in particular have the following powers...supervising 
the units of the banking sector ... the bank may undertake any tasks or take any measures 
required for applying ....credit, and banking policies, as well as for guaranteeing the 
soundness of bank credit (Law88,2003: Article 6: 5-6). 
The CBE exerts also a normative pressure through the EBI which is established by law 
88/2003: 
The banking institute shall be established and Tie affiliated to the central bank ... the 
banking institute shall be concerned with the development of skills in the fields of 
banking, financial and monetary aspects, and combating of money laundering, for staff of 
the central bank, banks and other parties ... with the aim of keeping abreast of world 
developments and firmly establishing sound professional rules {Law 88,2003, article 
45:21). 
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Indeed, the EBI has taken the initiative to increase corporate governance awareness in 
the EBS by organizing corporate governance seminars^ ,^ but still more efforts are 
required. According to the EBI's executive manager, the institute is now preparing a 
corporate governance code for banks in collaboration with the IFC '^'. 
Auditing firms as well exert pressure on the banking sector in relation to their corporate 
governance practices, but indeed, to the limit stipulated by law and regulation and as 
enforced by the CBE. Here it should be noted that auditing firm pressure is derived 
from the authority of the regulator (CBE). As the banking law has determined the role 
of the external auditing firm in the following: 
Bank accounts shall be audited by two auditors ... each bank shall determine the 
procedures to be applied for facing irregular finance and credit facilities. The 
management of each bank shall comply with these standards & implement these 
procedures. The auditors shall also verify the compliance of the bank management with 
these standards (ibid: 11). The two auditors shall prepare their report on auditing the 
banks financial statements, the extent of adequacy of internal control... any regulatory or 
supervisory standards that the Board of directors of the central bank requires the 
auditors to verify bank's compliance with (ibid: PP.37-38). 
As such auditor exerts pressure on banks to comply with banking regulations including 
corporate governance related because they are required to verify banks' compliance 
with applicable laws and regvdations. 
External auditors should play an extremely important role in banks' corporate 
governance, because they report to the shareholders and the general meeting about 
everything in the bank including financial statements, credit and investment operations 
and internal controls as well (CB official). 
In case of non-compliance the two auditors are responsible to communicate the case to 
the CBE and the bank's general assembly. This can possibly lead to penalizing these 
banks by the CBE. 
In practice, this role is questioned by participants from international auditing firms, 
bank executives and directors. They raised the issue that many auditors focus on 
appearance rather than essence as shown in the following quote: 
'^  The researcher has attended an international event organized by the EBI and CIPE on "corporate 
governance of the Egyptian banks" held on 15* April 2009 in Marriott Hotel, Cairo, Egypt. 
Although this announcement was made in the same seminar above mentioned, till this thesis has been 
submitted the code was not yet issued. 
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Although on paper everything seems to be perfect, it is form over substance. Officially 
auditors have done rigours auditing of banks, but how effective is that? It is not effective. 
Most domestic Auditors focus on evidence collection without properly analyzing them 
(Executive Manager, International auditing firm). 
This indicates that local auditors' competence is questioned and as such there role in 
bringing about corporate governance compliance is questioned. 
Finally, international organizations exert pressures on the EBS regarding its corporate 
governance practices. This opinion was agreed upon by corporate governance expert, 
bank directors and executives from Foreign and Private Banks as well as CB officials*'*. 
Donors such as the IFC, the World Bank and OECD have played a significant role in 
bringing corporate governance to Egypt. They require certain standards to donate funds. 
Moreover, the OECD has a great influence on the Egyptian code of corporate governance. 
These international organizations affect the corporate governance in the EBS indirectly 
through co-operation with the government (Corporate governance expert). 
International organizations exert a normative pressure*^ by establishing standards that 
constitute good corporate governance. In fact, international organizations play a role for 
stimulating compliance with international standards of corporate governance. On one 
hand, by requiring the compliance with these standards as a condition for donation, 
indeed, this encourages banks that seek the international organizations' funds to show 
compliance with these standards. On the other hand, international organizations 
establish corporate governance standards that overtime become the norm of the 
international banking community. The latter case is similar to Basel I and Basel II 
accords, which are not mandatory, but the CBE is keen to mention the compliance with 
Basel I and seeking compliance with Basel II to appear legitimate in the eyes of the 
international banking community. Recently, the CBE has mentioned that "considered 
These participants have identified the pressures of the International organizations because they have 
Foreign origin such as the Foreign banks, have interests of expansion such as Private Banks or 
responsible for integration with the international banking community as in the case of the CBE. 
*^  Here normative pressures refer to the pressure created on banks as a result of corporate governance 
standards established by international organizations. These standards creates an institutional pressure 
based on a binding expectation that banks should comply with these corporate governance standards to be 
perceived as appropriate within the international banking domain (Scott, 2001). Also, international 
organizations normally use these standards as a benchmark for well-governed banking organization. 
More precisely, international organizations would use these standards when making donations to well 
governed banks. 
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as requirements of sound hanking, the EBS has fully complied with Basel I and in the 
way to comply with Basel II (CBE, 2009). 
Governmental entities 
Governmental entities are another source of pressure on the EBS in relation to corporate 
governance. Executive managers and directors from various banks and governmental 
officials have named the Ministry of Investment as the principal governmental entity 
that exert pressure on the EBS regarding corporate governance. "The Ministry of 
Investment is responsible of improving the investment climate in Egypt They are the 
principal body behind corporate governance reform in Egypt" (Director, State bank). 
Another Executive Manager added "The ministry of investment has a vital role in 
introducing corporate governance in Egypt" (Executive Manager, Private bank). In 
fact, the Ministry of Investment has started corporate governance reform in Egypt by 
asking the World Bank to assess corporate govemance in Egypt (ROSC, 2001; ROSC, 
2004). Upon the recommendations of these assessments, the Ministry of Investment has 
undertaken serious steps to improve corporate govemance in Egypt. For instance it 
established the EIOD with the responsibility of "spread awareness, knowledge and best 
practices of corporate governance in Egypt" (EIOD, 2009) [online]. The EIOD has 
made a genuine contribution towards reforming corporate govemance in Egypt by 
issuing the first code of corporate govemance in 2005. This code affect banks, it has 
assigned banks the responsibility of corporate governance promotion "banks ...should 
take the articles listed in the code into consideration when doing business with or 
evaluating corporations to determine the extent to which the provisions and content of 
these rules are upheld" (ECOCG, 2005:4). In addition to encouraging banks to comply 
with the code articles. As such this code exerts another normative pressure on the 
banking sector by requiring it to consider corporate govemance principles as criteria of 
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doing good business with clients, and at the same time by encouraging the banking 
sector itself to adopt its principles. 
Another, governmental body that exerts pressure on the EBS regarding corporate 
governance is the Egyptian Stock Exchange "Now, CASE^^ has added corporate 
governance related issues as part of the listing rules, with which we must comply with" 
(Executive Manager, Private Bank). Participants from the stock market have indicated 
that few corporate governance aspects^ ^ have been added to the listing rules "we have 
introduced some of the code principles into our listing rules. This included the 
requirement to disclose material events, related party transactions and audit 
committees Formation" (Governmental official, CASE). It must be noted that CASE is 
not in favour of requiring listed companies to comply with all the articles of the 
ECOCG (2005), because 
Previously we had a high number of listed companies now we have only 320 companies and 
my own expectations that these number will decrease by the end of the current year, 
companies now prefer to do transaction over the counter, unfortunately we have no say on 
transaction made over the counter regarding enforcing governance rules, we do want to be 
more strict at the time being because this means that more companies will choose to be 
delisted ( Governmental official). 
So, in effect banks do not face a real pressure from the stock market in relation to 
corporate governance because corporate governance requirements established by the 
CBE have a wider scope. 
II. Impact of Pressure 
Although various bank types (Foreign, Private, Arab, State) have different corporate 
governance identities as discussed earlier in this section. They are all affected by the 
abovementioned pressures and do respond to it. Responses of the four bank types are 
basically related to being perceived as legitimate by the CBE and shareholders. Based 
on the participants' views, the pressures exerted by the CBE is the most significant 
86 Cairo and Alexandria Stock Exchange 
Based on the 2008 CBE registered banks list and participants of the study, 16 listed banks and 5 
unlisted banks are included. It is worth noting that all state banks are unlisted. 
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pressure on the banking sector towards adoption of particular corporate governance 
arrangements. The stock market exerts a similar coercive pressure on listed banks to 
comply with the corporate governance requirements within the listing rules to avoid 
penalties. But this impact is limited because the CBE requirements are wider in scope 
and banks are already required to comply with the CBE regulations. 
While, International organizations pressures impact the banking sector indirectly 
through the CBE. As these organizations such the World Bank and Basel Committee 
identify corporate governance of banks as a measure of soundness and appropriateness. 
Moreover, they can directly impact banks by requiring good corporate governance as a 
prerequisite for donation. However, the former case occurs over time and is likely to 
bring about more change because they induce the CBE to change the regulatory 
framework in accordance to international standards. As such one could conclude that 
international organizations exert pressure on the banking sector, however, its impact can 
be felt over time. 
Regarding the EIOD, it should have a major role in corporate governance promotion in 
Egypt; however, none of the participants recognised this role indicating that 
communication chaimels with the banking sector are not well established. Also, this 
would indicate that the EIOD focus is on non-financial institutions. Similarly, the EBI 
should play a role in corporate governance promotion through its professional training 
services; however, this role is currently not significant as the EBI has organized only 
one corporate governance seminar in the last 2 years and until now corporate 
governance training courses do not exist. 
The Institute has not yet started providing corporate governance training courses. 
Principally, many of bankers are not familiar with the concept, so it will be worthless to 
organize training courses that no one will attend (EBI Official). 
5.3.6 Interests' Protection 
Interest refer to "material right, benefit, asset, or share possessed by fiduciary or by 
others with whom he/she is legally or closely associated family members, business 
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partners, employers, benefactor, client, or the like)" (Luebke, 1987:69 cited in Martin 
and Gabard,2001:315). In the context of this study, the open category mterests' 
protection refers to the role of particular interest holders in deriving the corporate 
governance phenomenon as a means of protecting their interests. Indeed, corporate 
governance has a role in ''Satisfying legitimate expectations...by interests beyond the 
corporate boundaries" (Tricker, 1984 cited in Solomon and Solomon, 2004:13) in 
addition to shareholders. The open category interests' protection has emerged from the 
data collection and analysis related to the following interview question: 
Q7- Whose interests does bank's corporate governance mechanisms protect? 
This category refers to the stakeholders' interests that are central to corporate 
governance of banks. Indeed, those recognized stakeholders' play an important role in 
bringing about corporate governance change as a means to better protect their interests. 
This category was observed in terms of its property ^ r/or/jfy of protection which can be 
discussed as follows. 
I. Priority Of Protection 
Stakeholders of a bank can include many parties such as shareholders, depositors, 
regulator, employees and the society. In relation to corporate govemance, bank 
executive managers and directors had totally agreed that corporate govemance 
mechanisms have to protect shareholders because they are the owners of the bank. 
The most important interests to be protected by corporate governance mechanisms are 
the shareholders' interests, simply we work for the shareholders so everything we do 
should serve their interests first (Executive Manager, Private bank) 
Another bank executive stated that: 
Without thinking, shareholders interests must be served, we work for them; if they are not 
satisfied the whole management team can be changed (Executive Manager, Foreign 
Bank). 
Moreover, even in the case of State banks which are totally owned by the govenmient, 
executive managers have also indicated that the government interests as the owner must 
be served. 
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The abovementioned agreement of participants from various banks on giving their 
shareholders the first priority in protection reflects the power^* of shareholders^^ on 
board and executive management teams. This was clearly observed across all cases. 
However, this does not mean that shareholders are actively seeking corporate 
governance improvement in all cases. This is particularly linked to the organizational 
perception of corporate governance discussed above in the corporate governance 
identity category. More precisely, some shareholders' such as those of foreign banks 
seek compliance to broader standards of corporate governance than those stipulated by 
the Egyptian banking corporate governance laws and regulations because it enhances 
shareholders' protection. While, other banks such as State banks seek legitimacy in the 
eyes of shareholders by serving their interests and appear as complying with the 
corporate governance regulations outlined by laws and regulations. 
In terms of priority, participants from the banking field agree that the regulator's 
interests should not be included amongst other stakeholders. Here the assumption is that 
the regulator has no interest that should be protected alike protecting shareholders' 
interests for instance. But they see that serving the regulator (CBE) is a must because it 
is the regulating authority that is maintaining the soundness of the whole banking 
system and serving it is not optional. In other words they have the powers and authority 
to bring about compliance with laws and regulations. 
The CBE is the sole regulator of the banking sector in Egypt, arty bank before starting its 
operations or even open a new small branch has to ask for approval from the Central 
bank. The banking law has granted the central bank all this Power. Also, all the 
appointments of board members, top executives and credit and or investment jobs must 
seek approval of the central bank So, there is ho choice but to observe its requirements. 
88 The shareholder's power over boards of directors and consequently on executive management is 
gained not only because they are the owners and both directors and manager owe to them fiduciary 
duty but also because the ownership concentration ratio is quite high in most of banks, where the top 
three owners shareholders own more than 90% of the bank's capital. As such this ownership 
concentration gives owners power to put pressures on the bank's board and management to serve 
their interests and offer them protection. 
89 Researcher calculation based on Bank-Scope (2009) data of the ownership structure of banks within 
the EBS. This ratio is calculated for 21 banks participating in the study. 
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otherwise, the bank may face troubles that can reach seizing to exist (Executive Manager, 
Private bank). 
Given the shareholder primary discussed above and the high ownership concentration 
ratio, potential conflict of interests between shareholders and other stakeholders such as 
depositors would increase. However, due to the special nature of the banking industry, 
the regulator (CBE) plays a pivotal role to put in place the corporate governance 
arrangements to maintain depositors' funds protection. Participants from the banking 
field have indicated that depositors' interests became an overriding objective of the 
CBE and consequently a fundamental reason for improving corporate governance in 
banks'°. This quote indicates this meaning "We protect depositors because the central 
bank is very stringent in this aspect" (Executive Manager, State Bank). 
Moreover, board directors and executive managers have spoken about other 
Stakeholders such as employees, local communities, environment and borrowers. Here, 
they agreed that these stakeholders are less important than the regulator, shareholders 
and depositors and banks do not have to serve them. 
When I talk about other stakeholders, this is selective and optional to the bank 
management to determine what policy to follow with them. However, they have indirect 
relationship with my business (Executive Manager, Foreign bank). 
This indicates that other stakeholders do not have enough power on banks to be 
included in the top priority groups neither they threaten the legitimacy of banks. At the 
same time, this would indicate that other stakeholder groups do not have interest in 
corporate governance either because they are vinaware of "corporate governance as a 
source of their protection as the term is new" (Director, State Bank) or because of their 
rejection of corporate governance "you cannot imagine the problems we had because of 
'" Protecting depositors' firnds has became a priority for the CBE, especially after corporate governance 
related bank failures has occurred during late 1990s. Leading to a huge NPL problem tiiat is burdening 
the Egyptian banking industry imtil now. So here protecting depositors is a priority for improving bank 
corporate governance in the EBS. Not because the depositors themselves are aware of what good 
corporate governance can offer them. These failures have cost the CBE high bail-out costs to compensate 
depositors for their lost funds. 
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the new application form, people are unhappy to supply any information. They are 
against corporate governance (Executive Manager, Private Bank). 
In conclusion, this clarifies that BCG is primarily driven by the power of the CBE and 
shareholders. Depositors themselves are not powerful in relation to inducing corporate 
governance change because in most of the cases they are unaware of corporate 
governance. But the CBE considers that their protection is an overriding objective. 
This open category can significantly clarify how corporate governance can be defined 
within the context of the EBS. As the debate is always whether corporate governance 
arrangements should serve shareholders solely or serve a wide range of stakeholders^ \ 
This category has identified whom interests' should corporate governance serve based 
on the power they have. This matches to a great extent the scope of corporate 
governance determined by EBI (2006) and Basel Committee's definition of corporate 
governance 
Corporate governance involves the manner in which...banks...meet the obligation of 
accountability to their shareholders and take into account the interests of other recognize 
stakeholders (supervisors, governments and depositors) " (BCBS,2005:4) 
Indeed, this reflects the prevailing corporate governance model in the EBS is likely to 
be a pluralistic model that serves recognised stakeholders namely: shareholders, 
regulator and depositors. 
5.3.7 Board Effectiveness in Corporate Governance 
The category of "Board effectiveness" has emerged in relation to the following 
interview questions: 
Q8: What role does the board of directors have'in corporate governance of banks? To 
what extent is this role effective? 
Q9: How the board ensures that board members understand their role in corporate 
governance? 
" See Literature Review Part One for detailed analysis of shareholding and stakeholding perspectives of 
corporate governance. 
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The category board effectiveness has emerged to explain the extent of board of 
directors' contribution to BCG promotion. According to Basel Committee (2005) the 
board of directors is 
Ultimately responsible for the operations and financial soundness of the bank. Board of 
directors and their individual members add strength to the corporate governance of a bank when 
they understand their oversight role and their fiduciary" duty of loyalty" and "duty of care" to 
the bank and its shareholder.... Avoid conflict of interests .... Commit sufficient time and energy 
to fulfilling their responsibilities ...continue to develop and maintain an appropriate level of 
collective expertise .... Periodically assess the effectiveness of their governance practices ... 
select, monitor replace key executives...Exercising their duty and authority to question and 
insist upon straight forward explanation from management .... Promote bank safety and 
soundness, understand the regulatory environment and ensure the bank maintains an effective 
relationship with supervisors (BCBG, 2005:10). 
As such, there is no doubt that the board of directors of any bank has a fundamental role 
in corporate governance. Within the context of the EBS, the majority of banks 
participated in the survey have confirmed this role . However, further investigations of 
this aspect through the semi-structured interviews have culminated the nature of this 
role. 
Board directors from various types of banks have agreed that the board has a 
fundamental role to strengthen BCG "TTie board of directors have a major role in 
bank's corporate governance" (Board director, Foreign bank). While, a state bank 
director adds: 
The board's role in corporate governance is fundamental The board is accountable to the 
shareholders and therefore they should make sure that the executive management is running the 
bank in compliance with applicable laws and regulations (Director, state bank). 
This indicates that directors are aware of the important role of boards' in corporate 
governance. Moreover, board directors considered that corporate governance is a 
mechanism that helps them to satisfy shareholders who can hold them accountable. In 
explaining what they mean by the board of directors' role in corporate govemance, 
board directors from various banks have indicated that the board should set govemance 
strategies and policies wdthin the overall bank strategy. 
'^  The survey has shown that 86 % of the participating banks confiimed that the board of director has a 
corporate govemance related role. 
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The board of directors is tiie main player in corporate governance; they set policies and 
strategies related to corporate governance amongst many other issues. They give green 
light to pursue something or the red light to stop another (Executive Manager, Private 
bank). 
To these participants corporate governance strategies and policies include a wide span 
of issues such as oversight and approval of aspects related to internal control, internal 
auditing, external auditing, financial reporting and disclosure, nomination and 
remuneration of key executives and board members. However, the effectiveness of 
carrying out these roles is questioned by participants. Moreover, board directors of 
various banks have agreed that board of directors should necessarily include a 
monitoring role on the bank's governance practices 
Corporate governance is a main concern of the board, their roles includes having regular 
meetings, setting and following up policies and strategies, to see whether they are 
implemented or not, they should request performance reports. The effectiveness of 
carrying out these roles varies from one bank to another. There are very good cases and 
there are poor cases (Director, Foreign bank) 
Indeed, boards' effectiveness in their corporate governance role differs fi-om one bank 
to another. According to participants this is related to some factors. These factors are 
discussed as the properties of the open category Board effectiveness. This includes 
formalization of corporate governance. Board members' Competence, and board 
members' independence. 
I. Formalization of Corporate Governance 
Board directors firom various types of banks have spoken of the degree of formalization 
of corporate governance at their banks. Here formalization means, whether corporate 
governance practices are based on formal written documents such as internal codes of 
corporate governance "We have an internal code of corporate governance, every 
employee can access this code on the internal computer network"(Executive Manager, 
Private Bank). Among the interviewed banks, mainly foreign and few private domestic 
banks have such codes. This indicates that from this perspective corporate governance is 
not formalized among most of banks. 
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Additionally, the existence of board level specialized committees related to the 
corporate governance is another way of formalizing corporate governance. These 
committees include credit, nomination and remuneration, risk management, audit and 
corporate governance committees. Specialized committees play a crucial role in 
corporate governance of the bank. These committees provide a formal mechanism to 
enhance corporate governance 
We have an audit, risk and credit committees, these committees main focus is corporate 
governance. In my opinion, these committees are a quite effective tool to manage corporate 
governance issues of the bank Without them the board effectiveness would be much lower 
because the board is very busy to do this job (Board director, private bank). 
However, having these committees is not a common practice in banks. For instance the 
survey has shown that 62% of surveyed banks have corporate governance related 
committees to a little extent. Indeed, all of them have an auditing committee as required 
by the banking law which interprets this percentage. Accordingly, it is unsurprising that 
most of banks do not have other committees, because they are not required legally to 
have them. Generally, this would highlight that the boards' role in corporate governance 
of banks is limited. Finally, this indicates that most of banks only consider corporate 
governance arrangements that enhance their legitimacy. So, as long as the formation of 
these committees is not legally sanctioned, banks do not consider them. 
II. Board Members' Independence 
Durectors and executive managers from various bank types have talked about board 
effectiveness in its corporate governance role in terms of board members' independence. 
An independent board director is 
A person whose directorship constitutes his or her only connection to the corporation. The 
purpose of identifying and appointing independent directors is to ensure that the board includes 
directors who can effectively exercise their best judgment for the exclusive benefit of the 
company; judgment is not clouded by real or perceived conflicts of interests (EBI, 2006:34) 
Here participants agreed that most boards are not independent, this would not only 
diminish their corporate governance role, but also would lead to potential conflict of 
interests with recognized stakeholders. The main reason behind the independence 
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problem as clarified by board directors and executive managers is the nomination and 
selection process of board members. They indicated that in the case of non-state owned 
banks dominance of shareholders is likely to bring about the independence problem and 
as such reduce board effectiveness in corporate governance related aspects. 
Selection of board members is not undertaken on proper basis, nowadays they select 
"grades " board members who are incompetent but accepts to do what they are told to do. 
Grade "1" has to keep themselves away because they do not fit in these roles (Central bank 
official). 
The reason behind this phenomenon is the prevailing ownership structure, with high 
ownership ratios in hands of few owners. This "controlling shareholders" do have 
power to appoint members of board of directors (Basel, 2005: 11). Indeed, State-owned 
banks have the same independence problem but here it is not the matter of ownership 
concentration rather political influence. 
As I told you effective corporate governance depend on the board effectiveness and the 
degree of independence from political influence, which still has a negative impact 
(Executive manager. State bank). 
To summarize, one of the factors that holds back the effectiveness of boards' role in 
corporate governance is the inappropriate nomination and appointment procedures in 
place in most of the banks. This procedures lead to boards' composition that lacks the 
fundamental quality of "independence" leading to potential conflict of interests which is 
against good practices of corporate governance. 
III. Board Members' Competence 
"Competence can be seen as the sum of knowledge and skills accumulated during a 
person's lifetime" (Pickett, 1998 cited in Brinckman, 2006: 21). There is no doubt that 
banks' board members play a crucial role in corporate governance of their respective 
banking organisations'^. As such, banks' board membership '^can no longer be looked 
upon as a matter of personal prestige, but banks need competent board members who 
can improve, innovate and drive the bank forward" (EBI official). 
^ See the introduction of this open category section 5.3.7 
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Therefore, the best people should sit onto boards; they should have and maintain a high 
competence level. Here, given the questionable nomination procedures of board 
members discussed in the previous section, it is unlikely that board members are 
competent enough to carry-out their corporate governance duties^ '*. 
During interviews one would have expected that as corporate governance subject is very 
recent to Egypt and its banking sector; it would have been normal that board members 
receive proper corporate governance training in order to increase their competence in 
the subject. However, the survey has indicated that in 90% of the surveyed banks, board 
members do not receive corporate governance training. This was confirmed by an EBI 
official that is the official training institute for the banking sector in Egypt 
Board members in most of the cases do not understand their role in corporate 
governance, nor they accept to receive training, they put rules and most of them are 
arrogant (EBI Official). 
Moreover, executive managers from various banks have agreed that board directors do 
not even accept the idea of learning and training. 
/ never heard of a board member that accept to take a training course. However, I know 
that they only accept to go for training, conferences and seminars but for entertainment 
purposes. Do you believe that a board member goes for 3 weeks abroad to attend 
"introduction to credit cards" I feel sorry for this country!!? (Executive Manager, Arab 
bank). 
This indicates that most of board directors lack the necessary competence required for 
enhancing corporate governance of the bank. However, it is the selection process that is 
responsible here, because it brings incompetent directors who are not willing to change 
or learn. This type of directors holds a misconception that sitting as a trainee would 
lower their personal status. 
Another instance that indicates a competence problem is that at the level of senior 
bankers a misconception about what constitutes corporate governance exists. This was 
apparent from the opinion of corporate governance expert who states: 
However, this does not mean that this is the case in all banks and all boards. Fortunately, there are 
competent directors who had shown their competence during the interview process. 
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One major point that I found when I was working on a project related to corporate 
governance reform in Egypt When we speak with senior bankers (Board members and 
senior executives) about corporate governance their responses were usually: we have good 
corporate governance because we have good risk management There is a misconception 
that risk management is equivalent to corporate governance, while it is not, it is part of 
corporate governance, but does not represent the whole aspects of corporate governance 
(International corporate governance expert). 
This was experienced during the interviewing process where five interviewees^^ did not 
know what corporate governance is about? Or confused it with the concepts of risk 
management, "corporate governance is just a new name from Risk management" 
(Executive, Private bank). Indeed, this reflects the lack of knowledge and competence 
related to corporate governance and shows the need for corporate governance training. 
5.3.8 Modifying Internal Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
The open category modifying internal corporate governance mechanisms has emerged 
from the analysis of the responses to the following questions: 
QlO-What are the internal governance mechanisms that the bank utilizes? 
Qll-To what extent bank insists on good corporate governance in credit 
operations? 
Q13-What is the basis to determine the risk management policy of the bank? 
Q14-To what extent does the accounting standards adopted enhance 
transparency? 
This open category explains various internal mechanisms that banks utilize in relation to 
their corporate governance structure and how they were modified and improved in 
response to arising requirements of corporate governance in the EBS. 
Here directors and executive managers of various banks have indicated that these 
mechanisms have witnessed improvements during the past few years as a part of the 
'^  Opinions from these Interviews with these five participants were not incorporated in analysis except for 
indication of their lack of knowledge. Because they do not know what corporate governance is? This 
included 1 participant from CBE, 1 board director and 2 executives from state banks and 1 executive from 
private domestic bank. 
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banking sector reform and the introduction of new banking law No. 88/ 2003 and other 
regulations such as credit worthiness rules and control instructions manual (ClMf^. 
However, it should be noted here that the case of Foreign banks is slightly different, 
because these banks have more mature internal governance mechanisms mandated by 
their head-quarters in branches all over the world. 
Talking about our case, the bank has an in house corporate governance system ... Foreign banks 
know how to control their overseas business. In other words they come with their own systems ... 
which makes the overseas business goes in harmony with the whole organization. (Director, 
Foreign bank). 
This category was observed through its properties internal control system and 
transparency. These are discussed as follows. 
I. Internal Control System 
An internal control system is in essence an internal governance system within a banking 
organization, it refers to a number of activities that represents the 
Foundation for the safe and sound operation of banking organizations. A system of strong 
internal controls can help to ensure that the goals and objectives of a banking organization will 
be met, that the bank will achieve long-term profitability targets, and maintain reliable financial 
and managerial reporting ... also help to assure that the bank will comply with laws and 
regulations as well as policies, plans, internal rules and procedures, and decrease the risk of 
unexpected losses or damage to the bank's reputation " (BCBS, 1998:1). 
A bank's system of internal control is a broad term that includes various functions such 
as: risk management, internal audit and compliance (BCBS, 2010). Indeed, an effective 
internal control system with its various components including risk management 
provides the foundations of a proper corporate governance system in banks (ibid). 
Directors and executives have also agreed that "Internal control is a very essential 
foundation to good corporate governance " (Director, Foreign Bank). 
The CIM was issued in late 2002, it consists of eight parts addressing the following issues: Part 1 : 
authorization of establishment of new banks and registering with the CBE; Part 2: appointment of the 
external auditors, basis of auditing banks financial statements, internal control and auditing committees; 
Parts: regulatory issues regarding capital adequacy, investment in other companies and reserve 
requirement of 10% of foreign currency deposits witii the CBE; Part 4: credit extension limits, credit 
classifications, capital lease, and mortgage; PartS: permissible banking activities, money laundering and 
e-banking; Part 6: official forms for mformation required by the CBE; Part?: basics of preparing financial 
statements and valuation basis; PartS: Regulation of foreign currency transactions, foreign currency 
exchange bureaus, statistics requirements and foreign transactions. 
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Directors and executive managers indicated that since the 1990s bank scandals, a 
number of actions were taken to improve the control environment within banks. The 
first is to implement organizational restructuring towards more centralization and higher 
accountability. "Improving Internal Control included making the control in the hands of 
the head office and not the branches" (Executive Manager, Private bank). The second 
aspect is related to utilizing modem Information technology Solutions (CBE, 2008). 
The CBE has considered this an essential part of the banking sector reform. This was 
considered a step towards improving internal control because these systems have built 
in effective internal control measures. Participants from the banking field agree that 
deploying information technology systems have contributed to enhancing internal 
Confrol. "ITsystem is the tool to internal control now" (CBE official). The third aspect 
was the introduction of the compliance function which focuses on "whether all divisions 
and departments of the bank are following the central bank regulations and the internal 
bank policies and procedures or not" (Executive manager, Private bank). 
This indicates that most of banks'' have embarked on modifying their internal control 
systems and as such this also reflects improvement in their corporate governance 
arrangements. 
Board members and executive managers from Foreign banks raise additional aspects, of 
relation to internal control, which is the internal auditing function'*. Here, participants 
from the international auditing firms'' have indicated that 
Internal audit in many banks, is a matter of recurring audit with no scientific and clear 
methodology in most of banks internal auditors do not exactly know what an Internal auditor 
have to do; still other banks confuse it with internal control (Executive Manager, international 
Auditing Firm). 
^ This refers to state, private domestic and Arab banks. Foreign banks are not meant here because they 
are abeady advanced in this aspects following there headquarter systems. 
" This was almost absent from responses of State, Arab and some Private Banks. Indicating that the 
internal audit function was not properly included in the internal control systems improvements. 
" Here, the opinion of external auditors is quite important because the banking law 88 / 2003 has 
assigned most of the burden of assessment of a bank's internal control to external auditors, who are 
required to express an opinion about the effectiveness of a bank's internal control system. 
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This explains why many participants did not mention internal auditing function. This 
also confirms the need for capacity building and training that most of banks should 
undertake in the field of internal audit and internal control in general. 
Participants fi-om the banking field have also talked about risk management^"". Indeed, 
this is one of the crucial areas within the context of the Egyptian banking. Improving 
risk management has been a basic aspect in the banking sector reform, especially after 
the 1990's credit failures and the associated NPLs. The CBE has produced a set of 
guidelines addressing the evaluation of credit-worthiness of clients in both the retail and 
corporate banking sectors (CBE Credit Rules, 2005)^°^Moreover, the CBE has issued 
other guidelines that regulate recording and reporting of credit operations. It should be 
noted here that external auditors are responsible to verify the degree of bank compliance 
with proper risk management gmdelines. Here, auditors indicated that some banks are 
self-disciplined and adhere to the CBE credit guidelines and beyond such as Foreign 
banks; while, many of the other banks focus on achieving legitimacy by fulfilling the 
formality but not the practice. 
Look, everything related to the CBE is implemented, credit committee, audit committee, risk 
management policy, but again the focus is the form over the substance, if we have a strong 
regulator all the problems would have been solved (Senior executive manager. International 
Auditing firm). 
Moreover, risk management practices differs firom one bank to another, this can be 
understood because the EBS is composed of a great diversity of banks in terms of size 
and capabilities. Some banks apply advanced techniques of risk management such as 
""* However, those participants did not indicate that risk management is a part of internal control system 
but as a standalone function. This is acceptable and reflects just a difference in classification (BCBS, 
2010). Indeed, risk management is a part of the overall internal control system, as "internal control are 
designed among other things to ensure that each key risk has a process or other measure to help contain or 
control that risk" (BCBS, 2010:16) As such, classification of risk management as part of the overall 
internal control system of the bank or as a standalone system does not affect it from being part of banks' 
internal corporate governance mechanism. 
"" Although the issuance of such rules is considered external corporate governance mechanism initiated 
by the CBE. The focus here is to discuss the response of individual banks and how these guidelines 
affected banks' internal corporate governance mechanisms 
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Basel II "we are fully compliant with Basel 11" (Executive manager. Foreign bank). 
While, other banks aim complying within two years "we will adopt Basel II in the future 
.... Say 1 to 2years" (Executive Manager, State Bank). Indeed, it can be concluded that 
risk management practices have improved within the EBS in response to the reforms 
initiated by the CBE*°l 
Finally, another important aspect of risk management related to the corporate 
governance of banks is the extent to which corporate governance quality of borrowers 
play a role in the loan granting decision. Here board directors and executive managers 
have clarified that borrowers' corporate governance does not play an explicit significant 
role in such decision. However, some corporate governance related aspects are taken 
into consideration such as the succession planning. In general, loan granting is a 
judgmental process with some corporate governance related factors included but 
implicitly "corporate governance of client is an advantage but not the principal 
criterion, still not in a formal manner. Other criteria used to judge the credit-worthiness 
of the borrower are cash conversion cycle, reputation, financial performance" 
(Executive manager, private bank). 
Notably, the evaluation of the clients' corporate governance in an explicit manner 
would occur overtime, with the development of the corporate governance concept 
within various types of banks that can subsequently promote the concept amongst their 
clients. 
'"^  Contradiction in the CBE dealing with Basel n was observed, the central bank officials are well 
convinced that if Basel II is adopted, credit would be hardly obtained "If we apply Basel II, no one will be 
able to lend a pound" (CB Official). Still, the CBE is seekmg technical assistance fi-om Europe Central 
Bank in this respect. This can be explained that CBE is trying to appear legitimate in the eyes of the 
international banking community. 
'"^  Close supervision is still required to achieve real rather appearance changes that lead to better 
corporate governance. 
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II. Transparency 
The concept of transparency refers to 
The ease with which an outsider is able to make a meaningful analysis of a company and its 
actions. Transparency refers to both information about the financial position of the company 
and to non-financial issues, such as the direction the company is taking, its strategic objectives, 
and so on .... (it also refers) to the clarity about the way that decisions are reached or processes 
carried out (Coyle, 2003:22; author brackets). 
Indeed, transparency is a crucial factor to "well functioning of corporate governance" 
(Solomon and Solomon, 2004:119). In the context of the banking industry 
"Transparency is essential for sound and effective corporate governance... it is difficult 
for shareholders, depositors, other relevant stakeholders and market participants to 
effectively monitor and properly hold accountable the board and senior management 
when there is insufficient transparency" (BCBS, 2010:28). 
Moreover, transparency importance is unrelated to the ownership structure of the bank 
(State V. Private) or whether it is Usted on not (BCBS, 2010). As such transparency is a 
prerequisite of good corporate governance practices in any banking organization. 
The Basel committee (BCBS,2010) recommends that banks should disclose 
material information on the bank's objectives, governance structure and policies (in particular 
the content of any corporate governance code or policy and the process by which it is 
implemented),major share ownership and voting rights and related parties transactions. The 
bank should appropriately disclose its incentive and compensation policy ...the bank should also 
disclose key points concerning its risk tolerance / appetite (without breaching necessary 
confidentiality), with a description of the process for defining it ...timely public disclosure is 
desirable on a bank's public website, in its annual and periodic financial reports or by other 
forms (BCBS. 2010:29). 
Within the context of the EBS transparency is a highly questioned issue. This is because 
the EBS is considered as one of the most opaque banking sectors worldwide (Huang, 
2006)^ °'*. Furthermore, the level of transparency was also criticized by researchers such 
as El-Shazly (2001) who indicated that during the late 1990s, the deterioration of 
transparency was a reason behind many bank failures. Here he mentioned that 
'"* Egypt was ranked at 106 out of 177 countries based on the bank disclosure index. This index is a 
composite index .... created for individual banks by measuring the level of details. Banks provide their 
published accounts on seventeen core disclosure items, and then the rational index is created by averaging 
the index values of individual banks in a country weighted by their assets (p.4) 
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publication of banks' financial statements were only made at the end of the year and was 
unsatisfactory. For instance published income statements were exceedingly brief with a 
couple of lines on revenues and expenditures which do not show the amount of 
provisions. He added that although the CBE had taken measures to tackle this problem 
by mandating monthly publishing of banks' financial results "market transparency is so 
far insufficient...with vital information missing such as non-performing loans, average 
rates of return, and risk-weighted capitalization" (ibid:9). 
Participants from auditing fums has expressed similar opinion regarding the 
insufficiency of transparency and disclosure within the EBS "we still have a 
transparency problem in the banking sector, a major area of weakness here lies in the 
disclosure regarding the risk profile of banks" (Executive Manager, Big 4 Audit Firm). 
In response to the transparency problem the CBE has issued the rules of preparation and 
presentation of financial statements for banks and basis of recognition and measurement 
in 2008. Although these rules are serious steps from the CBE towards improving 
transparency in the EBS, the impact cannot be evaluated because these rules came into 
effect only in 2010. 
Transparency within the banking sector are not limited only to their financial results, 
CBE officials have indicated that banks are also opaque in relation to providing 
transparent and clear information about their products, fees and interest rates. "In 
response to identifying malpractices in disclosing true information about bank products, 
the CBE has required banks to properly disclose the true information to clients and 
reminded that non-complying banks will face troubles mentioned in banking law 88" 
(CBE, official) 
Another indicator of opaqueness is the practice of most banks to avoid disclosing the 
remuneration of board members and key executives. ''Definitely, we never publish the 
remuneration of board members or any other employee, this is confidential" (Board 
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director, Private bank). This indicates the rejection of governance culture prevailing in 
the banking sector. This will be discussed in more detail in the next section "Hawkamat 
Al-Sharikat culture ". 
Indeed transparency is a mechanism of corporate governance as above mentioned in this 
section. The regulator puts forth to improve transparency but still the practice needs 
enhancement. However, change is taking place towards better disclosure (especially 
non-financial) this can be observed by the increasing trend of having bi-lingual websites 
of banks as indicated by the survey. As 57% of banks have websites but with varying 
content "Improvement is taking place. Foreign banks have given good examples of 
websites, now every bank has a web-site compared to 2 years ago transparency is 
better" (Executive manager. Foreign bank). 
5.3.9 Hawkamat Al-Sharikat Culture 
The open category Hawkamat Al-Sharikat Culture has emerged from the analysis of the 
responses to the following questions: 
QIl: To what extent the bank insists on good corporate governance in the credit 
operations? 
Q12: What impact does the Egyptian business culture have on corporate governance 
of banks? 
Hawkamat Al-Sharikat is the Arabic translation of corporate governance. This 
translation has appeared during the early 2000, although there was a dispute around the 
proper Arabic translation of corporate governance, the term Hawkamat Al-Sharikat was 
widely accepted "following its endorsement by Al-Azhar university in Cairo, a 
renowned authority on the Arabic language" (World Bank, 2010) [online]. 
This would clearly indicate that the term is relatively recent to the Arab world. On the 
other hand culture refers to "a pattern of shared basic assumptions that was learned by 
a group as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that 
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has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new 
members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems " 
(Schein, 2004:17). Indeed, this definition implies that culture can be formed within a 
group. Here a group refers to a collection of people who have enough history sharing, 
meaning that not every collection of people can be considered a group. Here, history 
sharing is what permits the formation of culture in the group (ibid). With shared 
assumptions between group members, and as the culture formation proceeds, 
assumptions become "taken for granted" in a way that determines 
much of the group's behaviour, and the rules and norms are taught to newcomers in a 
socialization process that is itself a reflection of culture ...shared assumptions will fijrm a 
paradigm, with more or less central governing assumptions driving the system, much as certain 
genes drive the genetic structure of human DNA (ibid:22), 
Culture includes some essential elements, in addition to history sharing namely: 
structural stability, depth, breadth and patterning or integration (ibid). Schein (2004) 
explains that structural stability occurs when group culture is formed "it becomes not 
only shared but also stable .... It is our major stabilizing force and will not be given up 
easily. Culture survives even when some members ... depart Culture is hard to change 
.... Provides meaning and predictability (ibid: 14). Depth is another feature of culture, 
this implies that when culture is formed it becomes ''unconscious part of a group and is 
therefore, less tangible and less visible ... (it) is more deeply embedded" (ibid; Author 
brackets). While, culture breadth is another feature that indicates the development of 
culture; breadth means that culture "covers all of a group's functioning....is pervasive; it 
influences all aspects of how our organization deals with its primary task, its various 
environments, and its internal operations" (ibid). Finally patterning or integration is the 
feature concerned with achieving stability; it implies that when culture is developed it 
integrates into a larger paradigm "culture somehow implies that rituals, climate, values, 
and behaviours tie together into a coherent whole; this patterning or integration is the 
essence of what we mean by culture " (ibid). 
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Leadership 
Leadership is a concept closely related to culture "They are two sides of the same coin; 
neither can really be understood by itself (ibid: 10). This occurs because culture is what 
defines, who will be accepted as a leader within our organization, in terms of "who will 
get the attention of followers" (ibid: 11). On the other hand one of the main tasks of 
leaders is to '^create and manage culture .... the unique talent of leaders^^^ is their 
ability to understand and work with culture; and that it is an ultimate act of leadership 
to destroy culture when it is viewed as dysfunctional" (ibid). 
Bearing in mind the abovementioned definition of Hawkamat El-Sharikat and culture. 
The open category Hawkamat El-Sharikat Culture was observed through its properties 
role of reformers, role of public governance and rejection of corporate governance 
culture. This is discussed as follows. 
L Role of Reformers 
As indicated above leadership is crucial to culture formation. So, one can argue that if 
Hawkamat El-Sharikat culture is existing, leaders of the EBS would have had a role in 
building this culture. Moreover, if this culture exists this would imply the existence of 
"a mode of behaviour of the principal players in governance systems i.e. (Stakeholders) 
that must reflect a deep and abiding commitment to governance- a commitment which 
comes naturally" (Dey, 2001:4). However, this culture does not exist. This is indicated 
clearly by the central bank officials who assured that Hawkamat El-Sharikat Culture is 
still developing and not yet established. The following quote indicates that building 
corporate governance culture is a long term objective that requires true and serious work 
by the EBS reformers especially the CBE "It is important to realize the enormity of the 
task ahead the central bank is working towards cultural change, as well as changing the 
'"^  To distinguish between leadership from management or administration one can argue that leadership 
creates and changes culture, while management and administration act within a particular culture (Schein, 
2004:11). 
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way it does business to bring the EBS up to speed" (CB official). Another CB official 
indicates "The CBE is engaged in institutional reform and it is important to realize that 
corporate governance is a long term goal rather a short term objective " (CB Official). 
This indicates that cultural formation is very much related to leadership action. Here the 
CBE plays the role of the leader not only the regulator, by starting corporate governance 
reforms that would eventually lead to corporate governance culture. In essence, this 
implies dysfimctional cultures change, such as rejection of corporate governance culture 
and rejection of learning by board members. Indeed, the formation of corporate 
governance culture will occur overtime. 
The cultural aspect of reform can be observed in the restructuring of state-owned banks 
for instance. Here, restructuring started by replacing top management at these banks 
with more competent figures, who are able to lead culture change in their banking 
organizations, including creating a corporate governance culture. 
As such new management of state owned banks has started this culture change, with 
strengthening of controls as previously mentioned. "They consider that internal control 
is his eye on the bank, this is their first move when they became in charge of their 
banks " (EBI official). In addition they enhanced internal control systems including risk 
management, internal audit and compliance functions. In essence this not only requires 
the change of the systems, but also the change of the culture where these new systems 
are operatmg. The relatively low corporate governance quality in state banks is partially 
blamed on the cultural aspect, as this corporate governance quality is still prevailing 
although systems have changed. 
Moreover, executive managers from various banks have indicated that currently banks 
do not explicitly consider corporate governance quality of borrowers "currently we do 
not include corporate governance quality of the client as a criteria of the assessment for 
loan granting "(Board director, Private Bank). Indeed, given the absence of corporate 
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governance aspects from the loan granting assessment criteria would indicate the lack of 
corporate governance culture or Hawkamat El-Sharikat culture because corporate 
governance commitment is too far from occurring naturally. At the same time, this 
imposes a great challenge to the CBE as the sector leader as well as individual banks 
leaders to contribute towards building this culture at their respective organizations. 
11. Role of Public Governance 
Public governance is the concept related to ''the process by which a society organizes its 
affairs and manage itself" (Manning and Kraan, 2006 cited in UN 2007:2). It implies 
that the supply of public goods occiir in agreement with democracy, transparency and 
accountability principles (UN, 2007). As such good public governance is ''participatory, 
transparent and accountable.... Encompasses State institutions and includes private 
sector and civil society organizations " (ibid: 4). "Global standard setters such as the 
IMF and the World Bank regard public governance as the bedrock for successful Stable 
economies" (Euromoney, 2006: 16). As such it is unsurprising to find arguments 
supporting that "Good public governance helps underpin good corporate 
governance ...thus in the eyes of the United Nations, public governance and corporate 
governance are interdependent mutually reinforcing concepts " (ibid). 
According to Euromoney survey (2006) some participants clearly link corporate 
governance to public governance. These participants explain the relation as follows: 
Poor public governance negatively impacts corporate governance ...it simply cannot be a case 
of do as I say, not do as I do. Financial markets don't exist in isolation. It's hard to lecture the 
private sector if the public sector is not operating in an exemplary way ... There's no point 
adhering to international standards in finance if you're doing that in a vacuum. This needs to be 
done in the context of political and economic development (ibid). 
Another participant in Euromoney survey (2006) adds 
Poor public governance hurts corporates...Corporate governance is part and parcel of the 
overall governance of the community, the state and the region. There could not be good private 
corporate governance without having good public governance. They are two wings by which a 
society flies to transparency, proficiency, development and maintenance of the moral foundation 
of the society. They are tightly coupled that's why the view must be holistic, not partial...a 
company can't be required to be a transparent and as well governed as it is in the west while 
having regimes that are at least 200 years away from the west (ibid). 
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Within the context of the EBS, board directors and executive managers expressed a 
similar opinion regarding the impact of public governance on corporate governance of 
the banking sector "/« the EBS, having good corporate governance will take long time. 
Still we have problems of the political influence, corruption, lack of transparency" 
(Director, State Bank). In reference to public governance a government official stated: 
"Is it the same if I am applying corporate governance in a country such as Switzerland 
and when I apply it in Ethiopia" (EBI official). 
Indeed, this reflects that participants consider poor public governance in Egypt as 
obstructing the evolution of BCG. Because, political influence**'^  as previously 
discussed affects CBE independence and consequently its creditability because "a 
central bank subject to...political influences would likely not be credible" (Bernanke, 
2010:2). Obviously, this means lower ability to lead culture change. 
In conclusion this reflects the absence of Hawkamat El-Sharikat culture and indicates a 
dysfunctional culture that works against corporate governance, due to poor public 
governance. However, participants see that more time and additional institutional 
reforms can improve public governance that can lead the way to the formation of 
Hawkamat El-Sharikat culture. 
III. Culture of Corporate Governance Rejection 
The third characteristic pertaining to Hawkamat Al-Sharikat is the prevailing culture of 
corporate governance rejection amongst bank clients and bankers themselves. This was 
observed amongst directors and executive- managers who mentioned that in the short-
term corporate governance is a competitive disadvantage especially in the retail banking 
'"* This issue has been previously discussed in section 5.3.3 Upgrading supervision. 
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segment . As such one could argue that these banks currently reject corporate 
governance because they consider it will adversely affect their business.'°^ 
Another indicator of the rejection of corporate governance culture is the general opinion 
stated by executive managers from various banks regarding that corporate governance 
of clients is not explicitly a requirement for loan granting. This signifies that even if 
banks are with assessment of clients' corporate governance, rejection of this culture 
amongst clients prevent them of doing this. 
Furthermore, board directors and executive managers from various banks have 
identified that rejection of Hawkamat Al-Sharikat culture amongst clients is evident; as 
other cultures are prevailing amongst bank clients such as "secrecy culture" that works 
against the leaders' effort to develop Hawkamat Al-Sharikat Culture. "Lately, we 
introduce some changes to our account opening application form. Now we are looking 
for more information such as other banks the client is banking with, average salary, 
club membership s assets owned etc You cannot imagine the problems and 
complaints received because of the new application form, people were unhappy giving 
information (Executive managers, private bank). 
Clearly, clients have a dominating secrecy culture. Another board director stated 
"secrecy culture adopted by most of Egyptians, emerge from the lack of trust and 
confidence between the citizen and the government" (Director, Foreign Bank). Even 
bankers' themselves have this secrecy culture as they reject disclosing board members' 
and key executives' salaries. 
107 See section 5.3.4 of this chapter 
1 no 
This is not the case for some banks such as Foreign banks driven by the corporate governance culture 
prevailing at their Foreign headquarters which refuses to compromise long-term competitiveness and 
soundness with short-term profits "According to our standards we never get into competition through 
reducing our conditions in favour of having a low quality client However, there are other banks in 
the market that choose to be more flexible .... This will turn to be a NPL and they will regret it !! 
(Executive Manager, Foreign bank). 
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Moreover, as previously shown board members have the culture of education rejection. 
This also contributes to oppose the efforts to build corporate governance culture. 
In conclusion, this can reveal a rejection of corporate governance culture, which needs 
an enormous effort from banking leaders and the Egyptian government to change the 
current dysfunctional culture of corporate governance rejection. 
Figure 5.1 summarizes the open categories discussed in this chapter in relation to their 
observed properties and related interview question (s). 
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Figure 5.1 The Nine Open Categories That Emerged In The Open Coding Stage 
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5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown the detailed analysis of the semi-structured interviews (A). 
Indeed, the questions were formulated in the light of previous chapter (survey analysis) 
as well as the informal conversations with participants. Following grounded theory 
procedures data collection and analysis has proceeded simultaneously. Interviews' 
transcripts and notes were read thoroughly, followed by in depth analysis to discover 
concepts and develop open categories in terms of their properties and dimensions. 
Analysis was accompanied by developing theoretical memos and visual representation 
of emerging concepts this has helped to increase theoretical sensitivity of the researcher 
and assist in focusing on theoretically significant concepts in subsequent interviews. 
Constantly, the emerging concepts after each interview was compared to other cases as 
well as data analysis was based on question-by-question analysis this was thought to 
provide an objective comparative method and keep the focus on theoretically significant 
concepts. 
The results of question analysis were presented in this chapter demonstrating how 
asking questions lead to developing open categories in terms of their properties and 
dimensions. Some questions contributed in developing more than open category. 
This chapter has developed nine open categories: corporate governance identity, laws 
and regulations; upgrading supervision, bank competitiveness, pressure groups, 
interests' protection, board effectiveness in corporate governance, modifying internal 
corporate governance mechanisms and Hawkamat Al-Sharikat culture. These open 
categories are carried forward to the axial coding stage with the purpose to rearrange 
them in a different way, discovering how they can be related axially. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Axial Coding 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the application of the paradigm model and the identification of 
five main categories based on the categories that emerged through open coding^° .^ Each 
main category subsumes a number of open categories presented in the previous chapter. 
Indeed, the output of this chapter is the foimdation of further analysis, the identification 
of the core category and formulation of the substantive theory'^ °. 
Axial coding is the second analytical stage of grounded theory applied in this thesis. 
The main purpose of axial coding is "reassembling data that were fractured during 
open coding" (Strauss and Corbin, 1998:124). The process of axial coding focuses on 
relating open coding categories together to yorm more precise and complete 
explanations about phenomena" (ibid). It demonstrates how the open coding categories 
can be arranged and linked together to form a coherent overall system (Howell, 2000). 
As such, axial coding focuses on identifying the phenomenon that can explain "what is 
going on" (Strauss and Corbin, 1998:125). Then this phenomenon is related to other 
categories in a way that gives it precision (ibid). This occurs by applying a coding 
paradigm that specifies a phenomenon "in terms of the conditions that give rise to it; the 
context in which it is embedded; the actions/interactions strategies by which it is 
handled; and the consequences of those strategies" (Strauss and Corbin, 1990b:91). 
Indeed, in axial coding the phenomenon stands as the category and the other 
components of the paradigm model are sub-categories. These sub-categories should 
answer questions pertaining to the phenomenon studied such as when, where, how and 
"" See chapter five. 
'"* Discussed in the next chapter. 
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with what consequences this phenomenon takes place; and as such help to contextualize 
the phenomenon (Strauss and Corbm, 1998). Toward this end, axial coding relates 
structure'*' with process''^ to capture some of the complexities in real life (ibid). 
It must be noted that open coding and axial coding are not necessarily sequential, in this 
thesis open and axial coding occurred both concurrently and sequentially. As both open 
and axial coding can ''proceed quite naturally together" (Strauss and Corbin; 1992). 
Open coding aims to develop categories m terms of their properties and dimensions. But 
axial coding aims to develop categories in terms of their relationships to enhance the 
density of the substantive theory, which will be articulated in the next chapter (Selective 
coding and Substantive theory). 
6.2 An Application of the Paradigm Model 
As previously mentioned in this chapter, axial coding reassembles data fractured 
through open coding, as such the nine open categories developed through open coding 
procedures (as shown in chapter 5) are sub-summed into five categories m axial coding, 
each represents a component of the paradigm model. Table 6.1 shows the main 
categories of axial coding and their corresponding open categories. 
'" Structure denotes the conditions which created "problems, issues, happenings, or events pertaining to a 
phenomenon" (Strauss and Corbin, 1998; 124) 
"^ Process denotes the action/interaction of those involved with the phenomenon in response to certain 
problems and issues (ibid). 
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Table 6.1 Axial Coding main Categories 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Main Categories (Axial coding)"^ 
Drivers 
Obstacles 
Reform Strategies 
Contextual factors 
Evolving BCG practices 
Open Categories (Open coding) 
Chapter Five 
• Pressvire Groups 
• Interests Protection 
• Bank Competitiveness 
• Board Effectiveness in corporate 
governance 
• Hawkamat Al-Sharikat Culture 
• Upgrading Supervision 
• Modifying Internal CO Mechanisms 
• Corporate Governance Identity 
• Laws and Regulations 
• Interests Protection 
• Pressure Groups 
• Corporate Governance Identity 
• Laws And Regulations 
• Upgrading Supervision 
• Bank Competitiveness 
• Board Effectiveness 
• Hawkamat Al-Sharikat Culture 
• Modifying Internal BCG Mechanisms 
Indeed, the utilization of the paradigm model aims to link and develop categories 
through "asking questions and the making of comparisons... In axial coding the nature 
of the questions we are asking are really denoting a type of relationship" (Strauss and 
Corbin 1990b: 107). This means that the focus is laid on "posing questions in terms of 
the conceptual labels themselves, and how one category might be related to another" 
(ibid: 108). Then with the question in mind "we then return to our data look for 
evidence, incidents, and events that support or refute our questions " (ibid). As such the 
following sections will demonstrate the axial coding procedures through discussing how 
open categories are linked and subsumed into main categories, what questions were 
asked to link these categories together, demonstrating the application of the paradigm 
model. 
'" All open categories contribute to the phenomenon of evolving BCG practices. 
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6.2.1 The Phenomenon 
According to Strauss and Corbin (1990b) a phenomenon "Is the central idea, event, 
happening, about which a set of actions/interactions is directed at managing or 
handling ...we identify the phenomenon by asking questions such as: what is the data 
referring to? What is the action/interaction all about" (P. 100). Simply it answers the 
questions of "what is going on here? " (Strauss and Corbin 1998:130) 
The answer to this question is Evolving BCG practices. This has been evident through 
data collection and analysis during the open and axial coding. Indeed, the phenomenon 
of Evolving BCG practices subsumes all the open categories identified through coding 
of data collected in the semi-structured interviews (A) namely: corporate governance 
identity, laws and regulations, upgrading Supervision, bank competitiveness, pressure 
groups, interests protection, board effectiveness in corporate governance role, 
modifying internal BCG mechanisms and Hawkamat Al-Sharikat culture as shown in 
table 6.1. 
Simply, the category of evolving BCG practices refers to the gradual change that is 
occurring in the BCG practices within the EBS. The change is evident in open 
categories that refer to processes such as upgrading supervision and modifying internal 
BCG mechanisms. The change is gradual because there are two structural forces 
working against each other. Firstly, there are drivers of BCG (pressure groups and 
Interests protection). Secondly, there are obstacles (Board of director's effectiveness, 
bank competitiveness, Hawkamat Al-Sharikat culture) that obstruct the occvirrence of 
BCG. This interplay is embedded within a particular context, framed with laws and 
regulations and the various corporate governance identities within the EBS. Within this 
complex setup, BCG can only evolve or change gradually according to the impetus of 
drivers and the ability to overcome obstacles. Indeed, change has to be gradual rather 
than radical. 
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The following sections will highlight how other components of the paradigm model, 
contributes to the evolving BCG practices phenomenon. 
6.2.2 Causal Conditions 
Causal conditions refer to events, incidents or happenings that lead the occurrence of the 
phenomenon (Strauss and Corbin, 1990b) or influence the phenomenon (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1998: 131). Accordingly, identifying the causal conditions requires asking the 
following question. 
What are the incidents, events or happenings that lead the occurrence of the 
phenomenon? 
The main category drivers answers this question. Here drivers indicate the incidents that 
caused or derived the phenomenon oi Evolving BCG practices. Indeed, this category is 
based on two open categories that emerged in the open coding stage namely: Pressure 
Groups and Interests Protection. 
Pressure Groups had derived the evolution of BCG practices in Egypt through the 
power each of these groups exerted on the EBS to develop their corporate governance 
practices. Participants from the banking sector have indicated that the CBE as the sole 
regulating authority of the banking sector in Egypt has exerted pressure on banks to 
develop their corporate governance practices through introducing corporate governance 
related articles in the new banking law 88/2003. Moreover, the CBE exerted pressures 
on the EBS through issuing corporate governance related banking regulations such as 
credit-worthiness evaluation guidelines and supervision and control manual. On, the 
other hand, the CBE has exerted a normative pressure through the EBI. This normative 
pressure focused on raising awareness of the EBS regarding the importance of 
developing BCG practices. Obviously, the EBI is currently preparing a corporate 
governance code for the EBS as indicated by its officials. 
Auditing firms are another pressure group that participated in the evolution of the bank's 
corporate governance practices. As the new banking law has assigned the responsibility 
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of periodical assessment of banks' internal control environment and disclosure practices 
as indicated by the regulatory framework governing banks. Indeed, this has put 
additional pressure on banks to comply with corporate governance related requirements 
spelled out by the banking law 88/2003'*'*. This also accounts partially for deriving the 
evolution of BCG practices. 
International organizations have also contributed to the evolution of banks' corporate 
governance practices through consideration of banks' corporate governance quality in 
donation decision making. Yet, another international organization such as Basel 
Committee has contributed through the emphasis on corporate governance as a crucial 
aspect in banking as expressed in its corporate governance guidelines, and other related 
aspects such as Basel I and II. Compliance to these guidelines has not only been 
supported by the CBE. But also gradually has developed to be a requirement to integrate 
with the banking industry at the international level. 
The Egyptian government contributed to the evolution of banks' corporate governance 
practices; this occurred through the Ministry of Investment efforts to reform corporate 
governance in Egypt as an important measure to make the investment climate more 
attractive. The Ministry of Investment has issued the first ECOCG (2005)'^^ this code 
was not only applicable to banks but also assigned banks and other financial institutions 
the responsibility to promote corporate governance amongst their clients, through 
adding clients' corporate governance as a criterion of loans' evaluation process. 
The two auditors shall prepare their report on auditing the bank's financial statements, according to 
the law and the Egyptian auditing standards, provided that their report shall elucidate whether the 
transactions audited thereby violate any of the provisions of this law, its executive regulations, or the 
decrees issued for its enforcement at least twenty one days before the convening of the general assembly, 
they shall send to the central bank a copy of their report.... Comprising the following: (A) The method of 
evaluating the bank's assets and estimating its commitments and obligations, (B) the extent of adequacy 
of the internal control system in the bank; (C) The extent of adequacy of the provisions formed against 
any decrease in the value of assets .... (D) Any regulatory or supervisory standards that the board of 
directors of the Central Bank requires the auditors to verify bank's compliance with (EBI, 2006 :rV) 
"' This code is a volimtary code, with some of its principles compulsory on listed companies. 
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Finally, the stock market has contributed to the evolution of this phenomenon through 
adding some corporate governance principle to the listing/delisting rules, as such 
enforcing listed banks to comply with these rules. 
Indeed, the above mentioned groups have induced the evolution of corporate 
governance practices of banks, especially, the pressures of the CBE and auditors that 
aims depositors' protection. Banks have to comply with the CBE requirements to 
achieve banks' legitimacy. While, the normative pressures exerted by international 
organizations, the ministry of investment and the EBI are still building-up and is not 
powerful as the CBE's pressures^'^. 
Interests' protection is another deriving aspect of the BCG phenomenon. Bank directors 
and executive managers have indicated that amongst the top interests protected by 
corporate governance systems are the shareholders, who have primacy as owners, 
especially with the high prevailing ownership concentration ratios within the EBS. As 
such, serving and protecting their interests are not only a fiduciary duty of the board of 
directors and management but a means of achieving legitimacy towards shareholders. 
In the like manner, depositors are one of the most important interests protected by 
corporate governance as indicated by bank directors and executive managers. This has 
gained momentum as part of the wide EBS reform program that addressed a number of 
aspects including corporate governance. Especially after weak corporate governance 
related banks' failures during the 1990's; putting corporate governance on the top of the 
CBE's reform priorities in order to protect depositors as indicated by CBE officials. It 
must be noted here that protecting depositors through compliance with related laws and 
regulations^ ^ ^ is essentially the prerequisite to achieve legitimacy from the CBE 
"* It should be noted that the impact of the stock exchange is not powerful as the CBE as indicated by 
participants that corporate governance requirements stipulated by the banking law and regulations which 
are enforced by the CBE are wider in scope than corporate governance requirements identified by the 
latter as previously mentioned. 
"^  Indeed, compliance with all applicable laws and regulations related to corporate governance is 
essential to achieve legitimacy from the CBE perspective as shown above. 
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perspective. As such interests' protection has contributed as well in the evolution of 
BCG practices. 
6.2.3 Context 
According to Strauss and Corbin (1990b), context represents "The particular set of 
conditions within which the action/interaction strategies are taken to...respond to a 
specific phenomenon" (p. 101) They are specific sets of conditions that intersect 
dimensionally at this time and place to create the set of circumstances or problems to 
which persons respond through actions (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). As such asking the 
following question would identify the context within which the phenomenon is taking 
place. 
What are the set of conditions that affect banks' strategies and responses in relation 
to their evolving corporate governance practices? 
Generally, context refers to "surrounding associated with phenomenon " (Cappelli and 
Sherer, 1991: 56). These surroundings play a crucial role in determining the pace and 
the degree of organizational change (ibid.). As such contextual factors can include 
internal as well as external elements. The contextual factors category sub-sums the two 
open categories Corporate Governance Identity and Laws and Regulations. The former 
represents the internal element, while the latter represents the external element. 
On the internal contextual factors, corporate governance identity delineates a main 
property pertaining to the phenomenon of evolving BCG practices. In other words, 
corporate governance identity shapes banks' corporate governance practices. Basically, 
each of the four corporate governance identities (Foreign, Private Domestic, Arab, 
State) determined previously in chapter five affects the way or strategy of handling and 
changing BCG practices. 
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As discussed in open coding, three elements determine the corporate governance 
identity firstly; the degree of management control '^* which affects the degree to which a 
bank can enforce internally certain rules such as those corporate governance related. 
For instance, tight management control at foreign banks is associated with a relatively 
better corporate governance practices compared with state-owned banks where 
management control is more lose. This is because foreign banks have better corporate 
governance rules enforced on all employees through tight management control. The 
second element of corporate governance identity is competence of board directors and 
executive managers of the bank, who hold the responsibility to design and run corporate 
governance systems. As such the more competent they are the better corporate 
governance practices will be and the easier a bank adopts corporate governance 
requirements. This also affects how successfijl the bank will be in designing appropriate 
corporate governance strategies and implement them successfiiUy. While, the third 
element of a bank's corporate governance identity is the organizational perception of 
corporate governance. Banks consider BCG to appear legitimate in the eyes of the CBE 
and shareholders. As such this also constitutes a part of the context where evolving 
BCG phenomenon is embedded. In essence the organizational perception of corporate 
governance affects the strategies towards handling the bank's BCG practices. 
External contextual factor is represented here by laws and regulations which represent 
the regulatory framework governing the banking sector. The changes to the regulatory 
framework with the introduction of the new banking law 88/2003 have included the 
introduction of corporate governance related issues, although on implicit basis '^^ . It was 
observed that banks corporate governance practices are basically affected by codes 
' " Refers to "the means by which the actions of individuals or groups within an organization are 
constrained to perform certam actions while avoiding other actions" ((Encyclopaedia of Management, 
2009:510). 
' " The term corporate governance has been completely absent from Laws and regulations governing the 
Egyptian banking sector. Although some aspects are corporate governance related. For instance the 
banking Law 88/2003 require banks to form an audit committee. 
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especially issued to the banking industry. As such none of the bank directors or 
executives mentioned the ECOCG (2005), although it addresses banks amongst other 
companies. Meanwhile, the issue of enforcement was an important aspect that 
determines the degree of compliance with corporate governance requirements. 
Therefore, laws and regulations shape the phenomenon of evolving BCG practices 
through the corporate governance scope within the regulatory framework and the degree 
of its enforcement. This is why the CBE officials have been conservative on endorsing a 
compulsory corporate governance code as they know the significant change regulations 
can introduce to the banking sector. 
In conclusion, corporate governance identity and Laws and regulations constitute the 
context where the phenomenon of evolving BCG practices is embedded. Indeed, they 
both affect how each bank draw its strategic response to arising BCG requirements. 
This comprises the very basis of variation in BCG practices between banks. 
6.2.4 Intervening Conditions 
According to Strauss and Corbin (1990b), intervening conditions are "broader 
structural context pertaining to a phenomenon". Intervening conditions "act to 
mitigate or otherwise alter the impact of casual conditions on phenomenon" (Strauss 
and Corbin, 1998:131). 
As such identification of the intervening conditions can take place by asking the 
following question: 
What are the conditions that mitigate or alter the impact of causal conditions on the 
evolving BCG practices within the EBS? 
The main category Obstacles refers to the crucial factors that diminish or modify the 
impact of the casual conditions {Pressure groups and Interests' protection) on the 
phenomenon of evolving BCG practices within the EBS. As such casual conditions and 
intervening conditions can be seen as opposing each other. On one hand, casual 
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conditions are pushing BCG to evolve; while on the other hand the intervening 
conditions are obstructing this evolution. 
The main category obstacles subsiune three open categories developed through open 
coding namely: Bank Competitiveness, Board of Directors Effectiveness and Hawkamat 
Al-Sharikat Culture. According to Strauss and Corbin (1998) intervening conditions can 
emerge from "micro or macro-level conditions" (P. 132). Here both bank 
competitiveness and board of directors' effectiveness represent the micro intervening 
conditions, while, Hawkamat Al-Sharikat culture represents the macro intervening 
condition. This can be further discussed as follows. 
Competitiveness'^" in the context of this study stands as an obstacle in front of some 
banks to adopt corporate governance. More precisely, banks giving primacy to achieve 
higher short-term profits adopt strategies that are inconsistent wdth adopting good 
corporate governance. These banks perceive BCG as a condition against achieving their 
success and as such competitiveness. Indeed, this affects the bank's BCG practices, as 
they choose to be less stringent in terms of their corporate governance practices in order 
to attract low creditworthy customers that are normally rejected by banks with proper 
corporate governance practices and consequently achieve greater market share. In 
essence, long-term oriented banks maintain stringent corporate governance practices 
and prefer to lose this type of risky business in favour of more stability and safety. This 
is more evident in the retail banking segment rather than corporate banking segment. 
Board of directors' effectiveness has shown to greatly affect BCG practices as indicated 
by the participants from the banking field, because the board has the ultimate 
responsibility of setting BCG strategies (BCBG, 2010). According to bank directors and 
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Bank competitiveness represents the resultant of strategies than an organization utilizes to achieve the 
"best possible strategic" objective (Cunliff, 2008). It also represents an organizational value that 
determines the targets an organization wants to achieve and how. This affects the unage of the 
organization in the eyes of its stakeholders. 
'^' These banks sacrifice short term profits that can be achieved through relaxing corporate governance; 
they prefer to achieve long term success and safety. 
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executives, board effectiveness in corporate governance role can alter BCG practices. 
Obviously, the degree of board effectiveness determines the extent to which the board is 
engaged in setting, approving and overseeing BCG strategies and policies. Participants 
have indicated that three major aspects affect board effectiveness in corporate 
governance: firstly, the degree of formalization of corporate governance strategies and 
policies through incorporating them in an in-house corporate governance code; as well 
as the degree of utilization of board level specialized committees to help the board in 
fulfilling its corporate governance role.'^ ^ Secondly, the degree of board members' 
corporate governance competence that enable them of fulfilling their corporate 
governance responsibilities. Thirdly, the degree of board members' independence that 
enable them to make objective judgment and avoid potential conflict of iiiterests. As 
such in the context of the EBS low board members' competence and independence as 
well as low degree of corporate governance formalization lead to board ineffectiveness 
in their corporate governance role. This means that board ineffectiveness currently 
obstructs the evolution of BCG practices. 
Hawkamat Al-Sharikat culture is another obstacle that mitigates the impact of the causal 
conditions (Pressure Groups and Interests Protection) on the phenomenon. As 
previously mentioned, Hawkamat Al-Sharikat culture does not yet exist within the EBS. 
It is still developing as indicated previously by CBE officials. The process of cultivation 
of corporate governance culture is at work. However, building Hawkamat Al-Sharikat 
culture is currently opposed by other factors such as the already established cultures of 
corporate governance rejection and secrecy. In addition to the prevailing low level of 
public governance. This indefinitely obstruct the evolution of BCG. Consequently, these 
factors alter the effect of causal conditions. 
'^ ^ Such as audit, nomination, remuneration and corporate governance committees. 
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6.2.5 Action / Interactional Strategies and Consequences 
According to Strauss and Corbin (1990), action /interactional strategies component of 
the paradigm model is "evolving in nature ... can be studied in terms of change 
overtime ... done for some reason-in response to or to manage a phenomenon (Strauss 
and Corbin, 1990: 104). Moreover, action / interactional strategies are affected by the 
conditions (causal, intervening and contextual) (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). 
Thus identifying of the action/ interactional strategies requires asking the following 
question: 
What are the action / interactional strategies adopted by various actors of the EBS in 
relation to BCG and within the causal, intervening and contextual conditions? 
The main category of Reform Strategies answer this question by demonstrating the 
action/ interactional strategies of various banks as well as the CBE in response to 
phenomenon of evolving BCG practices under the conditions mentioned in the previous 
sections. As such the main category of Reform Strategies subsumes two open categories 
of modifying internal corporate governance mechanisms and upgrading supervision as 
shown in table 6.1. Both banks responses and the CBE response are discussed as 
follows. 
Obviously, banks' action /interactional strategies are outlined and framed within the 
interplay between the causal conditions (Pressure Groups and Interests Protection), the 
intervening conditions (Bank Competitiveness, Board Effectiveness, and Hawkamat Al-
Sharikat Culture) and the contextual conditions (Corporate Governance Identity and 
Laws and Regulations). Notably, these three types of conditions represent the structure 
where the BCG phenomenon is embedded. 
In general, bank directors and executives have indicated that the response (action) of 
banks in relation to the phenomenon was to modify their internal BCG mechanisms. 
This is indicated by the main category reform strategies shown in table 6.1. However, 
given the above mentioned complex structure of conditions that set the framework in 
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which the phenomenon is taking place. A range of action/ interactional strategies 
emerged to handle the phenomenon. Indeed, various bank types (Foreign, Private 
Domestic, Arab, State) are affected differently by the structural conditions. 
Figure 6.1 presents the Action Choice Matrix that determines the strategy followed by 
every bank type to deal with the phenomenon of BCG on the basis of the impact of 
mtervemng conditions on a particular bank type as well as its corporate governance 
identity. It should be noted here that corporate governance identity can lead to 
classifying various types of banks on a continuum from low to high commitment to 
BCG^^ '*. Finally, the matrix assumes that all banks are equally required to comply with 
BCG laws and regulations. 
FJ'fii 
I 
LI 
Least Highest 
>-Obstacles impact ~~ S{ 
Figure 6.1 Bank Action Choice Matrix 
123 Bank Competitiveness, Board Effectiveness, and Hawkamat Al-Sharikat Culture 
'^ ^ Management control, Board directors and executives' competence, organizational perception of 
corporate governance are the three properties that explain the corporate governance identity of banks as 
previously discussed m the open coding chapter 5. If management control is tight, board directors and 
executives are competent. The bank is likely to be highly committed to BCG and when it seeks legitimacy 
in the eyes of the CBE and its shareholders, it does so by real compliance to BCG requirements. Within 
the BBS Foreign banks exemplifies this type. On the other end of the continuum if the bank has lose 
control and incompetent directors and executives, the bank is likely to be less committed to BCG. 
However, the bank still needs to achieve legitimacy of the CBE and shareholders. The only way then is to 
conceal or disguise its non-compliance. 
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As shown in figure 6.1 bank modification of its internal corporate governance 
mechanisms range from compliance to concealment. Here the compliance or 
concealment is in relation to the corporate governance requirements set by the 
applicable laws and regulations. Obviously, the pressure of the laws and regulations is 
the most powerful pressure as indicated by various bank directors and executives. 
Because with laws and regulations comes the enforcement and coercion and the 
possibility of punishment. 
Figure 6.1 indicates that Foreign banks have a committed corporate governance identity 
reflecting tight management control and high staff competence and a need to achieve 
shareholders' and the regulator legitimacy. As such, these banks have high commitment 
to BCG and are least affected by the intervening conditions. These banks are naturally 
complying wdth laws and regulations because their Foreign headquarters adopt a stricter 
corporate governance structures than that required by Egyptian banking. 
Domestic private banks come in the second place, they have relatively committed 
corporate governance identity , but here these banks are more susceptible to the effect 
of intervening conditions, but with serious desire to expand and a need to achieve 
legitimacy in the eyes of both the shareholders' (current and potential) and the CBE. As 
such most of these banks adopt a compliance strategy. 
Arab banks come in the third place; they have a less committed corporate governance 
identity^^ ,^ with higher susceptibility to the intervening conditions. But still these banks 
want to achieve their legitimacy to the regulator, as such they are more likely to conceal 
or disguise their non-conformity through pronovmcing their compliance but v^ dthout 
changing the essence. For instance, some banks do have an audit committee (legal 
125 Relatively tight controls and competency of directors and executives compared to Foreign banks 
'^ * Have relatively lose control and less competency of directors and executives compared to Foreign 
banks 
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requirement) but with no effective role in external or internal auditing functions. These 
practices are significant among this type of banks. 
Finally, State banks have the least committed corporate governance identity'^', are 
subject to high impact of intervening conditions and the majority achieve their 
legitimacy by modifying their corporate governance mechanisms but not its essence. 
Most of the state banks adopt a concealing strategy. 
Therefore, banks respond to the various conditions framing the phenomenon, by either 
complying or concealing non-compliance with corporate governance requirements set 
by laws and regulations. 
On the other hand, the second part of the Reform Strategies category, is the upgrading 
supervision. In fact, supervision reform reflects an important component of the 
action/interaction strategies adopted to manage the phenomenon examined. Upgrading 
supervision is affected by the structural conditions where the phenomenon is located. 
Obviously, it is affected by the international organizations pressures that determine the 
norm of accepted level of corporate governance practices such as BCBS (2005:2010) 
guidelines. This is noticed in the second stage of the banking sector reform that 
witnessed more emphasis on ''reviewing and firmly applying international governance 
rules for banks" (CBE, 2009: D). 
Also, upgrading supervision is expected to witness an increase in the scope of 
examination to include more good governance rules to achieve better "interests 
protection" of depositors and indeed shareholders (ibid). Indicating that upgrading 
supervision is the strategy adopted by the CBE in response to or to manage the 
phenomenon of the evolving BCG phenomenon. 
Moreover, through the supervision upgrading the CBE interacts with the strategies 
adopted by banks to manage the phenomenon. As such this upgrading includes 
'^ ' Lose controls and low directors and executive competence compared with Foreign banks. 
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increasing the corporate governance content within the regulations governing the EBS, 
improving the methodology of examination process and increasing the examination 
frequency. With the upgrade coming into effect the efficiency and effectiveness of 
supervision process are likely to increase. Thus, highly committed banks will then try to 
maintain their coinpliance status. Less committed banks concealing their non-
compliance are likely to be discovered and will accordingly be asked to take corrective 
actions to comply with the corporate governance regulations. Indeed, this process will 
lead to more evolution of BCG practices and fiirther BCG reform to address new issues 
discovered. 
Consequences 
Consequences are the outcomes of actions/interactions; they are also the result of 
failures of persons or groups to respond to the situation created by actions/interactions 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1998). Therefore they can be identified through the following 
question: 
What are the consequences of the strategies adopted by various actors within the EBS 
in response to the phenomenon of evolving BCG practices? 
As mentioned above, banks within the EBS either adopt compliance or avoidance 
through concealment strategies. Basically banks adoption of these strategies aimed to 
achieve pragmatic legitimacy to the regulator and shareholders. The consequence of 
these strategies is that banks enhance their legitimacy to the CBE and then-
shareholders. As such, they are perceived as better serving the interests of their 
shareholders, the CBE and depositors. However, as some banks are concealing their 
non-conformity, while the CBE is upgrading the supervision function; these 
concealments are likely to be discovered. As such these banks will be required to take 
corrective actions with the aid of the CBE. Meaning that further BCG reforms will be 
initiated, leading to the continuous evolution of BCG practices within the EBS. 
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6.3 The Paradigm Model of Evolving BCG Practices within the EBS 
Axial coding aims to bring grounded theory analysis together to form an integrated unit 
(Howell, 2000). The paradigm model is an analytical tool that assists to "systematically 
gather and order data in such a way that structure and process are integrated" (Strauss 
and Corbin, 1998: 128). An application of axial coding through the paradigm model is 
identified in this thesis through: 
A. The reform pressures exerted by the CBE to improve BCG practices are the 
principal driver of BCG phenomenon. These reforms are derived by the need to 
improve BCG practices to offer shareholders and depositors better protection 
and minimize potential conflict of interests. 
B. The change created by reform pressures aiming interests' protection of 
shareholders, CBE and depositors leads to the evolution of BCG practices. 
C. The Egyptian banking laws and regulations, as well as various corporate 
governance identities (Foreign, Private Domestic, Arab, State banks) 
contextualize the evolution of BCG practices. 
D. Bank directors' ineffectiveness in their corporate governance role, the perceived 
negative relation between BCG and bank competitiveness and the immaturity of 
Hawkamat Al Sharikat culture are obstructing the evolution of BCG practices. 
E. Banks adopt different strategies to handle the arising BCG requirements 
introduced by laws and regulations, this include: 
I. Following a compliance strategy with enforceable corporate 
governance requirements either naturally or by reforming their 
corporate governance structures. 
11. Following an avoidance strategy through concealing their non-
compliance. 
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F. The CBE upgrades its supervision function as the main mechanism to enforce 
BCG and derive banks towards more compliance. 
G. The outcomes of these strategies (compliance or concealment) are enhancing of 
legitimacy of banks to their shareholders and the CBE. Hence, improving the 
perception that banks are better serving their shareholders and depositors and 
the regulator. In addition to inducing further BCG reform. 
In more specific terms, the casual conditions and phenomenon are the drivers and 
evolving BCG practices. The context is the contextual factors. The intervening 
conditions are the obstacles. While the actions / interactional strategies are represented 
by Reform Strategies. Finally the consequences, are enhancing banks' legitimacy, 
improved serving their shareholders, depositors and the regulator. In addition to 
bringing further BCG reform. 
Figure 6.2 summarizes the paradigm model; indeed, it shows how axial coding has 
accounted for both the structure and process. The former is denoted by the drivers, 
contextual factors and obstacles. While, the latter is denoted by reform strategies. The 
interplay between both the structure and process leads to the consequences of enhancing 
banks' legitimacy, improved serving their shareholders, depositors and the regulator. In 
addition to bringing further BCG reform. 
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Perceived protection of Interests 
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Figure 6.2 The Paradigm Model Of Evolving BCG Practices Within The EBS 
6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter demonstrates axial coding within grounded theory procedures. The main 
purpose of axial coding was to reassemble data fractured during open coding (Strauss 
and Corbin, 1998). It demonstrated how the nine open categories that emerged during 
open coding can be further arranged and linked together to form a coherent overall 
system (Howell, 2000). It developed five main categories; here the focus was on 
developing categories on the basis of their relationship not in terms of their properties 
and dimensions. Main categories developed through axial coding are: Drivers, 
obstacles, reform strategies, contextual factors and evolving BCG practices. These 
categories were related together by means of the coding paradigm (Strauss and Corbin, 
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1990; 1998). An application of the paradigm model included identifying the 
phenomenon studied, the context where it is embedded, the intervening conditions, the 
causal conditions, actions/ interactional strategies and their consequences. More 
precisely drivers are the causal conditions, evolving BCG practices in the phenomenon; 
while obstacles represent the intervening conditions; reform strategies are the action / 
interactional strategies that occurred with the consequences of enhancing banks' 
legitimacy, improved protection of shareholders' and depositors in addition to bringing 
further corporate governance reform. Indeed the phenomenon represents the category 
and other components of the paradigm model are sub-categories. 
This chapter is based on the semi-structured interviews (A). Axial coding and open 
coding are not necessarily sequential, in this thesis both occurred concurrently and 
sequentially. Indeed the purpose of each was different, open coding aimed at developing 
categories in terms of their properties and dimensions; while axial coding aimed at 
developing categories in terms of their relationships. Axial coding was aided by the 
means Bank Action Choice Matrix and the evolving BCG practices model. Both 
contributed in visualising the application of the paradigm model. The evolving BCG 
practices model clarifies how the structure and process are integrated in axial coding. 
The output of this chapter is the foundation of fiirther data collection (semi-structured 
interviews (B)) and analysis within the selective coding stage as discussed in the next 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Selective Coding and 
Constructing the Substantive Theory 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents selective coding which is the final coding stage within grounded 
theory. Indeed, selective coding is based on the output of open and axial coding 
presented in chapters five and six. Selective coding is 
the process of selecting the core category, systematically relating it to other categories, 
validating those relationships the core category is the central phenomenon around which all 
the other categories are integrated (Strauss andCorbin, 1990b: 116). 
10H 
In open coding , analysis focus on generating categories in terms of their properties 
and dimensions; while, in axial coding'^ ^ the focus is on categories development in 
terms of their relationships. 
"However, it is not until the major categories are finally integrated to form a larger 
theoretical scheme that the research findings take the form of theory" (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1998:43). Thus, selective coding process focus is on "integration and refining 
of categories" (ibid). It should be noted that theory integration does not differ fi-om 
axial coding, but it is done at a higher level of abstraction (Strauss and Corbin, 1990b). 
Thus axial coding develops the basis for selective coding (ibid). Axial coding draws all 
parts of the analysis together and it is the pivot or the axis of theory building; while 
"selective coding identifies the core category and develops it in relation to 
subcategories" (Howell, 2000:184). 
This chapter firstly, identifies the core category in terms of its properties and 
dimensions. This occurs based on data collection and analysis of the semi-structured 
interviews (B). This is made explicit through the analysis of the results of the 
'^' Chapter 5 
'^' Chapter 6 
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mterviews . Secondly, and also through the analysis of the semi-structured interviews 
(B), this chapter links and verifies the relationship between the core category and other 
subcategories earlier presented in axial coding. Here this occurs again by means of the 
paradigm model. Finally, this chapter concludes by presenting the substantive theory. 
7.2 Analysis of Semi-Structured Interviews (B) Results and 
Identification of the Core Category 
Selective coding aims at identifying the core category and developing it in relation to 
subcategories (Howell, 2000). Here, axial coding provides the basis of selective coding 
procedures (Strauss and Corbin 1990b). Obviously, axial coding main categories 
Drivers, obstacles, reform strategies, contextual factors which were linked to the 
phenomenon of evolving BCG practices, were all developed with the core category in 
mind (Howell, 2000). Selective coding continues the coding process started during axial 
coding, where the relatively unclear conceptual relationships between the main 
categories built during axial coding stages are refined during selective coding (Howell, 
2003a). This occurs using a combination of both inductive and deductive thinking, in 
which the grounded theorist moves between asking questions, generating hypotheses 
and making comparisons (Strauss and Corbin, 1990b: 131). 
In applying selective coding in this thesis, the open categories that emerged during the 
open coding: corporate governance identity, laws and regulations, upgrading 
supervision, bank competitiveness, pressure groups, interests' protection, board 
effectiveness, modifying BCG internal mechanisms and Hawkamat Al-Sharikat culture 
were subsumed into axial coding main categorifes and linked with the phenomenon of 
evolving BCG practices. Axial coding main categories were drivers, obstacles, reform 
strategies and contextual factors stand as causal conditions, interviewing conditions, 
actions/interaction and context respectively. 
"° This is very much related to the pattern observed in the axial coding stage and verified at the selective 
coding by the aid of semi-structured interviews (B) carried-out in accordance to discriminate sampling 
techniques. 
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Here, identifying the core category occurs by asking questions such as "What is the 
main analytical idea presented in this research? What does all the action/ interaction 
seem to be about" (Corbin and Strauss, 1990: 15 cited in Howell, 2003a: 13). The 
answer to which is BCG Reform. As such, the questions can be paraphrased as: How 
BCG reform is initiated and how the action/interaction of various banks jointly with 
CBE respond to BCG reform and how this interplay adds impetus to further BCG 
reform within the EBS to achieve better protection of recognized stakeholders 
(shareholders, depositors and regulator) and maintaining safety and soundness of the 
EBS. 
Although, BCG reform was in mind during previous coding stages (open and axial 
coding), the proposed relationships between the core category and other subcategories 
has not been confirmed but in the selective coding stage. This occurred by the aid of the 
semi-structured interviews (B). Where the main properties of the core category BCG 
reform are identified and its relationships with other subcategories are verified. The next 
section demonstrates how the analysis of the semi-structured interviews (B) has 
contributed towards this end, giving the theory more specificity. 
7.2.1 Analysis of the Semi-Structure Interviews (B) results 
Discriminate sampling is the type of theoretical sampling associated with selective 
coding (Strauss and Corbin, 1990b). "Its aim is to maximize opportunities for verifying 
the story line and relationships between categories" (ibid). Therefore, a number of 
statements were developed to elucidate the main category of BCG reform and validate 
its relationships with other subcategories. These statements were put along a Likert 
scale of one to five. Participants were asked to express the extent of agreement to each 
statement. Indeed, the semi-structured interview method was thought as more relevant 
here than a survey because it gives the chance to talk with participants and as such 
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enrich the process of development of and selection of the core category and linking it 
with other sub-categories. 
Strauss and Corbin (1999b, 1998) recommend that in selective coding the aim 
is to integrate the categories...to form a theory, validate the integrative statements of 
relationship...thus sampling now must become very directed and deliberate, with conscious 
choices made about who and what to sample in order to obtain needed data...In discriminate 
sampling, a researcher chooses the sites, persons, and documents that will maximize 
opportunities for verifying the story line, relationships between categories (Strauss and Corbin, 
1990b: 187). 
To achieve that, eight statements were developed to define the main properties of the 
core category and illustrate the logical relationships between the core category of BCG 
reform and other subcategories developed previously in axial coding. To which 
participants will state their agreement or disagreement. While, this method is structured, 
this was intended because of the directed nature of the discriminate sampling. However, 
it is a semi-structured interview and both the researcher and the participants can discuss 
and raise important issues on ad-hoc basis. This is useful to verify that the main 
categories' properties and dimensions had been adequately discovered (Benaquisto, 
2008:806). In addition, this help in verifying the story line expressed by the eight 
statements. 
226 
The eight statements used are shown in Table 7.1. 
Table 7.1: The Statements Used in the Semi-Structured Interview (B) 
1. Bank corporate governance has witnessed reform due to pressures from the CBE, international 
organizations and the Egyptian government. 
2. Bank corporate governance reform aims at minimizing potential conflict of interests between shareholders, 
depositors and the regulator (CBE); hence better serving their interests. 
3. Bank corporate governance reform is an ongoing process taking place through the CBE's supervision to 
enhance the safety and soundness of the banking sector according to the international best practices. 
4. Variability of bank corporate governance practices is related to the differences in the corporate 
governance identity of the bank (management control, competence and organizational perception of 
corporate governance) as well as the limited corporate governance scope of applicable laws and 
regulations. 
5. Further reform should address the challenges of boards' ineffectiveness in corporate governance, market 
myopia (short-termism) and corporate governance cultural immaturity within the EBS. 
6. Banks respond to evolving corporate governance requirements resulting from reform either by compliance 
or disguising of non-compliance. 
7. The outcome of the compliance or disguising of non-compliance strategies in response to corporate 
governance reform includes enhancing bank's legitimacy towards the regulator and shareholders; 
improvement in interests protection andfiirther corporate governance reform. 
8. The impact of corporate governance reform will vary between Foreign, Private Domestic, Arab and State 
banks within the EBS given their different corporate governance identities and qualities. 
Participants for these semi-structured interviews (B) were approached from the original 
34 participants already interviewed in semi-structured interviews (A). 
If fact, the researcher has already planned to use focus groups at the stage of selective 
coding, however, this was impossible because of confidentiality issues, as all 
participants did not agree to talk in the presence of others. 
Gaining the consent of participants to participate in the semi-structured interviews (B) 
again was challenging; out of the 34 participants 14 gave their consent. However, all 
efforts were directed to have participants from the four bank types (Foreign, Private, 
Arab, State)^ '^. 
"' Details of those participants are presented in Appendix 6 
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This is important to verify the fitness of the story to respondents from various banks. 
Finally, the raw data from the semi-structured interview (A) were revisited when 
necessary. The results of the responses to the statements can be summarized as shown in 
figure 7.1^^^ 
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Figure 7.1 Summary of the Responses to the interview (B) Likert Scale Statements 
To demonstrate clearly the results of the interviews, the results shown in figure 7.1 are 
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converted to straight (Yes/No) answers. This can be shown in figure 7.2. 
"^ SI stands for statement one, S2 for statement 2 and so on. 
" ' Strongly disagree, disagree are equivalent to (No), While, No view, Agree and strongly agree answers 
are equivalent to (Yes). 
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Figure 7.2 Summary of Responses to Semi-structured Interviews (B) Likert Scale 
Statements Converted To Yes/ No Answers. 
Indeed, the results of the interviews shown above in figure 7.2 contributes to both the 
determination of the core category in terms of identifying its properties and dimensions 
as well as verifying its relationship with other sub-categories. This can be shown in 
details in the following section. 
7.2.2 Identification of the Core Category 
As previously mentioned, the core category BCG reform represents the central 
phenomenon of the study, selection of data and the creation of other categories have 
been processed with BCG reform in mind. However, the role of selective coding is to 
determine the core category in terms of its properties and dimensions as well as relate 
other sub-categories to the core category (Strauss and Corbin 1998). Certainly, open and 
axial coding provides the basis of selection of the core category. But it is the selective 
coding that determines its characteristics and verifies its relationships with other sub-
categories to achieve integration necessary for theory development. Towards this end, 
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the results of the semi-structured interviews (B) have played an important role. Table 
7.2 represents the main properties and dimensions of the BCG reform. This is based on 
the interview statements that contribute to identification of a particular property as 
shown in table 7.2 as well as the participants'^ '* opinions expressed and agreed on by 
most of the participants indicating their theoretical significance. This can be shown as 
follows. 
""* Bank directors and executives, in addition to central bank officials who participated in semi-structured 
interviews (B). 
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Table 7.2 Identification of the Properties and Dimensions of the Core Category Based On Semi-
Structured Interviews (B) 
Item 
1 
Core Category (BCG Reform) properties 
Nature of the BCG Reform 
• Ongoing 
Interview Statement 
No. 
I 
Statement 
Bank corporate governance has 
witnessed reform due to pressures 
from the CBE, international 
organizations and the Egyptian 
government. 
Interpretation and further discussion 
-statements analysis show a consensus from the 
participants that the corporate governance 
phenomenon occurring in the EBS can be best 
described as reform. 
-To participants BCG reform, means 
restructuring the corporate governance structures 
within the regulatory framework. This occurs by 
introducing the unified banking law No.88/ 2003 
as mentioned previously in open coding. 
Essentially this includes giving the CBE more 
autonomy to enable it of supervising the banking 
sector effectively. Though this independence 
was questioned earlier, a CB official commented 
that " / <^ree with you that independence is not 
100% as it should be, but corporate governance wise, 
the previous reform steps and the current ones 
cannot be ignored, we cannot say that reform is not 
taking place "(CB official). 
This confirms that corporate governance is in the 
reform stage. The CBE indicates this as well 
"Recent years have witnessed considerable efforts by 
the Central Bank of Egypt to increase the soundness 
and to modernize the Egyptian Banking Sector... 
CBE has made considerable progress in developing 
its supervisory framework.. CBE complied with most 
of the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking 
Supervision... In support for the efforts done to 
modernize this sector, further reforms need to be 
introduced.. Enhancing and monitoring corporate 
governance in aU banks''(CBE.2003). Later the 
CBE (2008) introduced the second stage of the 
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3 
Bank corporate governance refonn 
is an ongoing process taking place 
through the CBE's supervision to 
enhance the safety and soundness of 
the banking sector according to the 
international best practices 
banking sector reform "After the successful 
conqtledon of the first stage of the banking reform 
plan, launched in September 2004, the Central 
Bank started to make the necessary preparations for 
the second stage (2009-2011). The refonn program 
at this stage is centred on a number of pillars...(S) 
reviewing and firmly cpplying international 
governance rules for banks and CBE"(ibid) 
This indicates that corporate governance is under 
continuous scrutinizing, arising issues are dealt 
with reform programmes. However, this occurs 
in a progressive way, the second stage of reform 
will now turn to firmly apply international 
governance rules, while the first stage only 
focused on enhancing and monitoring corporate 
governance rules, with no reference to the 
international rules. 
This also implies that cmxently, the corporate 
governance practices are not up to the 
international standards, as such the second stage 
aims at improving these evolving practices. 
100 % of the participants agreed to this 
statement. This clarifies that BCG reform is 
ongoing, which means that it is dynamic to 
match the nature of the banking industry. 
Moreover, BCG refonn should be carried out in 
terms of the international standards to maintam 
safety and soundness of the banking sector. 
"You have to know that BCG is a must, now , 
especially after the financial crisis it represents the 
rules of the game, all banks everywhere, must adopt 
the best practices such as Basel principles" ( 
Foreign bank Director). 
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Objectives of the BCG reform 
• Serve selected stakeholders and minimize 
potential conflict of interests between them. 
• enhance the safety and soundness of the 
banking sector 
Bank corporate governance has 
witnessed reform due to pressures 
from the CBE, international 
organizations and the Egyptian 
government. 
Bank corporate governance reform 
aims at minimizing potential 
conflict of interests between 
shareholders, depositors and the 
100 % of the participants have agreed to this 
statement. This indicates that the main 
influential parties behind the reform, especially 
the CBE try to enhance soundness and safety of 
the EBS, and avoid the type of scandals occurred 
in 1990s. This is also confirmed in the following 
quote " the previous failures occurred in 1990s are 
due to weak corporate governance practices, now the 
global financial crisis stressed on corporate 
governance, we have to continue what we started 
andjirmfy" (CBE official). 
Meanwhile, serving depositors is a major 
objective of the CBE. This is consistently 
observed in open coding (interests protection), 
axial coding (Drivers) and in the CBE second 
stage of reform objectives "Add to this a nund>er 
of qualitative standards that ensure the sound 
perfomumce of banks and the sitfety of depositors' 
funds" (CBE, 2008). 
Given the high concentration of ownership, 
comes the possibility of potential conflict of 
interests between shareholders and depositors' in 
particular. As such a fimdamental role of 
corporate governance in this context is to 
minimize potential conflicts by maintaining 
proper checks and balances that can prevent 
power abuse by shareholders or their agents. 
Especially that depositor is at an information 
disadvantage compared to bank insiders. 
100 % of the Participants have agreed on that 
BCG reform in the EBS aims minimizing 
potential conflict of interests between 
shareholders, depositors and the regulator. 
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3 
4 
Mechanisms of the BCG reform 
• Supervision 
Impact of the BCG reform 
• enhancing banks' legitimacy towards the 
regulator and shareholders 
• improvement in interests' protection 
3 
3 
8 
regulator (CBE); hence better 
serving their interests 
Bank corporate governance reform 
is an ongoing process taking place 
through the CBE's supervision to 
enhance the safety and soimdness of 
the banking sector according to the 
international best practices 
Bank corporate governance reform 
is an ongoing process taking place 
through the CBE's supervision to 
enhance the safety and soimdness of 
the banking sector according to the 
international best practices 
The impact of corporate 
governance reform will vary 
between Foreign, Private 
Domestic, Arab and State 
This was consistently observed during the open 
coding (Interests protection category) and in 
axial coding (Drivers category). 
This Clarifies that the overriding objective of the 
CBE from the BCG reform is to "enhance the 
safety and soundness" (S3, Semi-structured 
interview B). 
Also the CBE indicates that the second stage of 
reform will focus on firm application of 
mtemational governance rules, while the first 
stage only focused on enhancing and monitoring 
corporate governance rules. "TTie reform program 
at this stage is centred on a number of piUars...(S) 
reviewing and firmty appfying international 
governance rules for banks and CBE" (CBE,2008a). 
Participants also confirmed that applying international 
corporate govemance standards is crucial for sound 
and effective supervision that can maintain safety and 
soundness of the banking sector. 
-This indicates that the main mechanism utilized 
by the CBE in implementing the reform and 
achieving its objectives is "...Bank corporate 
govemance reform is an ongoing process taking 
place through the CBE's supervision" (S4, Semi-
structured interview B). 
- This was previously mentioned in the open 
coding ( Open category: Supervision Reform) as 
well as Axial coding ( Reform Strategies 
category) 
100 % of the participants have agreed on this 
statement. This indicates that BCG reform 
results will definitely be affected by the context 
where the reform should be applied. As Foreign, 
234 
• Further corporate governance reform 
7 
banks within the EBS given 
their different corporate 
governance identities and 
qualities 
The outcome of the compliance or 
disguising of non-compliance 
strategies in response to corporate 
governance reform includes 
enhancing banks' legitimacy 
towards the regulator and 
shareholders; improvement in 
interests protection and further 
corporate governance reform 
Private Domestic, Arab and State banks have 
different corporate governance identities; the 
implication of the reform on banks is normally 
different. Because with different contexts come 
the different courses of action and strategies to 
respond to reform requirements. This was duly 
observed in open and axial coding (Modifying 
BCG internal mechanisms) where banks either 
adopt a compliance or disguising of non-
compliance strategies. Also, this was observed in 
axial coding (Contextual Factors category) 
which represents the context component of the 
paradigm model. 
Indeed, this creates the phenomenon of evolving 
BCG practices. That implies movement towards 
development of BCG practise through the 
operation of reform. 
TTie following quote reflects this meaning 
" what is happening is that reform affects all 
banks, but at the same time banks are different, 
despite that all banks have to implement the 
reform requirements some banks emphasis on 
the appearance rather the substance of 
conformance, so I agree with you" ( Bank 
Executive, Private Bank). 
100 % of participants agree to this statement, 
conHnning that the outeome of BCG is enhancing 
banks' legitimacy, improvement of interests' 
protection and identifying of further BCG reform. 
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Based on the participants' responses presented in figures 7.1 and 7.2 and the 
discussion presented in table 7.1. Properties of the core category BCG reform can be 
summarized as follows: 
I. The Nature of BCG Reform: 
SI: Bank corporate governance has witnessed reform due to pressures from the CBE, 
international organizations and the Egyptian government 
S3: BCG reform is an ongoing process taking place through the CBE's supervision 
to enhance the safety and soundness of the banking sector according to the 
international best practices. 
The above mentioned statements have contributed to identification of the nature of 
BCG reform summarized as an ongoing process that takes place progressively. This 
means that the ongoing reform gains its impetus, continuity and progression based on 
the continuous scrutinizing from the CBE and the interactions of various banks to 
reform requirements. 
II. Objectives of the BCG reform 
SI: bank corporate governance has witnessed reform due to pressures from the CBE, 
international organizations and the Egyptian government. 
S2: Bank corporate governance reform aims at minimizing potential conflict of 
interests between shareholders, depositors .and the regulator (CBE); hence better 
serves their interests. 
S3: Bank corporate governance reform is an ongoing process taking place through 
the CBE's supervision to enhance the safety and soundness of the banking sector 
according to the international best practices. 
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The abovementioned statements have contributed to the identification of the 
objectives of the core category BCG reform as shown in table 7.2. These objectives 
can be summarized in serving the shareholders, depositors and the CBE. While 
international organizations have come into the play, with stronger normative 
pressures with what constitutes good corporate governance especially after the 
financial crisis. Therefore, the CBE have started to draw on the international 
corporate governance standards to initiate fiirther reforms more than ever. In essence 
this contributes to occurrence of a type feed forward that initiates BCG reform and 
thus set the desired corporate governance practices expected from banks. Indeed, this 
lead to evolving of BCG practices. 
EQ. Mechanisms of the BCG reform 
S3: Bank corporate governance reform is an ongoing process taking place through 
the CBE's supervision to enhance the safety and soundness of the banking sector 
according to the international best practices. 
As shown in table 7.2, the above mentioned statement contributes to identifying the 
mechanisms utilized by the CBE to enact the BCG reform, this mechanism is 
supervision. The supervision mechanisms are subject to continuous upgrading as 
previously shown in axial coding (Reform strategies category). This upgrading is 
based on the arising issues emerging during the course of supervision, where 
examination assesses the degree of compliance of the bank with the BCG 
requirements outlined by the regulatory framework. 
Non-compliance or the discovery of banks' concealment of non-compliance leads to 
providing feedback to the CBE, thus providing information about areas that needs 
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further enhancement. At this point of time, further BCG reform may be initiated 
leading to further evolution of BCG practices as banks (especially those concealing 
their non-compliance) will have to take corrective actions regarding their BCG 
practices. Indeed, all banks (both already complying and those concealing their non-
compUance) will have to respond to the new BCG requirements. 
III. Impact of BCG reform 
S7: The outcome of the compliance or disguising of non-compliance strategies in 
response to corporate governance reform includes enhancing bank's legitimacy 
towards the regulator and shareholders; improvement in interests' protection and 
further corporate governance reform. 
S8: The impact of corporate governance reform will vary between Foreign, Private 
Domestic, Arab and State banks within the EBS given their different corporate 
governance identities and qualities. 
The abovementioned statements have contributed to further identify the core category 
of BCG reform through determining its impact on evolution of the BCG practices 
within the EBS. This impact is affected by the context where the phenomenon is 
taking place (various banks), as such various corporate govemance identities 
(previously discussed in open and axial coding) would not stop the reform from 
taking place, but every bank adapts itself to. the reform requirements. This occurs by 
either compliance or concealing non-compliance! In essence, both actions will lead 
achieving legitimacy and the perception of serving recognized stakeholders. 
However, with tougher scrutinizing banks concealing their non-compliance will be 
discovered. The following quote clarifies this issue: 
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If we have a strong regulator that effectively supervise banks, all corporate governance 
issues and other banking regulation aspects will be running smoothly. This is what the whole 
issue is about To give you an example, you know the new traffic law, which comes into effect 
in 2007. As the law requires that the driver must fasten his seatbelt all time, this doesn't 
happen. People rush to fix their seatbelts to avoid being penalized if a police officer stops 
them. On the other hand police officers only look at the seatbelt from outside the car; they 
never examine it The result is that many drivers do fasten their seatbelts but they use non-
conforming to standards cheap belts which do not function properly, but because police is 
looking for appearance, this happens although seatbelts can save lives. Recently, police has 
begun to be stricter, compliance begin to improve. Not because the driver is convinced that 
this is an important safety measure but because he will be discovered and penalized" (Bank 
Director, Private Bank). 
This quote indicated that as corporate governance culture does not exist, it is the 
supervision function that can drive further compliance and improvement of BCG. 
Supervision will hence force banks towards more compliant status rather than 
disguising of non-compliance. 
7.3 BCG Reform a System Perspective 
As a matter of fact, open and axial coding have contributed towards the determination 
of the core category of BCG reform. The selective coding through the discriminate 
sampling has identified its nature, objectives, mechanisms and impact. 
On the dimensions of the core category, the BCG reform process can be either 
feedback led or feed forward led. From the previous discussion and analysis shown in 
table 7.2, the BCG is feedback led based on the supervision function that scrutinize 
BCG practices and structure and provides the CBE with feedback about these 
practices. It is feed forward based as the CBE setting the objectives of BCG reform 
and further reforms not only on the basis of supervision outcomes but also based on 
international corporate governance benchmarks. This occurs because the overriding 
objective of the CBE is to maintain safety and soundness of the CBE. Post the 
financial arises central banks around the world has learned a tough lesson regarding 
239 
the importance of BCG reform, even in more developed countries, where corporate 
governance practices are assumed to be more mature. As such the CBE cannot ignore 
the international benchmark. 
In fact, the properties and dimensions of the core category of BCG reform process 
indicate that it is a dynamic process mterrelated with the environment where it is 
taking place. As such it involves the interaction between a number of actors 
including: CBE, banks, depositors, shareholders and international organizations. This 
interaction occurs as the BCG reform process receives input from the environment in 
the form of feedback on BCG practices and how it meets the objectives of various 
actors namely: shareholders and the regulator and indirectly depositors. Also, it 
receives input in the form of feed- forward from the CBE to determine reform future 
objectives in relation in corporate governance. It has outputs that include enhancing 
the legitimacy of banks towards their recognized stakeholders and hence perceived 
protection of their interests. In addition to ftirther BCG reforms that arise either from 
feedback'^ ^ or feed- forward'^ * information, all leading to fiirther evolving of BCG 
practices. 
Obviously, this exemplifies a system. A system is defined as "group of interacting 
units or elements that have a common purpose" (Encyclopaedia of Management, 
2009: 630). Systems can be either closed or opened. The former "refers to systems 
that have relatively little interaction with .... The outside environment" (ibid), the 
latter ''''refers to systems that interact with .... The outside environment" (ibid). As 
"^ When the supervision function discovers the non-compliance of some banlcs 
"* When the CBE increase the scope of corporate governance regulations according to international 
best practices. 
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shown above the BCG reform system is a relatively open-system due to the 
interaction with the environment. The CBE feeds the system with BCG requirement 
to which various banks must comply. These requirements are either based on new 
requirements arising from international benchmarks and selected by the CBE as the 
proper course of actions (Feed forward), or based on the scrutinizing and examination 
of banks' extent of compliance with current corporate governance requirements as set 
by the CBE (Feedback). Indeed, both feed forward and feedback are examples of the 
interaction between the reform system and the environment. 
The output of this system is generally the evolution of BCG practices. These practices 
interact with environment to achieve secondary outputs namely enhanced legitimacy, 
perceived protection of recognized stakeholders and further BCG reform based on the 
extent that the BCG practices achieves legitimacy and protection of recognized 
stakeholders. 
Figure 7.3 demonstrates the BCG reform system and its various constituents as 
mentioned above. This can be summarized as follows: 
1- Input: Feed Forward and Feedback BCG Requirements 
2- Process: Supervision by CBE 
3- Output: Evolving BCG practices 
4-Environment: Recognized stakeholders and international banking community. 
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Figure 73 BCG Reform System in the EBS 
The above model is taken forward to the final stage of the selective coding, that aims 
to link the core category of BCG reform vvdth other subcategories by means of Strauss 
and Corbin's (1990,1998) paradigm model. This will show the bigger picture of BCG 
reform system upon which the substantive theory will be based. 
7.4 Linking the Core Category to Subcategories 
Linking the core category to subcategories within the selective coding can be 
achieved by means of the paradigm model (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). hideed, 
developing the subcategories was the focus of the axial coding, selection of data and 
establishing of connections was done wdth the core category in mind (Howell, 2000). 
However selective coding has taken these subcategories namely: Drivers, obstacles, 
contextual factors, reform strategies and verified their relationships with the core 
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category. This done by means of the Semi-structured interviews (B) statements and 
the accompanying comments by participants. 
Table 7.3 The Application of the Paradigm Model to Verify Relationships Between the Core 
Category and Subcategories. 
Interview statement 
Bank corporate governance has witnessed reform due to 
pressures from the CBE, international organization and the 
Egyptian government 
Bank corporate governance reform aims at minimizing 
potential conflict of interests between shareholders, depositors 
and the regulator (CBE); hence better serving their interests. 
-Bank corporate governance reform is an ongoing process 
taking place through the CBE's supervision to enhance the 
safety and soundness of the banking sector according to the 
international best practices. 
-Banks respond to evolving corporate governance requirements 
resulting from reform either by compliance or disguising of 
non-compliance. 
Variability of bank corporate governance practices is related to 
the differences in the corporate governance identity of the bank 
(management control, competence and organizational 
perception of corporate governance) as well as the limited 
corporate governance scope of applicable laws and 
regulations. 
Further reform should address the challenges of boards' 
ineffectiveness in corporate governance, market myopia (short-
termism) and corporate governance cultural immaturity within 
the EBS. 
The outcome of the compliance or disguising of non-
compliance strategies in response to corporate governance 
reform includes enhancing bank's legitimacy towards the 
regulator and shareholders; improvement in interests 
protection and further corporate governance reform. 
Subcategory 
Driver 
Reform 
Strategies 
Contextual 
Factors 
Obstacles 
Consequences 
Paradigm 
component 
Causal 
Conditions 
Action/Interaction 
Strategies 
Context 
Intervening 
conditions 
Consequences 
More precisely, for each component of the paradigm model an equivalent statement 
or more represents the relationship between, the core category and one of the 
subcategories. Table 7.3 shows the semi-structured interview statements verifying the 
relationship between the core category and the subcategories within the framework of 
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the paradigm model. It must be mentioned that verifying these relationships is based 
on the participants responses to the interviews statements shown in figure 7.2'^ ^ 
The application of the paradigm model to link the core category with other 
subcategories can be explained as follows: 
I. Causal conditions of BCG reform (Drivers) 
BCG reform arises due to the pressures exerted fi"om various pressure groups namely 
the CBE, International organizations and the Egyptian government. Indeed, the 
degree of pressure varies with the source of this pressure. For example, the most 
powerful pressure comes from the CBE because it is the sole responsible authority on 
running and regulating the EBS and possesses the power to discipline non-complying 
banks. 
BCG reform is initiated as well to achieve protection of interests of recognized 
stakeholders namely: depositors, shareholders and the CBE. Reform here is meant to 
mmimize the potential conflict of interests between these parties that would 
jeopardize the overriding objective of the CBE to maintain the soundness and safety 
of the EBS. This is a top priority especially after the corporate governance related 
failures that occurred during late 1990s. Instability of the EBS is a major threat to the 
Egyptian Economy which is bank-based; as such a good governed banking sector 
cannot be compromised. 
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Figure 7.2 converts participants' answers on a direct scale of (Yes/No) that clearly indicates the 
agreements of participants on the suggested relationships between the core category and other 
subcategories. 
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n. Contextual Conditions (Contextual factors) 
BCG reform occurs within the current banking laws and regulations which sets the 
formal requirements related to BCG arrangements and practices. Earlier BCG reform 
introduced new BCG requirements, while, further BCG reform increases the 
corporate governance scope within the banking laws and regulations. BCG reform is 
imposed on banks with heterogeneous characteristics and corporate governance 
identities. As such bank responses to BCG reform are dissimilar as well. 
III. Intervening conditions (Obstacles) 
These are broader contextual factors that can alter /mitigate the impact of causal 
conditions on the phenomenon of BCG reform. Obstacles such as board of directors' 
ineffectiveness, short-termisim and immaturity of Hawkamat Al-Sharikat culture. 
Are the factors that may alter the effect of drivers. Meaning that these obstacles 
interfere in the occurrence of BCG reform and indeed this have a bearing on the 
responses of banks and the outcome of these responses. 
IV. Action / Interactional Strategies: 
There are two sets of action/interactional strategies taking place within the BBS to 
manage the BCG reform phenomenon. The first action / interactional strategies are 
those adopted by various banks in response to BCG reform. These strategies are 
either compliance or disguising of non-compliance. The choice of the strategy is 
based on the bank's corporate governance identity, influence of obstacles on the bank 
commitment to reform requirements. The second set of action/interactional strategies 
is initiated by the CBE to manage BCG reform. Supervision represents a scrutinizing 
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mechanism that aims to enact the reform and enforce it. Moreover, based on the 
results of scrutinizing, feedback about the process is provided. The CBE reacts to 
arising issues by upgrading the supervision to achieve the BCG reform. Finally, the 
CBE upgrades supervision to achieve the objectives of reform in accordance to 
international corporate governance benchmarks. 
V. Consequences 
These are the output of the actions/interactional strategies. Basically the interplay 
between banks' strategies and the CBE strategy of upgrading supervision in relation 
to BCG reform is the evolution of BCG practices within the EBS. On one hand, 
banks' responses lead to enhancing their legitimacy to recognized stakeholders'^* , 
being perceived as better protecting these stakeholders. While, increasing the 
efficiency and effectiveness of supervision brings about further BCG reform by the 
CBE. 
To summarize, based on the agreement of participants on all the statements of the 
semi-structured interview (B) as shown in figure 7.2, application of the paradigm 
model in selective coding can be stated as follows: 
1- BCG reform occurs due to reform pressures from the CBE, international 
organizations and the Egyptian .government. However, the overriding 
objectives of reform are to minimize potential conflict of interests between 
'^ ^ because, legitimacy is the corporate governance perception of all banks, as such both compliant 
banks and those disguising their non-compliance achieve legitimacy and consequently, they are 
perceived to better protect the CBE and shareholders' interests 
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shareholders, depositors and the regulator (CBE); hence better serving their 
interests. 
2- BCG reform have different impact on banks based on the context, two 
contextual factors identify the nature of bank response to reform: its 
corporate governance identity (Management Control, Employees Competence 
and the Organizational Perception of Corporate Governance) in addition to 
the banking laws and regulations. 
3- BCG reform should address the obstacles that hinder achieving outstanding 
BCG practices namely boards' ineffectiveness, short-termism and Hawkamat 
Al- Sharikat culture immaturity within the EBS. 
4- Banks respond to arising corporate governance requirements addressed by 
reform, either by compliance or disguising of non-compliance, while, the 
CBE enhances and upgrades its supervision function as the mechanism of 
scrutinizing bank's compliance to reform requirements. 
5- The outcome of the CBE's upgrading of supervision function as well as 
banks' compliance or disguising of non-compliance m response to BCG 
reform is the evolution of BCG practices, while enhancing banks' legitimacy 
towards the regulator and shareholders as well as improvement in perceived 
interest protection and further BCG reform. 
More precisely, BCG represents the core pheno'menon, with drivers as the causal 
conditions, contextual factors as the context, obstacles as intervening conditions, 
reform strategies as action/intemational strategies and evolving BCG practices as the 
consequence. 
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The relationship of the core phenomenon to subcategories can be depicted as shown 
in figure 7.3 this can be further summarized as follows. 
Drivers 
Pressure 
Groups 
Interests 
Protection 
im 
Contextual Factors 
Laws & 
Rsgulatlons 
Varfuos C O . 
Identities 
Determine Responses 
E 
Feed-Fonward 
Reform Strategies 
Compliance / Dlsgulslna of non< 
oompllanoe 
Upgrading 
Supervision 
Evolving BCG practices 
Bnhanoed l-egltlmaoy 
Peroelved Protection of 
shareholders* & CBE 
Further BCO reform 
Figure 7.4 BCG Reform Model 
7.5 Towards a Substantive Theory of BCG 
As the main objective of this study is discovering the nature of BCG phenomenon 
within the context of the EBS, the substantive theory developed in this study achieves 
this objective through determining the reasons that led the occurrence of the 
phenomenon, the contextual conditions in which it is embedded in, the responses of 
various parties related to BCG and the consequences of their actions / interactions. 
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Indeed, the substantive theory helps to promote our understanding of BCG in Egypt. 
This is important to be able to set strategies to enhance BCG practices of all banks, 
properly protect the depositors' and shareholders' funds, avoid corporate governance 
related bank failures and above all maintain the safety and soundness of the EBS. 
The substantive theory is the result of coding, categorization and analysis of data 
systematically collected for this study through: a survey and two semi-structured 
interviews rounds. It reflects the opinions of bank directors and executives, CB 
officials and auditors. As such it is groimded on data obtained from substantive area 
(EBS). Finally as the substantive theory exemplify a system of BCG reform, it 
captures some of the complexities of the real life and demonstrates the interaction and 
interplay between BCG reform and the banking environment that leads to the 
evolution of BCG practices within the EBS. 
The substantive theory can be summarized as follows: 
(a) The substantive theory shows how BCG practices evolve from the ongoing 
process of BCG reform. 
(b) It demonstrates that BCG reform occurs due to pressures from various 
banking sector stakeholders, with the most influential pressure coming from 
the regulator and shareholders given their respective powers. 
(c) Improving BCG practices is thought to decrease potential conflict of interests 
between shareholders, depositors and the* regulator. This is another reason to 
reform BCG. 
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(d) Contextual factors such as laws and regulations, and BCG identity (degree of 
management control, employees' competence and organizational perception) 
are determinates of how banks respond to BCG reform requirements. 
(e) In the context of this study, BCG reform faces obstacles that may alter or 
mitigate its impetus; this includes board of dkectors' ineffectiveness, banks' 
short termisim and immaturity of Hawkamat Al-Sharikat culture. 
(f) Located in the study context, banks adopt two strategies in response to BCG 
reform, either compliance or avoidance by disguising non-compliance. 
(g) The regulator manages BCG reform by the means of the supervision function 
and ongoing updating and improving the function by investing in people and 
systems and co-operating with other central banks. 
(h) From a system perspective, BCG reform is given impetus by feedback 
regarding the achievement of reform objectives from both the regulator and 
recognized stakeholders perspective. As well as feed-forward by the 
regulator to enhance BCG by implementing internationally accepted 
practices. 
(i) Ongoing BCG reform, induce banks to comply. While, supervision scrutinize 
compliance to address further BCG reforms. Meanwhile, the interplay with 
obstacles will eventually induce changes to occur, to cross these obstacles; 
this complex interplay will keep BCG practices evolving. 
(j) The corporate governance model prevailing in the EBS is a pluralistic model 
that aims to serve recognized stakeholders: shareholders, depositors and the 
regulator. 
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7.6 Conclusion 
On the basis of the previous chapter (Axial coding) this chapter presents the final 
coding procedure of the grounded theory. Two objectives were achieved in this 
chapter. The identification of the core category or the central phenomenon in terms of 
its properties and dimensions, additionally, validating the relationship between the 
core category and other subcategories. This took place through a second round of 
semi-structured interviews (B) based on the results of axial coding. 
At this stage discriminate sampling took place, where sampling must become directed 
and deliberate. As such interviewees were asked to state their opinion regarding eight 
statements prepared carefully to verify relationships and developed the core category 
in terms of its properties and dimensions. Indeed, the core category of BCG reform 
was in mind during open and axial coding, but it became only developed and linked 
to other subcategories at the selective coding stage. 
This chapter deployed a statement by statement analysis, as well as developed an 
overall frequency table and chart to clarify the results of interviews. However, notes 
taking during interviews enriched and supplemented the analysis, especially in what 
concerns developing the core category in terms of its properties and dimensions. 
This was facilitated through constructing a table showing the property of the core 
category, the statement contributing to its development and the interpretation based 
on the participants opinions recorded during the semi-structure interviews B. 
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This was summarized and visualized through a BCG reform system model. Linking 
of the core category with other subcategories was undertaken by the means of the 
paradigm model. 
Finally, this chapter presented the substantive theory of BCG which is the result of 
codmg, categorization and analysis of data systematically collected for this study 
through a survey and two rounds of semi-structured interviews. It reflects the 
opinions of bank directors and executives, CB officials and auditors. As such it is 
grounded on data obtained fi-om substantive area (EBS). The substantive theory 
exemplify a system of BCG reform, it captures some of the complexities of the real 
life by accounting for both the structure the phenomenon of BCG reform is embedded 
as well as the processes taking place. It shows the interaction and interplay between 
BCG reform and the banking environment that indeed leads to the evolution of BCG 
practices in the EBS. 
Substantive theory shows that BCG reform is derived by both pressure groups who 
seek their interests' protection by means of BCG. It is embedded within a fi-amework 
of banking laws and regulations and each individual bank is affected by the bank's 
corporate governance identity. It is altered with a number of obstacles that impedes 
its development including board of directors' ineffectiveness, short-termisim and the 
immature Hawkamat Al-Sharikat culture. It involves actions/ interactions in the form 
of bank strategic responses to reform pressures either by compliance or disguise of 
non-compliance and indeed the upgrading of the supervision function of the CBE to 
force reactions of banks. It leads to enhanced legitimacy of banks, a perceived 
protection of shareholders and depositors and through the interaction of supervision. 
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bank strategies and obstacles, further BCG reform is identified. Indeed the ongoing 
interplay of all these aspects leads ultimately to evolving BCG practices. 
In the next chapter the substantive theory is explained using a NIST theoretical 
framework, giving it more formality. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Relating Substantive Theory to Formal Theory 
8.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to discuss the substantive theory of BCG presented in 
the previous chapter in the light of the extant literature related to formal theory 
(NIST). hideed the substantive theory of BCG was arrived to through the application 
of grounded theory techniques as follows: the open coding which included data 
collection about BCG phenomenon within the EBS using semi-structured interviews 
(A) with bank directors and executives amongst other governmental officials and 
professionals. Semi-structured interviews questions were enlightened by a survey of 
BCG practices within EBS that identified important areas to be addressed during the 
subsequent interviews. The semi-structured interviews (A) allowed the emergence of 
nine open categories whose properties and dimensions were identified. The open 
categories that emerged from open coding are: Bank corporate governance identity, 
laws and regulations, upgrading supervision. Bank competitiveness, pressure groups, 
interests' protection, board effectiveness in corporate governance, modifying BCG 
internal mechanisms and Hawkamat Al-Sharikat Culture. Where open coding main 
purpose was to develop categories in terms of their properties and dimensions, axial 
coding aimed to reassemble the data fractured in open coding and focuses on relating 
the open categories and arrange them to form a coherent overall system (Howell, 
2000). Open and axial coding occurred both concurrently and sequentially, they 
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proceeded together, as such sampling through the semi-structured interviews (A) 
contributed to both stages. Li axial coding the nine open categories were subsumed 
into five main categories: Drivers, Obstacles, Reform strategies, contextual factors 
and evolving BCG practices. Axial coding focused on the identification of a 
phenomenon that can explain "what is going on" (Strauss and Corbin, 1998: 125). As 
such the five abovementioned main categories were related by the means of a coding 
paradigm model (Strauss and Corbin, 1990; 1998). Precisely, the causal conditions 
and phenomenon are drivers and evolving BCG practices. The context and 
intervening conditions are contextual factors and obstacles. While the reform 
strategies represent the action/ interaction component of the paradigm model. Finally, 
the consequences of the reform strategies were enhanced legitimacy towards the 
shareholders and regulators, better perceived protection of their interests and further 
BCG reform. Indeed, the action choice matrix and evolving BCG model have 
contributed in identification of the processes and demonstrated the link with the 
structure where the phenomenon of evolving BCG is embedded, thus capturing as far 
as possible complexities of the real life (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). 
This has provided the basis of the selective coding. As the final coding stage, 
selective coding aimed to "select the core category and validate its relationship with 
other subcategories to form a larger theoretical scheme that the research findings 
take the form of theory" (Strauss and Corbin, 1998: 143). As such on the basis of 
patterns established during axial coding, selective coding has identified the core 
category and verified its relationship with subcategories by utilizing the paradigm 
model again. Although, sampling was initially variational and relational during open 
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and axial coding; during selective coding sampling was discriminate and identified 
those to be interviewed, leading to utilizing a second round of semi-structured 
interviews (B) with participants from various bank types and the CBE. Selective 
coding identified the core category as BCG reform in terms of its properties and 
dimensions that lead to developing the BCG reform model. This model and 
verification of relationships between BCG and subcategories lead to the formulation 
of the substantive theory of BCG. 
8.2 Formal Grounded Theory Building 
In this context, the substantive theory is further discussed in the light of the extant 
literature relating to formal theory. The objective is to arrive at a more formal 
grounded theory. The difference between formal and substantive theories is that the 
former "emerges from the study of a phenomenon examined under different types of 
situations" (Strauss andCorbin, 1990:174). While, the latter "evolvesfrom the study 
of a phenomenon situated in one particular situational context" (ibid). 
Indeed, this study aimed at developing a substantive theory about corporate 
governance within the EBS context. However, still the substantive theory can be a 
more formal grounded theory '^'(Glaser and Strauss, 1967). This can occur by 
applying a formal theory to the substantive theory already developed. This can give it 
"greater meaning" (ibid: 94). This may possibly "refrnes, extends, challenges, or 
supersedes extant concepts" (Charmaz, 2006: 169). Furthermore, linking the 
substantive and formal theories would help to locate the arguments made in the 
" ' The formal grounded theory is still a substantive theory but gain more formality through 
comparison with already established formal theories (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) 
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substantive theory in the existing body of knowledge, thus making the substantive 
theory more explicit (ibid). 
As previously mentioned traditional corporate governance theorizing''"',''*' is unable 
to offer the corporate governance phenomenon the required level of understanding 
because: its economic underpinnings of efficiency and rationality are incompatible 
with the corporate governance phenomenon as a social process; considers corporate 
governance as a static phenomenon detached from its institutional context (Letza and 
Sun, 2002; Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Letza et al, 2004; Kirkbride et al, 2005; 
Mason et al, 2007; Ardalan, 2007; Letza et al, 2008). Moreover, traditional 
theoretical framework is not compatible with the changing nature of the organization 
(Zingales, 2000); of limited benefit in and un-transferable to non-Anglo-American 
markets (Rwegarsia, 2000); did not prove fitness with corporate governance related 
scandals occurring at global scale (Kirkpatrik, 2009; De larosie're et al, 2009). In 
contrast, NSIT is not only able to overcome traditional theorizing shortcomings but 
also is particularly well-suited to fiirther discuss the main findings of this study. 
The rest of this chapter will firstly, summarize the reasons that NIST is relevant to 
underpin corporate governance research and as such ftirther explore the main findings 
of the substantive theory, then critically review corporate governance studies 
'*" Numerous corporate governance studies are informed by either the agency or stakeholder theories, 
as the widely accepted theoretical framework for studying corporate governance (Freeman and Reed, 
1983; Maher and Andersson, 2000; O'suUivan, 2000; Kakabadse and Kakabasde, 2001; Friedman and 
Miles, 2002; Omran et al, 2002; Letza and Sun, 2002; Letza et al, 2004; Kirkbride et al 2005, Chilosi 
and Damiani, 2007; Carillo, 2007; Nwanji and Howell, 2007a; Nwanji and Howell, 2007b; Letza et 
a.1,2008; Keay, 2010). 
'•*' Previously mentioned in the literature review, for details see section 2.7 alternative corporate 
governance dieorizing. 
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informed with NIST and finally discusses the substantive theory in the light of NIST 
and present a more formal substantive theory. 
8.3 Relevance of NIST to Study Corporate Governance Research 
Generally, it can be argued that NIST is well-suited to study corporate governance 
phenomenon. The grounds for this argument are highlighted in details within the 
literature review chapter of this thesis. However, these reasons are briefly revisited 
here as follows: 
1. The NIST is quite useful for understanding institutions such as corporate 
governance that affects and is affected by the wider institutional environment 
(Scott, 2001). It is also useful in examining the effects of an institution such as 
corporate governance on organizations within a particular field (Scott, 1987). 
2. NIST emphasises the embeddedness of organizations in social structures and 
pays attention to legitimacy as the main reason of organizational change rather 
than the economic notions of rationality and efficiency ''*^(DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977). As such it probably offers a non-
traditional venue for better understanding corporate governance. 
3. NIST analyzes organizations from an open system perspective (Scott, 2001, 
2003), considers that organizations are social and cultural systems and not 
merely production systems (Scott, 2001), which is more compatible with 
corporate governance considered as a social phenomenon that: varies 
according to the institutional context where it is embedded, is dynamic and 
'""^  which is the main criticism of the traditional corporate governance theorizing 
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evolving, is affected by non-economic factors such as culture and politics, 
requires a processual and pluralistic approach of analysis that is uniquely 
affected by the surrounding environment (Letza and Sun, 2002; Letza et al, 
2004, Kirkbride et al, 2005, Letza et al, 2008). 
4. NIST pays attention to organizational change related to institutionalization or 
deinstitutionalization as a social process where various actors can participate 
in creation of the social reality (Berger and Luckman, 1967; Zajac and 
Westphal, 2004; Scott, 1987). Therefore, from a social constructionist point of 
view, NIST matches the nature of corporate governance as a social process 
affected by and affects its surrounding environment. 
5. NIST pays attention to the importance of power conception and its reflection 
on actors' interests (Scott, 2001; Dillard et al, 2004, Mason et al, 2007; 
Powell, 2008). Similarly, the concept of power is central to corporate 
governance, as corporate governance can be seen as "The exercise of power at 
the level of the corporate entity" (Tricker, 1995). 
6. NIST is getting more popularity for corporate governance researchers as will 
be shown in detail in the following section. 
8.4 Reviewing Corporate Governance Research Utilizing NIST 
Many corporate governance researches have utilized NIST as their theoretical 
framework, one commonality amongst this research venue is using NIST to 
imderstand why codes of corporate governance are initiated and adopted. For 
example Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazuraa (2004) explored codes of corporate 
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governance in 49 countries and questioned the reasons for adoption of these codes; 
they concluded that legitimating pressures was a leading reason for code adoption. 
Enrione et al (2006) studied the process of institutionalization of corporate 
governance codes in 78 countries and identified the actors who played a significant 
role in the institutionalization process. Obviously, Enrione et al (2006) have 
identified the main drivers of issuing a code being maintaining legitimacy of law 
makers and regulators. Similarly, Zattoni and Cuomo (2008) have studied the reasons 
for adoption of codes of corporate governance in 60 countries and concluded that in 
civil law countries corporate governance codes are adopted because of legitimating 
reasons rather than to improve corporate governance practices among national 
companies. 
Other researchers have utilized NIST to understand corporate governance reforms or 
changes at a country level. For example Khadaroo and Shaikh (2007) studied 
corporate governance reform in Malaysia utilizing a NIST lens; they identified 
various coercive, normative and mimetic pressures that lead to corporate governance 
reform. They identified that the Malaysian approach for corporate governance reform 
was regulations based. Deo and Irvine (2007) have studied the role of corporate 
governance rules and regulations in assisting banks to maintain their legitimacy and 
public image during crisis. Yoshikawa et al. (2007) utilized NIST to study corporate 
governance changes in Japan and identified that the Japanese Ministry of Justice has 
revised the commercial code seeking legitimacy. Moreover, Siddiqui (2010) has 
studied the development of corporate governance regulation in Bangladesh utilizing a 
NIST fi-amework; Siddiqui (2010) identified seeking legitimacy rather than efficiency 
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aspects as the reason for adoption of the prevailing corporate governance model. 
Other researchers utilized NIST as a foundation to examine institutional changes 
related to corporate governance, for example Ben-Messaoud (2004) have utilized 
NIST to understand the mimetic behaviour of Anglo-Saxon institutional investors 
regarding supporting the diffusion of Anglo-Saxon corporate governance model in 
France by addressing legitimacy reasons. Finally, Chizema and Buck (2006) have 
utilized NIST to develop propositions regarding corporate governance change in the 
context of Germany. They particularly addressed the executive stock options. The 
paper concluded that testing such propositions may require long time for 
institutionalization to occur but they identified that the degree of embeddedness of the 
firm with particular institutions is a key aspect to predict institutional change. 
Indeed, the previous researches indicate that NIST is relevant to explain the corporate 
governance phenomenon. However, it should be noted that the previous papers share 
the emphasis on institutionalization as an output rather than a process, as well as 
focusing on legitimation aspect of corporate governance (Aguilera and Cuervo-
Cazuraa, 2004; Enrione et al, 2006; Zattoni, and Cuomo, 2008; Khadaroo and 
Shaikh, 2007; Deo and frvine, 2007; Yoshikawa et al, 2007; Siddiqui, 2010). While, 
Ben-Messauod (2004) and Chizema and Buck (2006) have addressed the institutional 
change at a theoretical rather empirical leveL 
8.4.1 Limitations of the Literature Linking NIST and Corporate Governance 
Here two limitations of NIST literature should be addressed: generally, the NIST 
literature have not adequately covered institutionalization as a process rather an 
output (Dillard et al, 2004; Phillips et al, 2004). This limitation is shared in the 
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literature linking the NIST to corporate governance as mentioned above. The second 
limitation of the NIST literature is that it usually focused on providing explanation 
for the homogeneity of organizational arrangements and structures due to 
isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Rather than explaining the heterogeneity 
of organizational responses to institutional pressures "the theory is silent on why some 
organizations adopt change whereas others do not" (Greenwood and Minings, 
1996, 1023). However, Dougharty (1994) and Greenwood and Minings (1996) see 
that NIST offers an excellent basis for accounting for change. 
In conclusion, NIST is well-suited to explore the findings of the substantive theory 
due to the reasons shown above, due to the fact it covers most of the substantive 
theory findings and on the other hand linking NIST to the substantive theory can 
overcome the shortcomings evident in the NIST and corporate governance literature, 
by attending to the institutionalization process and explaining how the interplay of 
internal organizational characteristics and external environment can impact the 
strategies adopted by organizations in response to institutional pressures. This is 
covered in details in the next section. 
8.5 Exploring the Substantive Tlieory within the Framework of NIST 
This section discusses the findings of the substantive theory presented in chapter 7 of 
this thesis utilizing NIST framework. As mentioned earlier, NIST covers most of the 
findings of the substantive theory. This can be shown as follows: 
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I. Analyzing Corporate Governance as a Social Process 
The substantive theory has presented BCG reform as the core phenomenon of this 
study. Here the BCG reform is an ongoing process that affects various banking 
organizations within the EBS. Lideed, there is an interplay between the reform 
process, the CBE as the principal actor in this process, banks and other recognized 
stakeholders namely shareholders and depositors. Moreover, BCG reform is affected 
by the wider environment where it is embedded. The substantive theory shows that 
BCG reform is affected by laws and regulations, organizational characteristics 
(management control, organizational perception of corporate governance, board 
directors and executives' competence). Moreover, BCG reform is obstructed by 
ineffectiveness of boards m corporate governance aspects, short-termisim prevailing 
in many banks. Finally, BCG reform is affected by the immaturity of Hawkamat Al-
Sharikat culture that encompasses other cultural aspects most importantly the 
prevailing culture of corporate governance rejection within the EBS and the secrecy 
culture and unsupportive public governance. 
Indeed, all this legal, organizational, political and cultural factors affect BCG 
practices of various banking organizations. As such, from a NIST point of view, 
banking organizations can be analyzed from an open system perspective, where their 
BCG practices are indeed, affected by "the wider context or environment" (Scott, 
2001: XX). Also this agrees with the argument that corporate governance is a social 
phenomenon that is affected by the institutional context it is embedded and 
consequently with non-economic factors such as culture, politics and legal aspects 
(Ardalan, 2007). Moreover, the institutional context includes human factors 
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(Zingales, 2004). Here, the substantive theory acknowledges that banking 
organizations seen as firms are composed of human beings as such directors and 
executives' competence has an influential impact on BCG practices. The substantive 
theory sees BCG practices as evolving and in continuous interplay with the 
environment, this also agrees with the social view of corporate governance that 
acknowledge that any corporate governance system will continue to evolve 
(Ardalan, 2007). 
n. Institutionalization of BCG within the EDS 
The substantive theory shows that BCG reform is a process initiated due to the 
pressures exerted primarily by the CBE (Regulator). However, other pressure groups 
mdirectly influence this process such as international organization (World Bank and 
Basel committee on banking supervision); here, the substantive theory indicated that 
these groups are only secondary and do not have the same power of the CBE. At the 
same time the substantive theory indicated that BCG reform is intended to serve 
particular interests protection namely: depositors, shareholders, and the regulator '^'^ . 
So the substantive theory is about the relative power of particular groups and how 
they protect their respective interests. Within the context of NIST, the BCG reform 
process can be considered as an institutionalization process, because 
"institutionalization is a political process, .and the success of the process and the 
form it takes depends on the relative power of the actors who strive to steer it" 
(Powell, 2008: 5). Indeed, the most powerful actors in the process of BCG are the 
CBE as the regulator of the banking sector and the shareholders. The source of power 
'*' Recognized stakeholders 
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of the former is based on the coercive power and the authority the CBE has on 
various banks. While, the latter (shareholders) are powerful especially that ownership 
concentration ratio is quite high in most of banks, thus shareholders are a powerful 
actor within this process. Regarding depositors, their power is not clear in relation to 
BCG, however, the CBE strives to protect their interests to achieve his overriding 
objective of maintaining the soundness and safety of the EBS and avoid corporate 
governance related bank failures. 
Moreover, the substantive theory indicates that the BCG reform process is initiated or 
based on particular pillars: Firstly, a regulative pillar represented by law 88/2003 and 
the corporate governance aspects it covers as well as the corporate governance related 
regulations issued by the CBE. Both present the main pillar of the BCG 
institutionalization process. It must be noted that this regulative pillar is accompanied 
with an informal structure which is the normative framework that entails obeying the 
CBE''*'*. This pillar utilizes coercive pressure on banks to comply with related BCG 
rules and regulations as well as normative pressures. From a NIST perspective this is 
the "most common case" (Scott, 2001: 53), where the coercive power is legitimated 
by a normative framework. The NIST also proposes that the institutionalization 
process based on the regulative pillar is carried through symbolic, relational and 
routine carries (Scott, 2001). Within the substantive theory this is commensurable, as 
BCG rules and regulations included in the banking law 88/2003 as well as the CBE 
directives represent symbolic carriers. Symbolic carriers connotes "uniformity and 
'""^  The substantive theory has shown that all banks agree that the interests of the CBE must be served 
at all times, indicating that obeying the commands is a binding expectation and a measure of 
appropriates. 
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promote consistency of action" (ibid: 78), which is compliance with these BCG rules 
and regulations. The coercive power associated with this rules and regulations 
represent relational system carriers. Finally, the CBE enact two types of routines to 
scrutinize and verify the compliance of banks with BCG rules and regulations. These 
routines are the supervision function (on-site and off-site examination) and the 
external auditing function implemented by auditing firms. Here routines are attempts 
by the CBE \o" formalize processes for checking suitability of governance activity" 
(Mason et al, 2007: 294) by various actors. 
Finally, the substantive theory indicated that compliance with the BCG rules and 
regulations is based on seeking pragmatic legitimacy which is "self-interested 
calculations" of an organization regarding its most direct audiences (Suchman, 1995: 
578). Pragmatic legitimacy here is sought by various banking organizations to be 
perceived as appropriate by the CBE and the shareholders. Pragmatic legitimacy here 
entails adopting BCG requirements as imposed by the CBE. At the meantime, 
achieving shareholders objectives cannot occur without compliance with the regulator 
requirements. So legitimacy is a principal framework governing banks. This indicates 
that BCG is more geared towards the regulative pillar. 
Although, the substantive theory has indicated that there are normative pressures 
from the EBI, EIOD and international organizations, the impact of these pressures is 
not strong enough to initiate change. Finally, aS the NIST can include a culture-
cognitive pillar that would bring institutionalization (Scott, 2001). The substantive 
theory indicated that at the time being the culture of corporate governance within the 
EBS is at its early stages of formation and that this requires changing or 
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deinstitutionalization of the rejection of corporate governance culture and secrecy 
culture and improving public governance to aid in building of Hawkamat Al-Sharikat 
culture. Indeed this is a long term process. However, the NIST acknowledges that 
organizations and organizational fields can be shaped by different combination of the 
regulative, normative and cultural elements that vary firom one context to another as 
well as overtime (Powell, 2008). Although currently the regulative element is salient, 
normative and culture-cognitive components may play a role over the long-term. 
In conclusion, the BCG reform indicates the institutionalization process of BCG 
within the EBS; this process is currently based on a regulative aspect. Indeed, 
institutionalization especially from a social constructivism point of view indicates a 
process "by which organizational policies become instilled with value and ultimately 
taken for granted among external constituents" (Zajac and Westphal, 2004: 440). It 
entails a "reciprocal typification of habitualized actions by types of actors (Berger 
and Luckmann, 1967: 72). However, institutionalisation happens to organizations 
overtime and "infuse with value beyond technical requirements of tasks" (Selznick, 
1957). This process of institutionalization proceeds till something is institutionalized, 
this occurs only "when it is unquestioned and taken for granted" (Hasselbladh and 
Kallinkos, 2000, cited Sandhue, 2009: 82). 
As the substantive theory indicates, the institutionalization of BCG is now derived by 
regulative pillar and legitimacy is based on coercive mechanism. However, normative 
pressures do exist, and by more efforts from professional bodies such as EBI and 
EIOD, overtime BCG practices may be adopted by the logic of appropriateness. This 
can occur because "professional training institutions are important centers for the 
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development of organizational norms among professional managers and their staff" 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983: 152). Leading to isomorphism, or adoption of BCG 
due to normative pressures. Overtime and the wide spread of adoption of BCG 
practices tliis can be taken for granted within culture-cognitive pillar of institution. 
The time that BCG can be considered fully institutionalized and organization adopt 
BCG seeking cognitive legitimacy'''^ (Suchman, 1995). 
m . Heterogeneity of Banking Organizations' Strategic Responses 
The substantive theory has indicated that banking organizations based on their 
corporate governance identity and the impact of obstacles on the bank'"* either 
chooses a compliance (Acquiesce) strategy (Oliver, 1991) or an avoidance strategy by 
disguising non-compliance (ibid). 
Indeed, organizational responses to institutional pressures are an important aspect 
within the NIST. However, NIST focused for long time on the responses that lead to 
homogeneity of organizational structure (isomorphism), as such it was criticized for 
inattention to heterogeneity of organizational responses, an issue that recently 
received attention of institutional scholars (Dacin et al, 2002). Here the substantive 
theory has shown how some banking organizations adopt arising BCG requirements 
by real compliance, while other banks comply by appearance only or on "ceremonial 
basis" (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). These banks disguising non-compliance do so 
is that type of legitimacy that is neither based on serving particular interests nor being evaluated as 
doing right things. It is based on the acceptance of an organization "as necessary or inevitable based on 
some taken-for-granted cultural account" (Suchman, 1995: 582). This type legitimacy reflects a 
"preconscious standards" related to how organizational activities should be performed (Mason et al, 
2007: 293). 
'''^see the Action choice matrix in chapter six: Axial coding. 
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because they too seek legitimacy, but they have internal organizational characteristics 
that in hinder implementation as well as being more susceptible to external obstacles. 
However, with the upgrading of the symbolic and routines carriers of BCG, the 
ability to discover non-compliance will increase, leading coercive pressures to 
increase as well. Moreover, the growth of normative pressures is progressing as a 
result of the EBI and EIOD efforts. As such, these banks will either comply or move 
to another strategic choice such as "defy" that involve open challenging or lobbying 
with other similar cases to influence the environment to make it more suitable to their 
needs (Fiss, 2008). As nicely described by Carruthers (1995) "Organizations play an 
active role in constructing rationalized myths, playing them off against each other, or 
shaping how they are applied in particular instances, organizations are not only 
granted legitimacy; sometimes they go out and get it" (P. 324). 
Therefore, the substantive theory can be explained within the NIST fi-amework, but 
not on the traditional basis of homogeneity of organizational responses, rather on the 
basis of accepting that organizations can differently respond to institutional pressures 
through various strategies such as outlined by Oliver (1991) which include 
Acquiesce, compromise, avoid, defy and manipulate (P. 152). This demonstrate 
empirically that NIST offers an excellent basis for accoimting for change and 
confirms earlier arguments of institutional researchers such as Dougharty (1994) and 
Greenwood and Hinings (1996). 
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8.6 More Formal Substantive Theory 
In the light of the previous discussion, the substantive theory can now be restated in 
a more formal way with a NIST underpinning as follows: 
• The substantive theory is indicated that corporate governance is a social 
phenomenon that is shaped by the concept of the relative power of particular 
groups and how they protect their respective interests and consequently 
initiate BCG reforms and exert pressures to protect their interests. As such 
the substantive theory accepts corporate governance definition of "77?e 
exercise of power at the level of the corporate entity" (Tricker, 1995) 
• It is about how the internal characteristics of banking organizations such as 
management control, employees' competence (directors and executives), and 
organizational perception of corporate governance interfere to determine the 
strategic response to BCG reform requirements within the overall regulatory 
framework. 
• It is also about how particular non-economic factors such culture, competence 
(human) and organizational dimensions can alter or mitigate the impetus of 
BCG reform. 
• The substantive theory is about the heterogeneity of strategic bank responses 
to BCG reform pressures with a complex interplay between the normative 
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framework of obeying the CBE, fear of punishment, effect of dominant 
culture of corporate governance rejection and secrecy and the effect of 
internal characteristics of the bank that lead to compliance or avoidance by 
disguising non-compliance. 
• Overall taking an open system perspective for organizational analysis would 
imply that BCG reform process is given impetus through interaction of arising 
corporate governance requirements set by the CBE, internal characteristics of 
banking organi2ations, and pressure groups' requirements. Thus leading to 
evolving BCG practices, enhanced legitimacy and perceived protection of 
recognized stakeholders. This along with the supervision function (routine) 
enacted by the CBE provide feed-back on bank responses and initiate further 
BCG reform requirements. 
• The substantive theory is about the institutionalization of BCG that is geared 
towards the regulative pillar of institutions and the use of coercive power and 
seeks legitimacy by serving particular interests. With a potential role of the 
normative and culture-cognitive pillars of institutions given that actors 
maintain their roles of agency. 
8.7 Conclusion 
This chapter explores the substantive theory of BCG presented in the previous 
chapter in the light of NIST outlined and discussed as an alternative theoretical 
framework that can underpin corporate governance discussions rather than the 
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traditional shareholding-stakeholding theorizing. This chapter revisits the relevance 
of NIST to discuss corporate governance phenomenon and summarizes the reasons of 
such relevancy. Explaining the substantive theory in terms of an existing formal 
theory such as NIST was not meant to turn the substantive to formal theory; but to 
make it a formal substantive theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). The substantive 
theory was interpreted in terms of the NIST from three perspectives: It interprets 
BCG reform as a social process and shows that banking organizations within the EBS 
can be analyzed from an open system perspective, where their respective BCG 
practices are affected by the wider context or environment (Scott, 2001). It confirms 
that BCG can be seen as a social process affected by non-economic factors such as 
culture, politics and legal aspects as posited by the substantive theory. It is also 
affected by human beings (Zingales, 2004) as indicated by the substantive theory 
(employee's competence). The substantive theory also confirms that BCG practices 
have an evolving nature due to continuous interplay with the environment. 
The second perspective explains that the BCG reform process indicates the 
institutionalization of BCG within the EBS. It shows how the various pressures 
exemplify Regulative-Normative-Cultural / Cognitive pillars of institutions. It 
concluded that BCG reform demonstrate that BCG is a political process, with the 
powerful actors pushing to serve their respective interests. It shows that BCG is about 
power. It identifies that the institutionalization of BCG gains it impetus from the 
coercive power of the regulative pillar of institutions. This occurs through enforcing 
BCG laws and issuing related regulations by the CBE. It shows that this institutional 
pillar is associated with a normative framework that entails obeying the CBE and 
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opposed by cultural-cognitive institution of rejection of corporate governance culture 
and secrecy culture. 
It shows that the regulatory pillar of institution is accompanied by two types of 
routines (supervision function and external auditors' work) and is carried through 
symbolic carriers (Laws and CBE directives). 
It shows that compliance with BCG institutions is based on banks' seeking pragmatic 
legitimacy rather than rationality imperative. 
This institutionalization is in process and BCG is not yet taken-for-granted or 
completely infused in the values of banks, indicating that BCG is not yet fully 
institutionalized. It is a matter of time and politics that will keep this process until it is 
unquestioned and taken for granted. This would occur overtime and probably lead to 
the change to the type of legitimacy sought by banks to be cognitive rather than 
pragmatic legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). 
The third aspect is that the NIST explained the heterogeneity of banks' strategic 
responses to the BCG institution. Some banks choose compliance while others choose 
disguising of non-compliance. But both do that seeking legitimacy indeed, the 
strategic choice is affected by internal organizational characteristics that in hinder 
compliance. Additionally, it makes them more susceptible to obstacles. But with 
stringent supervision being introduced, coercive pressures are likely to increase. Also, 
normative pressures of the EBI and EIOD are likely to increase. Those banks 
disguising non-compliance will move institutional pressures to comply or move to 
another strategic choice such as defy (Oliver, 1991) by challenging BCG institution 
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through lobbing. Finally, the chapter restates the substantive theory within the NIST 
framework. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
Conclusion, Contributions and Future Research 
9.1 Introduction 
This thesis has investigated the phenomenon of corporate governance within the 
context of the EBS. It identified its nature in terms of the structures where it is 
embedded and how these structures interact with a number of processes to bring 
about the phenomenon of evolving BCG practices. Indeed, this included identifying 
the factors shaping the phenomenon as shown in the substantive theory (see chapter 
seven). This thesis is based on a combination of social constructionist and 
interpretative paradigms of inquiry. It applied a grounded theory methodology to 
develop the substantive theory of BCG through systematic data collection and 
analysis. This chapter presents the overall conclusion of the thesis, the contributions 
to knowledge and directions for future research. 
9.2 Conclusion of the Thesis 
This thesis has achieved the objectives of this study to build a substantive theory of 
BCG within the EBS using the NIST theoretical framework. As such, discovered and 
understood the nature of BCG phenomenon throu^ identifying the structural factors 
shaping it and how these factors interact together with certain processes leading to the 
occurrence of the phenomenon. Additionally, this thesis empirically demonstrated 
the utilisation of a non-traditional theoretical framework for corporate governance 
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understanding. Indeed, the thesis has utilized a grounded theory methodology to build 
the substantive theory of BCG. This included utilizing grounded theory techniques of 
coding, comparative analysis and theoretical sampling. The substantive theory is 
grounded on data as it reflects the opinion of banks' directors and executives, CB 
officials, government officials and auditors. The substantive theory acknowledges 
that corporate governance is a social phenomenon that is affected by the institutional 
environment where it is embedded. Open coding and the data collected from the 
semi-structured interviews (A) allowed the development of categories in terms of 
their properties and dimensions. Axial coding re-arranged these categories in different 
ways and linked them together utilizing the paradigm model. Finally, selective coding 
utilized another round of semi-structured interviews (B) to identify the core category 
of BCG reform in terms of its properties and dimensions and linked it to other sub-
categories using the paradigm model. Furthermore, using the NIST theoretical 
framework the thesis constructed a formal grounded theory that can be summarized 
as follows: 
• The substantive theory is about the relative power of particular groups and 
how they protect their respective interests and consequently initiate BCG 
reforms. As such, the substantive theory accepts corporate governance 
definition of '''The exercise of power, at the level of the corporate entity" 
(Tricker, 1995). 
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• It is about how the internal characteristics of banks interfere to determine the 
strategic response of banks to BCG reform requirements according to laws 
and regulations governing the EBS. 
• It is also about how particular non-economic factors such as culture, 
competence and regulatory framework can alter or mitigate the impetus of 
BCG reform. 
• The substantive theory is about the heterogeneity of banks' responses to BCG 
reform pressures shaped by a complex interplay between the normative 
framework of obeying the CBE, fear of punishment, effect of dominant 
cultures of corporate governance rejection and secrecy and the impact of 
internal characteristics of banking organizations that lead to either compliance 
with reform pressures or their avoidance by disguising non-compliance. 
• Overall, taking an open system perspective for organizational analysis would 
imply that BCG reform process is given impetus through interaction of arising 
corporate governance requirements set by the CBE, internal characteristics of 
banking organizations and pressure groups' requirements. Thus leading to 
evolution of BCG practices, enhanced legitimacy and perceived protection of 
recognized stakeholders. Meanwhile, the CBE's supervision provides feed-
back on the extent of banks' compliance leading to the discovery of some 
non-complying banks and accordingly initiate further BCG reforms. 
• The substantive theory is about the institutionalization of BCG that is geared 
towards the regulative pillar of institutions, the use of coercive power and 
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pragmatic legitimacy seeking through serving particular interests. In the future 
the normative and culture-cognitive pillars of institutions can potentially come 
into play given that actors''*^ maintain their roles of agency. 
9.3 Contributions of the Tliesis 
This study has come up with a number of contributions at the methodological, 
theoretical and empirical levels. This can be summarized as follows: 
1- Using of grounded theory to explore the phenomenon of corporate 
governance in an unexplored context 
On the basis of the literature review undertaken in this thesis (Chapter 2) a gap in 
the body of knowledge concerning the lack of research addressing the 
phenomenon of corporate governance in the context of the EBS was identified. 
Moreover, the literature review has clarified a number of important issues 
namely: the criticism directed towards the traditional shareholding-stakeholding 
perspectives adopted to understand corporate governance phenomenon; the 
peculiarity of corporate governance of banking organizations; the special 
importance of corporate governance to banking organizations of developing 
countries and in particularity of the Egyptian case where corporate governance 
weaknesses were blamed as a principal cause for the late 1990s bank failures. In 
addition to the recent role assigned to Egyptian banks to promote good corporate 
govemance practices amongst its clients as part of a nationwide corporate 
governance reform. All signifies the importance of researching corporate 
147 CBE, international organizations, EBI, EIOD 
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governance within the context of the EBS. Towards understanding the nature of 
BCG within the EBS and interpreting it based on a more suitable theoretical 
framework, this thesis has responded by using grounded theory to generate a 
substantive theory of BCG within the EBS and utilized the NIST as an alternative 
theoretical underpinning rather than the traditional theories.''*^ 
A qualitative research design underpinned with a combination of interpretative-
social constructionist paradigms was utilized to achieve the objectives of this 
study. Indeed, the ultimate objective was to build a substantive theory of BCG 
using the theoretical framework of NIST. 
As such, this research has extended the grounded theory research by utilizing it as 
the research methodology relevant to explore the phenomenon of corporate 
governance within an unexplored context of the EB S. 
Grounded theory procedures were applied based on data collected from bank 
directors and executives as the main actors responsible for corporate governance 
of banking organizations (BCBS, 2010). Being guided with theoretical samplmg 
technique other important research sites emerged during the research process; as 
such participants' opinions from these sites were integrated within the substantive 
theory namely: CBE, international auditing firms, EBI, EIOD and Egyptian Stock 
exchange. Data collection and analysis occurred simultaneously, and analysis 
guided further data collection (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). Data collection in this 
thesis included: a survey that enlightened data collection using semi-structured 
148 The agency or the stakeholders' theories. 
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interviews, semi-structured interviews (A) which contributed to open, variational 
/relational sampling and discriminate sampling. In addition to the second round of 
semi-structured interviews (B) related to discriminate sampling. 
The data collected for this thesis were analyzed using grounded theory methods. 
This included the processes of data reduction, concepts discovery, categories 
development. These categories were integrated into the substantive theory 
(Howell, 2000). As advocated by Strauss and Corbin (1990a; 1990b; 1998) 
initially, open coding aimed at developing categories in terms of their properties 
and dimensions. Through simultaneous data collection''*' and analysis nine open 
categories were developed: bank's corporate governance identity, laws and 
regulations, upgrading supervision, bank competitiveness, pressure groups, 
interests' protection, board effectiveness in corporate governance, modifying 
internal BCG mechanisms and Hawkamat Al-Sharikat culture. 
Axial coding aimed to re-assemble the data fractured in open coding and focused 
on relating the open categories and arranging them to form a coherent overall 
system (Howell, 2000). Open and axial coding occurred both concurrently and 
sequentially; they proceeded together, as such sampling through the semi-
structured interviews (A) contributed to both stages. In axial coding the nine open 
categories were subsumed mto five main, categories: Drivers, Obstacles, reform 
strategies, contextual factors and evolving BCG practices. These main categories 
were linked together by the means of the paradigm model (Strauss and Corbin, 
1998). The causal conditions and phenomenon are represented by drivers and 
'*' Semi- Structured interviews 
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evolving BCG practices. The context and intervening conditions are represented 
by the contextual factors and obstacles. While, reform strategies represented the 
action / interaction component of the paradigm model. Finally, the consequences 
of the reform strategies were enhanced legitimacy toward the shareholders and the 
regulator, perceived better protection of recognised stakeholders as well as further 
BCG reform. Indeed, the Action Choice Matrix and the Evolving BCG Model 
contributed in identification of the processes and linked it together with the 
structure where the BCG phenomenon is embedded. This captured as far as 
possible some of the complexities of real life (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). At the 
final coding stage, selective coding aimed to select "the core category and 
validate its relationship with other subcategories to form a larger theoretical 
scheme that the research findings take the form of theory" (Strauss and Corbin, 
1998: 143). As such on the basis of patterns laid down during axial coding, 
selective coding has identified the core category and verified its relationship with 
subcategories by utilizing the paradigm model again. Although the sampling was 
initially variational and relational during open and axial coding, during selective 
coding sampling was discriminate and identified those to be interviewed, leading 
to utilizing a second round of semi-structured interviews (B) with participants 
from various bank types and the CBE.. Selective coding identified the core 
category as BCG reform in terms of its properties and dimensions that lead to 
developing a BCG Reform Model which demonstrates the substantive theory of 
BCG. 
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The substantive theory reflects the opinions of bank directors and executives, CB 
officials, auditors and other governmental officials. Thus, it is grounded on data 
obtained from the substantive area studied here that is the EBS. The substantive 
theory exemplifies a system of BCG reform; it captures some of the complexities 
of the real life by accovinting for both the structure where the phenomenon of 
BCG is embedded as well as the processes taking place. It shows the interaction 
and interplay between BCG reform and the banking environment that indeed, 
leads to the evolution of the BCG practices within the EBS. The theory shows 
that BCG reform is derived by pressure groups seeking protection of their 
interests by means of proper corporate governance of banks. BCG phenomenon is 
embedded within a macro-framework of banking laws and regulations, and a 
micro-framework at individual banks level of bank corporate governance identity 
based on the degree of management control, employees competence (bank 
directors and executives) and the bank's organizational perception of corporate 
governance. The substantive theory also attended to a number of obstacles that 
impede further development of BCG namely: the board of directors' 
ineffectiveness in corporate governance, short-termism and immature Hawkamat 
Al-Sharikat culture. It identifies banks' strategic responses to BCG reform 
pressures by either compliance or disguise of non-compliance. The substantive 
theory also identified the CBE actions in relation to BCG is upgrading its 
supervisory role. The response of banks currently leads to an enhanced legitimacy 
of banks because of their appearance as compliant with the legal corporate 
governance requirements. Also this leads to banks being perceived by recognized 
282 
stakeholders (shareholders, regulator and depositors) as providing them with 
better protection of their respective interests. While, the interaction of bank 
responses with the upgrading of supervision and auditors role in scrutinizing 
corporate governance structures lead to discovery of new points of weaknesses 
and hence lead to further BCG reforms. Finally the substantive theory shows that 
the ongoing interplay of the structure and actions / interactions by main actors 
ultimately lead to evolution of BCG practices within the EBS. ' 
Hence, this thesis contributes to extending the application of grounded theory to 
give a fresh and faithful understanding of corporate governance phenomenon in 
an unexplored context. Few previous studies of corporate governance have 
utilized the grovinded theory to explore the phenomenon of corporate governance 
namely: Xiao et al (2004), Goddard and Assad (2006) and Nwanji (2006). 
However, none of these previous studies has aimed principally to explore the 
corporate governance phenomenon per se, but only an aspect or more of corporate 
governance such as the role of the supervisory board (see Xiao et al, 2004), while, 
Goddard and Assad (2006) investigated the phenomenon of accounting in non-
governmental organizations. They investigated governance in a limited way that 
focused only on corporate governance as a way of improving credibility of these 
organizations. Nwanji (2006) investigated the ethical implications of corporate 
governance. As such, this study is the first study to investigate the corporate 
governance phenomenon in a profound manner using grounded theory. The 
generated substantive theory as shown above identifies how the corporate 
governance of banks is a dynamic process that includes interaction between 
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organizations and their external environment. It clarifies that corporate 
governance is not adopted on the basis of economic efficiency or rationality but 
organizations adopt corporate governance seeking legitimacy. Corporate 
governance of every organization is uniquely affected by legal, regulatory, 
human, organizational and cultural factors. As such this thesis has heeded the 
calls for empirical corporate governance research that takes into account the 
institutional environment where corporate governance is embedded 
(Zingalas,2000; Letza and Sun,2004;Letza et a/,2004; Ratnatunga and Ariff 
,2005; Lubatkin et a/,2005; Judge,2009; Durisin and Puzone,2009). And also 
responded to calls of studying the corporate governance phenomenon itself rather 
explaining it in terms of proxies; it is a response to calls to seek meaningfiil 
evidence that can "inform and improve practice" (Smallman, 2007). 
2- Extension of the Neo-Institutional Sociological Theory to explore the 
phenomenon of BCG 
Recently, many corporate governance researchers have been directed towards 
utilizing the NIST to underpin their corporate governance research. One 
commonality amongst this research stream is using NIST to understand why 
corporate governance codes are initiated and adopted for example Aguilera and 
Cuervo-Cazurra (2004), Enrione et al (2006) as well as Zattoni and Cuomo 
(2008). Other researchers have utilized NIST to'understand corporate governance 
reforms or change at country level for example Khadaroo and Shaikh (2006), Deo 
and Irvine (2007), Yoshikawa et a/ (2007) and Siddiqui (2010). hideed, one 
common conclusion among this line of research is that the adoption of corporate 
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governance occurs for reasons of seeking legitimacy. However, it is important to 
point out here that the emphasis of these papers was on the institutionalization of 
corporate governance as an output rather than a process as well as on focusing on 
legitimizing aspect of adopting corporate governance (Aguilera and Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2004; Enirone et al, 2006; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008; Khadaroo and 
Shaikh, 2007; Deo and Irvine, 2007; Yoshikawa et al, Siddiqui, 2010). Other 
researchers such as Ben-messoud (2004) and Chizema and Buck (2006) have 
addressed institutionalisation process of corporate governance, however, this was 
only at a theoretical rather than empirical level. As such the limitation of NIST 
literature in dealing with institutionalisation as a process rather than an output is 
documented (Dillard et al, 2004; Phillips et al, 2004). This limitation is shared in 
the literature linking the NIST to corporate governance as mentioned above. A 
second limitation of NIST is that it is usually seen as providing explanations for 
the homogeneity of organizational arrangements and structure due to 
isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Rather than explaining the 
heterogeneity of organizational responses "//;e theory is silent on why some 
organizations adopt... change whereas others do not" (GreenwoodandHinnings, 
1996:1023). However, Dougharty (1994) as well as Greenwood and Hirmings 
(1996) share the opinion that NIST can offer an excellent basis for accounting for 
change. 
In this thesis NIST was utilized as a formal theory to further explore the findings 
of the substantive theory of BCG. It was used to give the substantive theory more 
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formality (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). This thesis has contributed to overcoming 
the above mentioned limitations of the NIST literature. 
Firstly, the thesis has accounted to institutionalization of corporate governance as 
a process rather than an output. It has shown that BCG reform is a process 
initiated due to the pressures exerted by many pressure groups. These pressures 
are exerted towards serving and protecting particular interests namely; depositors, 
shareholders and the regulator. One important aspect of the initiation of BCG is 
the notion of power. The influence of the regulator comes from its coercive power 
and authority over banks granted by law, while, the power of shareholders comes 
from their strong and dominant position given the high ownership concentration 
ratios, finally, depositors' power is not clearly related to BCG; however, the CBE 
strives to protect their interests to achieve his overriding objective of mamtaining 
the soundness and safety of the EBS and avoid the repetition of the 1990s 
corporate governance related bank failures. Within this context, the BCG reform 
process was considered as an institutionalization process, because 
"institutionalisation is a political process and the success of the process and the 
form it takes depends on the relative power of the actors who strive to steer it" 
(Powell, 2008:5). 
Moreover, NIST has interpreted the institutionalisation process of BCG in terms 
of identifying its institutional pillars. NIST posits that institutionalization process 
can be based on a regulative, normative or cultural-cognitive pillars (Scott, 2001). 
Here, the institutionalisation of BCG is occurring in terms of the regulative pillar 
accompanied by a normative framework entailing that all banks should obey the 
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CBE. This institution is carried through symbolic carriers (Scott, 2001) of laws 
and CBE directives. While, the coercive power associated with these rules and 
regulations represent the relational system carrier (ibid). Finally, this institution is 
accompanied by two types of routines to scrutinize and verify the compliance of 
banks with BCG rules and regulations. These routines are the supervisory 
function (on-site and off-site examination) and the external auditing function 
implemented by external auditing firms. Here, the institutionalization process 
brings about change in banking organizations that respond to the 
institutionalization of BCG because they are legitimacy seeking organizations and 
complying with BCG institution is the means of achieving this legitimacy in the 
eyes of the regulator and respective shareholders. Indeed, institutionalisation of 
BCG is still in process and not yet fiilly institutionalized because something is 
institutionalized "when it is unquestioned and taken-for-granted" (Hasselbladh 
and Kallinkos, 2000 cited in Sandhue, 2009:82). The thesis has explained that 
full institutionalisation may occur when other pillars of institutions are enacted. 
That is the normative framework of BCG becomes more effective, and banks seek 
legitimacy on the basis of appropriateness rather than pragmatism (Suchman, 
1995) thus compliance to BCG entails achieving moral legitimacy (ibid). 
Overtime, this would face changes that lead to BCG being completely 
unquestioned and taken-for-granted by banks In Egypt. Only then, compliance 
with BCG will be based on seeking legitimacy on different basis i.e. cognitive 
legitimacy (ibid). The thesis has indicated that this process needs to take place 
overtime and requires continuous efforts fi-om professional organizations such as 
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EBI and EIOD in addition to embedding the value of BCG in the banking 
environment to face the opposing cultures of corporate governance rejection and 
secrecy that are currently obstructing the institutionalisation process, this also 
requires reforming of public governance in Egypt. 
Secondly, the thesis has used NIST to explain the heterogeneity of banking 
organizations' strategic responses rather than explaining their homogeneity. 
Building on Oliver (1991), the thesis has indicated that banking organizations 
based on their corporate governance identities and the impact of obstacles'^° 
either chooses a compliance'^' strategy or an avoidance strategy by disguising 
non-compliance (ibid). Indeed, both responses would superficially indicate that 
banks are complying; the thesis has indicated that banks do so because they are 
seeking legitimacy. Moreover, the thesis has indicated that further pressures and 
upgrading of the scrutinizing routines would lead to better ability to discover 
banks disguising non-compliance. So this would lead to these banks either 
complying or turning to another strategic responses such as "defy" that involve 
open challenging or actively lobby with other similar cases to influence the 
environment to make it more suitable to their needs (Fiss,2008) ''organizations 
are not only granted legitimacy; sometimes they go out and get it" 
(Carruthers. 1995.-324). 
As such this thesis has contributed towards utilizing the NIST in explaining the 
institutionalisation process and also extends the NIST as providing useful 
''" See the action choice matrix, chapter six axial coding. 
' ' ' acquiesce 
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explanations of heterogeneity of organizations based on their internal 
characteristics. 
3- Corporate governance theorizing 
The literature review has clarified the criticism directed at traditional corporate 
governance theorizing based on the agency and stakeholder theories. This 
included the inability of corporate governance theorising based on the economic 
notions of efficiency and rationality to conceptualize corporate governance as a 
social process embedded in particular contextual non-economic factors that vary 
firom one context to another. Thus considering corporate governance as a static, 
detached from the environment, (Letza and Sun, 2002; Aguilera and Jackson, 
2008; Letza et al, 2004; Kirkbride et al, 2005; Mason et al, 2007; Ardalan, 2007; 
Letza et al, 2008). Considering corporate governance as unrelated to factors such 
as "power, legislation, social relationships and institutional contexts" (Ardalan, 
2007:511). As well as other factors such as ^'politics...legal systems...social 
conventions, cultures, models of thought" (Letza et al, 2004:258). It looks at 
corporate governance from a very narrow perspective that does not acknowledge 
corporate governance as complex social phenomenon; thus adopting a closed 
system perspective to organizational analysis (Aguilera and Jackson, 2008). It 
neglects the ever-changing nature of the organization that differs from the time 
when these perspectives were developed -(Zingalas, 2000). It does not 
acknowledge that the characteristics of the Anglo-American markets such as low 
degree of ownership concentration, limited bank holdings and timely information 
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are unrealizable in other economics such as Africa (Rwegarsia, 2000) making 
these models hardly transferable to these countries. 
This thesis has heeded the calls for alternative theoretical perspectives that 
account for factors shaping corporate governance practices and can offer a better 
explanation of corporate governance practices (Aguilera and Jackson,2003; Lee 
and Yoo, 2008; Boyer,2004; Judge,2009). Here the substantive theory of BCG 
developed in this thesis has shown: 
• The inability of the shareholding-stakeholding perspectives of corporate 
governance to explain the substantive theory, because the basic theoretical 
assumption that underpins these theories is the efficiency theory (Letza et 
al, 2008) and the economic notions of efficiency and rationality. Whereas 
the substantive theory posits that banks adopt BCG practices seeking 
legitimacy regardless of efficiency in agreement with Meyer and Rowan 
(1977) earlier argument. Indeed, this also agrees with corporate 
governance research underpinned by NIST (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2004; Enirone et al, 2006; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008; Khadaroo and 
Shaikh, 2007; Deo and Irvine, 2007; Yoshikawa et al, Siddiqui, 2010). 
Here, the corporate governance phenomenon is a social process, 
embedded and attached to the institutional context, affected by non-
economic factors namely: legal, regulatory, human, organizational and 
cultural factors. Corporate governance is dynamic and continuously 
evolving. Organizational responses cannot be similar due to internal 
characteristics of the organization that affect how their corporate 
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governance structures are affected by institutional pressures. It indicates 
that what really drives adoption and compliance of corporate governance 
is organizations seeking legitimacy not efficiency or rationality. 
The prevailing model of corporate governance within the EBS has neither 
been a shareholding model nor a stakeholder model, but rather a pluralistic 
model in between. It is a model that seeks serving shareholders and 
recognised stakeholders namely: depositors and the regulator. This agrees 
with BCG model as per BCBS (2005, 2010) and the EBI. Building on 
Tricker (1995) and the substantive theory a more precise definition of 
BCG is offered "as a process of power exercising in corporation that 
serves the interests of recognised stakeholders namely: shareholders, 
regulator and depositors". According to the substantive theory BCG is 
based on the respective powers of these stakeholders within a political 
process (Powell, 2008). Indeed, this provides an industry specific 
definition of corporate governance that is quite useful especially that 
defining corporate governance is a controversial issue as shown in the 
literature review. Finally, arriving to the corporate governance model 
prevailing in the EBS is important as it provides the empirical basis that 
supports the recent calls for a pluralistic approach to corporate governance 
(Letza and Sun, 2002; Letza et al, 2004;'Kirkbride et al, 2005; Letza et al, 
2008). 
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4- Triangulation of corporate governance, grounded theory and NIST 
Based on the three abovementioned contributions of this thesis namely: the 
use of grounded theory to explore the phenomenon of corporate governance in 
an unexplored context, extending of NIST to explore the phenomenon of 
corporate governance and advancing the knowledge related to corporate 
governance theorizing. This thesis is the first thesis attempting at combining 
the three domains of corporate governance, grovinded theory and NIST 
together. Indeed, this adds to the novelty of this thesis in addressing an 
important concept such as corporate governance that needs revisiting its 
theoretical underpiimings using the grounded theory methodology that '/orce 
the researcher to look beyond the superficial, to apply every possible 
interpretation before developing final concepts, and to demonstrate these 
concepts through explication and data supported evidence " (Goulding, 2004: 
297), then exploring the resulting substantive theory of BCG by utilizing 
NIST, thus providing a new approach to corporate governance understandmg. 
Through this approach corporate governance is context specific. This 
triangulation is a response to calls to seek meaningfiil evidence that can 
"inform and improve practice" (Smallman, 2007). 
5- Practical contributions 
This thesis provides some practical contributions to policy makers in the EBS; 
these can be summarized as follows: 
• The substantive theory has identified determinants of banks corporate 
governance identity (Management control, Employees competence and 
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organizational perception of corporate governance). This can be useful for 
policy makers and the CBE in particular by addressing these aspects within 
the next (third) stage of BCG reform. 
• More importantly the substantive theory identifies the obstacles that are 
currently obstructing the BCG reform namely: board of directors' 
ineffectiveness, short-termism and immaturity of Hawkamat Al-Sharikat 
Culture. These aspects are critical to be addressed by reform programmes as 
well. 
• As the thesis has discussed how the BCG reform process indicates the 
institutionalization of BCG, this can be of importance to reformers as they can 
expect how banking organizations can respond to institutional pressures. As 
such continuing the regulation based institutionalization process in-parallel 
with directing efforts of professional organizations such as the EBI and EIOD 
towards exerting normative pressures that would help in institutionalising 
BCG. At the same time, continuing the CBE efforts of building corporate 
governance culture within the banking sector. In addition, to call the 
government to reform public governance as a necessary prerequisite for 
corporate governance culture or Hawkamat Al-Sharikat Culture as the 
substantive theory has shown. 
9.4. Directions of Future Research 
The main objective of this thesis was to develop a substantive theory of BCG. 
However, it must be noted that substantive theory only interprets corporate 
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governance phenomenon within the context of the Egyptian banking and reflects the 
opinions of those included in the study. Although, the substantive theory of BCG 
was given more formality by further exploring the results of the substantive theory 
using the NIST theoretical framework, this does not automatically upgrade the theory 
into formal theory. This can only be achieved through studying BCG within many 
substantive areas. As such other researchers can study BCG in different banking 
sectors and expand and refine the grounded theory produced in this thesis. Moreover, 
they can also utilize the NIST as an alternative framework and examine how far it 
offers plausible explanations of BCG. 
The findings of this thesis can also open the way for other researchers to study the 
variables identified as shaping BCG in utilising quantitative research designs. 
Finally, the current events taking place in Egypt after the people's revolution on 
twenty fifth of January 2011 indicates that major changes in governance and the 
political system are likely to occur. These changes will gain more impetus given the 
current dramatic wake of fighting corruption in all sectors of the economy including 
the banking sector. Indeed, this will certainly change the banking scene in Egypt and 
its corporate governance practices. Hence, this thesis provides usefial directions for 
policy makers to tackle the obstacles that hinder BCG and as such in the fiiture other 
researchers can extend the substantive theory, provided in this thesis in terms of the 
changes introduced by the revolution. Moreover, fiiture research can address cultural 
changes in the EBS in relation to BCG post the twenty fifth January revolution. 
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UNIVERSITY APPROACH LETTER 
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To whom it may concern 
I have the pleasure to introduce Mr. Karim Sorour who is a PhD student 
at the University of Plymouth Business School in the UK. Mr. Sorour is 
researching on corporate governance issues in the Egyptian banking 
sector, for which he needs to have access to participants whether they are 
responsible employees, board directors of Egyptian banks or are 
affiliated to bodies that are related to the banking industry in Egypt. Mr. 
Sorour will ask the participants to fill in a structured questionnaire about 
corporate governance in the Egyptian banking sector as well as 
participate in semi- structured interviews. The interviewing process and 
the questionnaire will be conducted on Anonymous basis. Thus the 
collected data will be treated in the strictest confidence and no 
information gained will be identified with any particular person or 
banking organization. Moreover, all information acquired during these 
processes will be only available for the student and his supervisor and 
will not be available to any 3^'^ party. 
I will be very grateful if you provide Mr. Sorour with all possible 
assistance in the interviewing process and questionnaire filling. 
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BANK OF EGYPT 
At 14 may 2008 
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Banks Registered With 
The Central Bank of Egypt 
At 14 May 2008 
Is 
First: Public Sector Banks : 
1. Banque Misr 
2. Bahque Du Caire 
3. National Bank of Egypt 
4i Egyptian Arab Land Bank 
5. Industrial; Development 
Bank of Egypt 
6. The Priiicipal Bank for 
Development and 
Agriculturai Credit 
Address 
151, Mohamed Farid St, Cairo. 
6, Dr. Moustafa Abu Zahra St, 
Nasr city, Cairo. 
1187, Comioh El Nile St , Cairo. 
78:Gameat El Dewal El Arabia 
St., Mphandesseen, Oiza. 
110, EiOalaa St, Cairo. 
110, El Kasr El Einy St, Cairo. 
Second : PHvate and Joint Venture Banlcs : 
1. BaiikoifAiexaQdi-ia 
2. Coiiimercial International 
Bank (Egypt) S.A.E. 
3. BlomBaiik -Egypt 
4. BNP Paribas S.A.E. 
5. Suez Canal Bank 
6. Piraeus Bank - Egypt 
7. Ahli United Bank - Egypt 
8. Audi Baiik S.A.E. 
9. Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt 
lb, Egyptian Saudi Fihance 
Bank 
11. Al Watahy Bank of Egypt 
12. National Bank For 
Development 
13. Union National Bank -^  
Egypt "UNB-E" 
14. EgJTJtian Gtilf Bank 
15. HSBC Bank Egypt S.A.E. 
16; Egyptian Wbrkws Bank 
49, kaisr El Nile St, Cairo. 
Nile Tower 21/23, Charles Du 
Gaulle St, (ex Giza St.,), Giza. 
64i Mohy El Din Abu El Ezz, El 
Dpkki,Giza. 
3, Latine America St, Garden 
City, Cairo. 
7,9 Abdel kaider Hamza St., 
Garden City, Cairo. 
10, Talaat Harh iSt, Cairo. 
1191, Comich El Nile St, World 
Trade Centre, Cairo; 
104. El Nile St., El Dokki, Qiza. 
3 - 2 6 July St., Cairo. 
60 Mohie El-bin Abu El EzZ El 
Dpkki, Giza. 
13, El Semar St., Gameat El 
Dewal El Arabia, Mohandeseen 
Giza, 
5A, El Boursa El Oededa St, 
Cairo; 
57,Giza St., El Gameaa Tower, 
Giza. 
El Oriiian Plaza Biiildiiig, 8 
Ahmed Nessim St, Oiza. 
3, Abu El FedaSt, Abu El Feda 
Building, Zamailek, Cairo. 
10, Mohamed Helmy Ibrahim 
St, Maarouf, Cairo: 
Registration 
No. 
1 
3 
33 
9 
63 
75 
2 
54 
70 
74 
80 
84 
86 
85 
88 
92 
93 
95 
101 
114 
121 
124 
Date 
18/01/1958 
18/01/1958 
01701/1961 
18/01/1958 
27/05/1976 
11/08/1977 
18/01/1958 
13/08/1975 
24/03/1977 
14/07/1977 
09/03/1978 
29/06/1978 
03/10/1978 
29/08/1978 
i4/b6/1979 
08/05/1980 
26/05/1980 
24/07/1980 
15/10/1981 
28/01/1982 
15/07/1982 
23/06/1983 
0 
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17. The United Bank 
18. Misriraii Development Baiik. 
19; Barclays Bank Egypt S.A.E. 
20. Societe Arabe Internationale 
deBanque. 
21. Credit Agricole Egypt S.A.E 
22. Natipnale Societe Oenerale 
Bank 
23. Federal Arab Bank For 
Investment & Development 
24. Housing and Deyelbpiheht 
Bank 
25. Arab African International 
Bank 
26. Arab Banking Ccnporation -
Egypt S.A.E. 
27. Export Development Bank of 
Egypt 
Third : Branches of Foreign Banks; 
1. National Bank of Abu Dhabi 
2. CitiBankNA/Egypt 
3. Arab Bank PLC 
4. The Bank of Nova Scotia 
5. Mashreq Bank 
6. National Baiik of Greece 
7. National^  Bank of Oman 
S:A.O;G. 
106,ElKasrElEinySt.,(Cairo 128 25/06/2006 
Center T0wer),Cair6. 
Nile Tower, 21/23 Charles De 53 26/06/1975 
Gaulle St, (ex Giza st.,), Giza. 
12, El Sheikh Ypussef Square- 55 13/08/1975 
Garden City, Cairo. 
56, Gameat El DewalAl Arabia 69 9/09/1976 
St, Mohandesseen, Giza. 
2.4, 6 Hassan Sabry St, 72 12/05/1977 
Zamalek, Cairo. 
DarChampellionS, 81 13/04/1978 
Champellion St, Downtown, 
Cairo. 
8,AbdelKhalekSarwatSt., 83 29/06/1978 
(Cairo-Sky Building), Cairo. 
12, Syria St, Mohandeseen; 89 24/09/1979 
Giza. 
5,ElSarayElKubtaSt,Garden 116 10/06/1982 
City, Cairo. 
1 El Saleh Ayoub St, Zamalek, 122 25/11/1982 
Cairo. 
108,MohyEIDinAbuElEzz, 127 31/12/1984 
El Dokki, Giza. 
21, Charles De gauUe St, 
(ex Giza St,), Nile Tower, Giza. 
4, Ahamed Bacha St, Garden 
City, Cairo. 
50, Geziret El Arab St, 
Mohandeseen, Giza. 
3, Ahmed Nessim St., Giza. 
21, 23 Charles Degaulle St., 
(ex. Giza St,), Nile Tower 
Building, Giza. 
32, Haron St., IJpkki, Qiza. 
133/135 Abd El Aziz Fahmy St, 
Heliopolis, Cairo. 
52 
57 
65 
68 
73 
78 
94 
23/01/1975 
16/10/1975 
10/6/1976 
26/08/1976 
26/05/1977 
9/02/1978 
26/06/1980 
u s * 
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BANKS INCLUDED IN THIS STUDY 
332 
• No.;-
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
. . . ^ . . . . . _ . . ^ . , . . . _ . . . • • • • ^ ; . " . ^ g g j j | ^ . - • , • - . • . • / • ; ; • •••• .•:;• 
NATIONAL BANK OF EGYPT 
BANQUE MISR 
BANQUE DU CAIRE 
COMMERCL^L INTERNATIONAL BANK 
NATIONAL SOCIETE GENERALE 
ARAB AFRICAN INTERNATIONAL 
BANK OF ALEXANDRIA 
HSBC BANK 
FAISAL ISLAMIC BANK 
CREIDT AGRICOLE BANK 
BNP PARIBAS 
BARCLAYS BANK 
SUEZ CANAL BANK 
THE UNITED BANK 
AL-WATANY BANK OF EGYPT 
PIRAEUS BANK 
MISR IRAN DEVELOPMENT BANKS 
AUDI BANK 
BLOMBANK 
EGYPTIAN SAUID FINANCE BANKS 
AHLI UNITED BANK 
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INFORMATION ABOUT PARTICIPANTS OF 
THE SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS (A) 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
Research site 
Foreign Banks 
Private Domestic Banks 
Arab Banks 
State Banks 
International Auditing Firms 
Governmental Officials 
Central Bank Of Egypt 
Not included interviews 
Double interviewed 
Total 
Number of 
Participants 
3 
4 
2 
4 
1 
5 
2 
6 
2 
3 
2 
34 Interviewee^ '^  
5 
5 
Position 
Bank Directors 
Executives 
Bank Directors 
Executives 
Bank Directors 
Executives 
Bank Directors 
Executives 
Executive managers 
Directors 
High rank officials 
44 Interviews 
"^ In addition to 5 bad interviews with 5 interviewees who do not know what corporate governance 
is, and 5 interviews with the interviewees shown above who are interviewed twice. Making the total 
number of interviews 44 interviews. 
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RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SURVEY RESULTS 
AND SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS (A) 
QUESTIONS FORMULATION 
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Survey 
Significant 
Areas 
Ownership type 
shareholders and 
stakeholders 
interests 
Boards' role in 
corporate 
governance 
practices) 
Transparency and 
Disclosure 
Related Semi-Structured Interview questions 
• To what extent does the bank's ownership type affects 
its quality of corporate governance practices? 
• To what extent do laws and regulations effectively 
promote bank's corporate governance? 
• What are the mechanisms used by the CBE to enhance 
bank's corporate governance practices? 
• On what basis does banks' consider improving their 
corporate governance structures? 
• Whose interests do the bank's corporate governance 
mechanisms protect? 
• What role does the board have in the corporate 
governance of the bank? To what extent is this role 
effective?( 
• How the board ensures that board members understand 
their role in corporate governance? 
• What are the corporate governance mechanisms that 
banks utilize? 
• To what extent the bank insists on good corporate 
governance in the credit operations? What benchmark 
the bank uses in this respect? 
• What is the basis to determine the risk management 
policy of the bank? 
• To what extent does the accounting standards adopted 
enhance transparency? 
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INFORMATION ABOUT PARTICIPANTS OF 
THE SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS (B) 
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\ 
; 
\ 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Research site 
Foreign banks (3) 
Private domestic banks (3) 
Arab banks (2) 
State banks (3) 
Governmental officials (1) 
Central bank of Egypt (2) 
Total 
Number of 
Participants 
1 
2 
1 
2 
2 
3 
1 
2 
Position 
Bank Directors 
Executives 
Bank Directors 
Executives 
Executives 
Executives 
Directors 
High rank officials 
14 
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